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INTRODUCTION

The penchant of attorneys to cloak legal confusions in arcane historical raiment is particularly apparent in the area of punitive damages for breach of contract. The orthodox doctrine governing the
field has found so little favor in some jurisdictions that their courts
resort to many exceptions and subterfuges to mitigate the perceived
harshness to its rule. In these jurisdictions, the "general rule" is so
perforated with "exceptions" as to gainsay the legitimacy of the or-
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thodox doctrine and the honesty of its application. In other jurisdictions, however, the courts so rigidly cling to the orthodox doctrine
that they actually shield outrageously immoral conduct committed in
breaching a contract from the force of the law.
The issue of punitive damages for breach of contract cases not only
underscores the ever-present perplexity concerning the proper classification of actions that include both tort and contract elements, but
also the perplexity concerning the proper standards for the imposition
of punitive damages.t Standards already imprecise become even
more obscure when applied to cases that cannot be classified readily
as tort or contract. The issue also focuses attention on the important,
yet conflicting, policy objectives of economic efficiency, individual
freedom, and fairness, particularly the need to promote personal morality and punish and deter immoral conduct. The consequence of the
wide variety of conflicting holdings, underpinned by clashing policy
rationales, enunciating vague or overly rigid standards, is to spawn
unpredictability, instability, unfairness, and disrespect in this area of
the law.
This article strives to solve the legal and theoretical puzzlement
concerning the availability of punitive damages in breach of contract
cases. This paper is based principally on an examination of statutes,
case law, and commentary of the last decade. Although the paper is
national in scope, Texas and Florida law is highlighted where
appropriate.
II. TRADITIONAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN TORT AND
CONTRACT

A.

Goals

Although tort and contract law are derived from a common source,
the common law has recognized distinct differences between tort and
breach of contract actions. Historically, the law has assigned different
objectives to tort and contract actions. Tort law, although concerned
with compensation, is also concerned with the deterrence and punisht The discussion of punitive damage standards is timely since the U.S. Supreme Court
recently has agreed to review the Alabama Supreme Court's decision upholding a substantial
punitive award against an insurance company. The case, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989), raises the question of whether such awards, issued with few
limits on a jury, violate the 14th Amendment guarantee of "due process."
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ment of misconduct.I Fault and motive emerge as key determinants
of liability. Tort law, consequently, protects members of society from

wrongdoing by imposing standards of conduct. In tort law, a public
policy decision is made to brand certain misconduct a legally actiona2
ble "tort."
The primary practical purpose of the law of contracts, of course, is
compensation. 3 Contract law is not comprehended as evoking public
policy concerns per se. Contract law, nevertheless, does afford a de-

gree of security in economic relationships by assuring contracting parties that contract promises will be kept.4 Contract law serves society
by promoting standardized conduct in the performance of promises

and produces certain, uniform, stable, and efficient business transactions.' Moreover, contract law is said to encourage individual opportunity.6 The traditional goals of contract law, therefore, stress
economic principles, not social justice.
B.

Nature of Liability

Tort law, traditionally, has been a fault based system of liability.
The victim must prove that the actor intentionally or negligently committed the wrongful act. As a general rule, unless there is a duty to
act, the failure to act does not trigger tort liability.
In contract law, however, the failure to perform a contractual duty
does constitute, as a general rule, a breach of contract. Contract law
does not entail proof that the breach was intentionally or negligently

1. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25
(5th ed. 1984).
2. See id. § 1, at 21-23 (moral stigma attached to tort liability); see also id. § 92, at 656;
Diamond, The Tort ofBad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be Extended
Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425, 434-35 (1981); Louderback & Jurika,
Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 187, 20206 (1982); Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 163, 168-74 (1983).
3. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1077, at 437-39 (1964).
4. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 133-34 (Yale University Press, 1922); J. JACKSON, CONTRACT LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 4 (1973).
5. J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 4-5; see also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 67 (1921); M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 107 (1933).
6. A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-3 (1979); see
also H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTS 88, 91, 131 (1961); Kronman,
Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 472-75 (1980).
7. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 657.
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committed.' Consequently, contract law emerges as a type of strict as
opposed to fault based liability.
C. Interest Protected
Tort law protects the broader social interest by securing one's person, property, and relationships from unauthorized harm, violation,
or misappropriation. 9 In contrast, contract law "interest" encompasses the interests protected upon breach of contract and, also, refers
to the structuring of remedies available for breach." Specifically, judicial remedies for breach attempt to protect one or more of three
interests: expectation, reliance, and restitution. 1
D. Duties
Tort duties are defined and imposed by operation of the law and are
sufficiently general so as to apply to all members of society. 2 The
duties encompass all persons within a legally13 found range of harm
created by the tortfeasor's wrongful conduct.
Contract duties, on the other hand, are created by the will of the
contracting parties, not the state. They are decided, defined, and delineated in the contract by the parties themselves." 4 The duties may
be confined by contract to the contracting parties or extended to third
parties. 5 As a consequence of the parties' capability to limit or expand the scope and content of the duties, the parties theoretically can,
and have, adequately safeguarded their interests.
E. Remedies
The primary remedial objective in tort, of course, is to restore the
victim to the position held before the tort, usually by replacing or
8. Id. § 92 at 664; see also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12.1,
at 455 (2d ed. 1977).
9. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 657-8; see also Speidel, supra note 2, at 163.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 at 102 (1981).
11. Id.; see also Speidel, supra note 2, at 169-70 (existing interest of individual protected
by tort law; reallocation of interest through agreement protected by contract law).
12. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 656.

13. Id. § 53, at 356-59, § 92, at 655.
14. Id. § 92, at 656-58; see also Diamond, supra note 2, at 433-35; Louderback, & Jurika,
supra note 2, at 202-03; Speidel, supra note 2, at 168-74.
15. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 18.24, at 662.
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correcting the loss through compensation. 6 All damages proximately
caused may be recovered, 7 frequently including mental distress
damages.' 8

The primary remedial goal of contract is to protect the aggrieved
party's interests by giving the victim damages equivalent to the value
of the breaching party's promised performance. 19 The injured party is

thus put into the position that he would have occupied if the contract
had been completed as intended.2' If damages are inadequate to make
the victim "whole," specific performance emerges as an alternative

remedy. 2 ' As a general rule, however, courts have refused to award

damages for mental suffering for breach of contract, regardless of the

22
willfulness or flagrancy of the breach.

F.

Foreseeability

Traditionally, tort and contract differ in their application of the
foreseeability principle. In tort, the general issue is whether the

tortfeasor's misconduct was the "legal" (proximate) cause of the
harm, and the resolution thereof revolves about the nature of the conduct and the likelihood of the loss. 23 Foreseeability, of course, is the

predominate theory of proximate cause in tort.24 The precise issue,
however, is whether the occurrence of the general type of harm was
foreseeable, not whether any precise type of injury was foreseeable.25
Consequently, if any general type of injury was foreseeable, the de16. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 94, at 672-3.
17. Id. § 92, at 665.
18. Id. § 12, at 57; see also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES

§ 88, at 315 (1935).
19. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 992 at 5-7; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 137, at
560-1; D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.1, at 786-88 (1973). Interests
of the aggrieved party are: 1) the restitution interest which is the value of the benefit the victim
granted to the breaching party, 2) the reliance interest which is the monetary loss the victim
suffered while preparing to fulfill the contract duties or receive the contract performance, or 3)
the expectation interest which is the gain the victim would have received if the contract had
not been breached. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 992, at 5-7.
20. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 14.4, at 521.
21. Id. § 16.1, at 581.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353, at 149 (1981); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 145, at 592-93.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435A, at 454 (1965); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 43, at 272-4.
24. PROSSER & KEETON supra note 1, § 43, at 297.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435A, at 454 (1965); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 43, at 299.
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fendant would be required to pay for all injuries that proximately result from the tortious conduct, even though the defendant could not
foresee the specific type of harm when the misconduct occurred. 6
In contract, however, a defendant is only liable for harms foreseeable at the time the contract was formed. The issue is whether the
breaching party, at the time the contract was entered into, had reason
to foresee that the loss would result as a probable consequence of the
breach.28 The reason to restrict the application of foreseeability in
contract is that a contract promise already involves the assumption of
a known risk, that is, the liability for damages for non-performance,
and, therefore, the contracting party should only assume the risk foreseeable when the contract was made. 29 In practice, therefore, the contract foreseeability interpretation has resulted in a more limited
recovery for damages for breach of contract than from the commission of a tort. °
G. Applicability of Punitive Damages
1. Tort
Various justifications are advanced to support the traditional rule
awarding punitive damages for sufficiently aggravated tortious conduct. Primarily, punitive damages are intended to serve as a civil
punishment for a wrong done to the public as well as to the victim
and also to deter others from engaging in similar misconduct.3 I Based
26. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1019, at 114-15.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351, at 135 (1981); see also A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14, at 876 (1982).

28. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 12.14, at 876.
29. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301-02 (1923).
30. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431, at 429 (1965) (defining legal
cause of harm in tort) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 351 comment a, at 135

(1981) (even with qualification to recovery in contract, foreseeability requirement limits liability more severely than proximate cause requirement in tort action); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 comment a, at 144 (1981) (courts traditionally have de-

manded greater certainty in proof of damages for breach of contract than in tort action). But
see McDowell, Foreseeabilityin Contract and Tort: The problems of Responsibility and Remoteness, 36 CASE W. RES. 286, 289 (1985) (foreseeability in tort and contract function similarily). The significant differences are not in foreseeability but in obligations which on the one
hand are based on strict liability and, on the other, arise under traditional fault-based contract
and tort theories. Id.
31. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 438; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 2,
at 9. The underlying ideas from criminal law invade the field of torts when the wrongdoing
has the character of outrage associated with a criminal act. Id.
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on the punishment precepts of the criminal law, punitive damages are
directed at the most aggravated misconduct.32 Lacking evidence that
a defendant engaged in flagrant, malicious, reckless, willful or wanton
misconduct, a plaintiff will not be awarded punitive damages.33
Therefore, punitive damages stress the admonitory and educative
functions of a traditional fault-based tort system. The imposition of
such punishment by the courts voices society's condemnation of aggravated wrongdoings and confirms society's commitment to sustaining its moral and legal foundations.
Moreover, only those wrongs which contravene the duty owed to
the public in general, as opposed to the duty owed to a private party,
are regarded as suitable subjects to fulfill the purposes of punitive
damages.34 Torts logically fit into this category since the associated
duties are implied by law and are based primarily on public policy,
not the will or intentions of the parties. 3
In addition to the paramount punishment and deterrent purposes,
punitive damages also provide a motive for private individuals to enforce rules of law and enable them to recover the expenses of so doing.
The "private attorney general" function of punitive damages is based
on the premise that many wrongs warranting punishment are beyond
the grasp of.criminal law and the public prosecutor. As a result, punitive damages, by inducing injured private persons to identify and
bring wrongdoers to justice, help to remedy a deficiency in the criminal justice system.36
Punitive damages permit a plaintiff to recoup actual monetary
losses, which can be considerable and not otherwise recoverable as
compensatory damages,37 as well as intangible losses, when the actual
monetary loss is minimal, but where the plaintiff sustains a harm for
which the defendant should be punished.38 Punitive damages, finally,
serve as a type of private and public revenge carried out by the courts,
32. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 2, at 8-9.
33. Id. § 21, at 9-10.
34. Coleman, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract: A New Approach, 11 STETSON L.
REV. 250, 277-8 (1982); see also CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 438-39; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 655-56, 665.
35. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 656-57.
36. DOBBS, supra note 19, § 3.9, at 205; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 2,
at 12.
37. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 2, at 12.
38. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 77, at 276; see also Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 875-76 (1976).
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thus preserving the peace.39
The allowance of punitive damages in tort cases developed partly
from historical contingencies. Early common law juries were often
individually acquainted with the facts and parties of the case and originally possessed broad power to ascertain damages.' ° In tort actions,
where losses were often indefinite, reviewing courts were hesitant to
set aside the jury's determination on damages unless they could concretely measure the extent of the damages. Consequently, large tort
damages, including presumably punitive elements, were upheld, and
precedent was rapidly established permitting punitive damages in tort
actions.4"
2.

Contract

Various policy considerations are cited to support the general rule
proscribing punitive damages for breach of contract. According to
Oliver Wendell Holmes, "a contract is simply a set of alternative
'42
promises either to perform or pay damages for non-performance.
Presuming that when compensatory damages are substituted for performance, they equate to the damages caused, then compensatory
damages emerge as a sufficient remedy for an aggrieved party to a
breached contract,4 3 particularly since the purpose of the award is to
compensate the victim rather than punish the breacher." Compensatory damages are viewed, moreover, as adequate to deter breaches of
contract.45
As a logical corollary to the theoretical efficacy of compensatory
damages, a further justification offered by economists is the theory
that breaches of contract are, in fact, efficient and wealth-producing.
According to this "efficient breach" theory, an award of punitive
39. Long, supra note 38, at 877.
40. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and Illusion ofLegal
Change, 61 MINN. L. REV.207, 213-18 (1977); see also Strausberg, A Roadmap Through Malice, Actual or Implied: Punitive Damages in Torts Arising Out of Contract in Maryland, 13 U.
BALT. L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1984).
41. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 212-14.
42. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1923); see also Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune
Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985).
43. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 143 (2d ed. 1977); see also Lewis v.
Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 223, 223 (Fla. 1982).
44. See Lewis, 428 So. 2d at 223.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355, comment a, at 154 (1981); CORBIN,
supra note 3, § 1002, at 33-34.
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damages would entail victimizing the breaching party by compelling
the breacher to pay to the non-breaching party more than the amount
of its compensable damages. Moreover, if a contract party is concerned about the potentiality of punitive damage liability, that party
may be deterred from breaching. The result may be that a party
might not breach where it would be efficient to do so. Thus, by encouraging the performance of economically unsound contracts, economic resources are wasted or unwisely allocated, and many

beneficial economic interactions are discouraged, all of which results
in a net loss for society."
Another view holds that making punitive damages available for
breach of contract actions introduces doubt and confusion into business transactions. 47 This uncertainty factor also materializes in a
nearly opposite setting to militate against punitive damages for breach
of contract. Some commentators note that contract damage princi-

ples are sufficiently uncertain to encompass other implicit goals of

damage law, such as punishment and deterrence.4 8
The theory of contract damages entails compensation. That is, the
promisee should be placed only in as good a position as if the prom-

isor had performed. 49 Moreover, the failure to perform one's contrac-

tual promise is not thought to provoke the type of emotional
distress, 50 private resentment and revenge, and community outrage as

46. See Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985); see also R.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 4.8, at 88-90 (2d ed. 1977); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 27, § 12.3, at 817-18; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 reporter's

note, at 106 (1981). The "efficient breach" theory is discussed more fully infra in notes 66-77
and accompanying text.
47. Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 223, 223 (Fla. 1982); see also FARNSWORTH, supra
note 27, § 12.14, at 873. The problem of uncertainty in business transactions was raised in the
precedential case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), which according to Farnsworth reflected a judicial attempt to promote the developing British enterprise
system. Id.; see also Strausberg, supra note 40, at 279; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 227 (Cal. 1988) (consideration should be given to important role that predictability of cost plays in commercial system when considering extending tort remedies for breach
of contract); Taylor v. Kenco Chem. & Mfg. Corp., 465 So. 2d 581, 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Pogge v. Fullerton Lumber Co., 277 N.W.2d 916, 919-20 (Iowa 1979) (punitive damages would lead to uncertainty and confusion in commercial transactions).
48. See CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1002, at 33 (uncertainty in awarding damages for breach
of contract may serve to punish and deter as well as to compensate).
49. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 14.4, at 521; see also CORBIN, supra note 3,
§ 992, at 5, § 1002, at 31; S. WILLISTON, II WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1338, at 198 (3d ed.
and Supp. 1983).
50. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 145, at 592-93.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 2, Art. 3

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:357

do wrongs designated as torts. 5 As a result, in breach of contract
cases there is supposedly less need for severe sanctions to satisfy the
victim's feelings or to mollify society.
Since parties to a contract create contractual responsibilities by
freely entering into the contract, and since failure to perform these
self-imposed responsibilities is only a breach of a private duty, which
does not technically contravene social norms, the rationale justifying
an award of punitive damages is not found in the contract setting.52
The failure to keep one's promise in an economic relationship apparently does not entail sufficient social approbation to make a damage
award comprising punishment and deterrent elements readily
53
acceptable.
The law of contracts deals with essentially economic interactions.
The amount of damages required to compensate for the harm can be
more readily and precisely measured as opposed to tort law, which
must compensate for harm to one's person and personal interests and
which is much more difficult to ascertain. This is especially true of
intangible losses. Since contract damages are capable of objective assessment, judges are able to curtail a jury's discretion to award damages beyond the actual damages as determined from the agreement.
Contract law theoretically does not require a damage principle which
would permit a jury to stretch an award to cover non-pecuniary losses
in order to adequately compensate a victim, and, concomitantly, to
justify such awards when the courts were not inclined to set them
aside. 54
H. Conclusion
A potential underlying reason behind any judicial reluctancy to
utilize tort type damages in a breach of contract situations may be the
perceived traditional distinctions between tort and contract and a
51. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 438; see also Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777
F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985).
52. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1,§ 92, at 656-57.
53. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 300-01 (1923); see also CORBIN, supra note 3,
§ 1077, at 438.

54. Thyssen, 777 F.2d at 63; see also Ellis, Fairnessand Efficiency and the Law ofPunitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1982); Sullivan, supra note 40, at 221-22; Strausberg,

supra note 40, at 276 (tort/contract distinction, primarily arrived at for judical convenience in
measuring damages foreshadowed and predated more sophisticated policy arguments that
would later arise.)
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concomitant sensed necessity to maintain the separate and distinct
status of the two classical common law categories. To the degree that
such considerations do emerge as significant in the debate centering

on punitive damages for breach of contract, such reasoning must be
assessed cautiously in light of the increasingly interdependent and
complicated nature of society which, in turn, may engender encroachments in traditional legal categories.
III.
A.

CONTRACT DAMAGES - LAW AND THEORY

Basic Principles

Traditional contract law allows a contract party to choose to perform contractual obligations or to pay damages. 5 5 Compelling adherence to contracts is not a policy of contract law; rather, the
assumption that a contract party can breach the contract at will while
hazarding only contract damages is one of the keystones of contract
law. 56 The compensatory goal of contract law, therefore, is to place
the non-breaching party in as good a position as he would have been
had the breaching party performed. 5" The expectation measure of
damages, defined as the contemplated benefit of the bargain profit at
the time of contracting, limits recovery, even if reliance losses exceed
expectation.5"
Since contract law allows the parties the right to breach the contract and pay only contract damages, the traditional law of contract

55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 16, Introductory Note, at 100 (1981).

56. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9, at 88 (2d ed. 1977); see also
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 475, 462 (1897). According to 0. W.
Holmes, "the duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it, - and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a
compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum
unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode of
looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much
ethics into the law as they can." But see G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF A CONTRACT 94-95
(1974) (the law should encourage parties to keep their promises by imposing greater liability
on the breaching party).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344, at 102, § 344 comment a, at 103
(1981); see also WILLISTON, supra note 49, § 1338, at 198.
58. FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 12.16 at 890, § 12.1, at 812-13; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a), at 102 (1981). "Expectation interest" is defined as
the promisee's interest in the benefit of his bargain, i.e., the interest represented by placing the
promisee in as good a position as he would have been in if the contract had been performed.
Id. § 349, at 124.
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remedies does not consider the conduct accompanying the breach.59
Under this principle, questions regarding the inadvertence or willfulness of the breach, or the breaching party's state of mind, are deemed
irrelevant in awarding damages to the non-breaching party."
Under the famous and widely-accepted rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,6 ' contract damages are limited to losses that are foreseeable at
the time the contract is made.62 Hadley thus bars recovery for special
damages unless the breaching party knew the particular risks at the
time of contracting.63 The Hadley rule, moreover, generally precludes
compensation for emotional distress because such distress is not usually a foreseeable result of a breach of contract. 61 The nonbreaching
party, finally, must prove contract damages with reasonable
certainty.65
B.

The Efficient Breach Theory

From the expectation measure and Hadley restrictions arose the
theory of the "efficient breach." Ideally, a party to an unprofitable
contract can calculate the price of breaching. When the costs of performance, either in actual costs or the loss of foregone profits, exceed
59. Farnsworth, Legal Remediesfor Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1146

(1970). "Courts in this country ... expressly reject the notion that remedies for breach of
contract have punishment as a goal, and with rare exceptions, refuse to grant 'punitive damages' for breach of contract. In so refusing they purport not to distinguish between aggravated
and innocent breach." Id.
60. See id. (impartiality of traditional contract law to breach not absolute); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, introductory note, at 309-10 (party may be
excused from performance altogether in event of "impossibility," although such defense is
strictly construed); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 comment a, at 144 (willfulness a factor in determining proof of damages with "reasonable certainty").
61. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); see also CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1007 (citing
Hadley as rule generally followed)
62. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 147; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 14.5, at
524-25.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351, at 135 (1981); see also Farnsworth, supra note 59, at 1200-01.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 35, at 141 (1981); see also CORBIN, supra
note 3, § 1076. But see Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon
Contract: Toward Achieving the Objectives of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565,
1586 (1986). "[It is difficult to believe that some emotional distress would not frequently be
deemed a foreseeable consequence of many contract breaches. Would it be so unusual to expect emotional distress to arise from a botched home remodeling job, from a defective auto
that continually broke down... [or] from the unjustified termination of disability insurance
payments ...." Id.
65. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 14.8, at 528.
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the cost of placing the nonbreaching party in the same position it
would have been if performance occurred, the breaching party can
intentionally breach since it would be more profitable to breach than
to perform. Then, after compensating the nonbreaching party, the
breaching party has available the net gains of the transaction and is
free to pursue more profitable ventures.66
The "efficient breach" theory, therefore, holds that such economi67
cally efficient breaches are beneficial and should not be discouraged.
To abrogate the Hadley restrictions and to impose liability beyond the
expectation interest would extinguish the economic incentive to pursue more profitable ventures, thereby inhibiting breaches of inefficient
agreements - breaches which arguably should not be discouraged, but
urged. 68 Since it would be inefficient to penalize the breaching party
in a net gain situation, it is argued that the law should postulate incentives to invite efficient breaches.
In addition to permitting and encouraging contract parties to make
efficient breaches, the law, by implication, should also deter inefficient
breaches. An inefficient breach is a breach where the nonbreaching
party's losses exceed the benefits the breaching party acquires as a
result of the breach, thereby causing a net loss. 69
The efficient breach theory, with its strategy of encouraging and
discouraging certain types of breaches, is based on the premise that it
is economically preferable to have societal resources efficiently allocated to their most profitable uses. 70 Encouraging economically effi66. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 227 n.25 (1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, at 100-02 (1981) (noting that the traditional

presumption against compelling a breaching party to perform is consistent with the conclusions reached by "at least some economic analysis"); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 3.8, at 57-8 (1973); DOBBS, supra note 19, § 21.1, at 786; FARNSWORTH, supra note 27,
§ 12.3, at 817; Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency,
24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970); Diamond, supra note 2, at 435-38; Linzer, On the
Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 111, 114-15 (1981).
67. See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 31-34 (1983);
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 14W § 3.8, at 57-58 (1973); Barton, The Economic Basis
of Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 278-279 (1972); Birmingham, supra
note 66, at 284; Farnsworth, 70 COLUM. L. REV. at 1146-49; FARNSWORTH, supra note 27,
§ 12.3, at 817.
68. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9, at 89-90 (2d ed. 1977); Strausberg, supra note 40, at 292-93.
69. Diamond, supra note 2, at 438.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344, at 101-2 (1981); see also L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 126 (1965); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
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cient breaches promotes the reinvestment of the "net gains" from the
breach in other economic opportunities, resulting in increased production of goods and services at lower cost to society; discouraging
inefficient breaches emphasizes the economic and societal rationales
of ensuring that the breaching party's gains are not acquired at a
higher cost to the non-breaching party.
The principles of restricted liability, neutrality toward intentional
breach, and the efficient breach theory are the traditional premises
upon which contract damages are based. These principles are
grounded in economic theory; restrictions on liability invite commercial contracting, promote business, and thus support the development
of the market economy; 7 neutrality toward breach and the efficient
72
breach theory advance the efficient allocation of societal resources.
These traditional principles apply as well to claims for punitive
damages for breach of contract. Thus, it is argued that the availability of punitive damages for breach of contract would discourage a
contract party from breaching the contract to pursue more profitable
and economically efficient business opportunities.3
C. Problems with the Efficient Breach Theory
Although the efficient breach theory has materialized as a major
premise to the orthodox rule rejecting punitive damage recovery for
breach of contract, factors exist which reduce the force of the
theory.74
The efficient breach theory is founded upon a classical model, and
accordingly presupposes that: 1) a transaction is between parties of
§ 3.8, at 89-90 (2d ed. 1977); FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 12.3, at 816-817; Diamond,
supra note 2, at 437; Linzer, supra note 66, at 114.
71. L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 126 (1965); see also Farnsworth, supra
note 59, at 1207.
72. L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 126 (1965); see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.8, at 89-90 (2d ed. 1977).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS introductory note, ch. 16, at 100-1 (1981);
see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 12.3, at 817-18.
74. See generally the following commentators who raise problems with the efficient
breach theory: Diamond, supra note 2, at 440-43; Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency
of Compensatory Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1444-46, 1450-51
(1980); Linzer, supra note 66, at 112; Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing
Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARIz. L. REV. 733, 736-39 (1982); MacNeil, Efficient
Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 954 (1982); Speidel, supra note 2,
at 192-93.
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relatively equal bargaining power, and occurs in a functioning market;
2) the parties to the contract possess the same degree of aversion to
risk; 3) the aggrieved party detects the breach and sues for damages as
a consequence; 4) a dollar price exists for every type of damage; 5) the
victim of the breach recovers compensation in a relatively speedy and
costless litigation; 6) the orthodox measure of contract damages supplies a full and true redress for all the harm suffered by the victim;
and 7) the parties actually attain an efficient agreement either before
or after the breach.
The orthodox view thus does not take into account that contracts
generally are not predominantly negotiated documents, but rather
"take it or leave it" standard forms. The theory also does not take
into account the differences in the degree of risk aversion between the
parties to the contract. In an insurance contract, for example, the
insured is considerably more risk averse than the insurer. In an employment contract, the average employee risks the loss of livelihood
while the employer risks merely the temporary inconvenience of finding a substitute employee. In a contract for financial service, the depositor is much more risk averse than the institution. The harm
suffered by the victim of a breach in the preceding contracts, therefore, is potentially greater than the compensation provided by the
traditional contract damage analysis.
The injured party, of course, must institute suit to implement the
rights that the law of contract does confer. If the probability of detecting the breach is low, the measure of damages necessary to deter
such a breach is greater than the amount of damages actually suffered
by a victim. Presuming the breach is detected, one must further assume the victim is fully cognizant of the contract terms or has access
to competent legal advice. Assuming a lawsuit is instituted, the legal
process entails considerable costs and attorneys' fees. Such costs frequently make a full prosecution impracticable to the injured party because it is not sufficiently remunerative, and therefore, the aggrieved
party may either fail to institute suit or settle for considerably less
than the actual damages. Litigation costs, therefore, can dissuade and
hinder a victim from securing full vindication against the wrongdoer.
The injustice of the situation is particularly exacerbated when a relatively small loss is caused through intentional breach by a large and
powerful entity. Because the amount of money may be too small and
the time and energy involved too great to sue for redress, an economically sound and just measure of contract damages that will afford ade-
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quate punishment and deterrent demands the imposition of additional
contractual damages.
The theory of the efficient breach is thus built on the fundamental
foundation that the traditional measure of contract damages truly
does compensate the aggrieved party for all the harm suffered. However, to the extent that certain harms and costs are not recoverable
and result in a net loss to the victimized plaintiff and a net gain to the
breaching defendant, the efficient breach foundation cracks. The inherent, latent defect in the efficient breach theory, that is, the danger
that the loss to the victim will equal or exceed the gain to the
breacher, is acutely realized where the breacher captures an immediate gain under circumstances where the prospect of full compensation
is low.
The law of contract damages posits that the nonbreaching party be
placed in the same position which he would have been in had the
contract been performed. Such a rule requires that the nonbreaching
party's interest be truly fulfilled.75 The practical application of the
traditional maxim, however, may fail to accomplish this objective.
Certain reliance losses, for example, emotional distress and further
economic losses, are not ordinarily recoverable.
Orthodox contract damage law and theory, moreover, fail to take
into account the high transaction costs of a breach. For example, the
substantial litigation costs and expenses, lost interest and attorneys'
fees generally are not contained in the calculation of a party's expectancy damages. Attorneys' fees, in particular, are not typically included in the traditional compensation for breach of contract."
The concurrence of limited liability and high transaction costs can
result in a stinted recovery. Therefore, any under-compensation of
contract reduces the expectation that unfilled promises will be sufficiently compensated. The reduced expectation then engenders the
under-enforcement of contract rights.
Since breaching parties, moreover, do not expect to pay full damages, promises may be routinely broken even when it is inefficient to
do so. Clearly, a contract party who is not liable for full compensation is less constrained to refrain from a breach and, therefore, is not
deterred from breaching the contract in a manner that inefficiently
75. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.8, at 90 (2d ed. 1977) (even Judge
Posner admits that for breach to be efficient, expectancy damages must be awarded).
76. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 14-35, at 646.
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allocates societal resources."
A potential practical effect of the efficient breach theory, therefore,
may actually be inefficient breach. Under-enforcement and undercompensation cannot only undermine the position of contract damage
law of providing compensation and deterring inefficient breaches, but
also can render contract law unjust."8
Additionally, efficient breach theory can be severely criticized for
minimizing the social costs incurred by a neutral attitude towards the
breach.79 The efficient breach theory discounts the probability that
both the private interests of the victim and strong public interests will
be adversely affected by the breach. The relational aspects of contractual transactions should militate in favor of more, not less, legal protection, particularly for persons with lesser economic power who
contract in reliance on the skill, judgment, and probity of others. The
orthodox rule, which continually downplays or disregards the wrongfulness of the breaching party's conduct regardless of how outrageously immoral, offends one's sense of fairness and justice and
engenders disrespect for the law.
IV.

THE ORTHODOX DOCTRINE AND TRADITIONAL
EXCEPTIONS THERETO

A. Introduction
The orthodox common law doctrine holds that an action for breach
of contract will not support a recovery for punitive damages, regard77. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 433 (scrutiny of commercial practice shows that our
system sanctions bad faith breaches and, with limitations, actually encourages them); see also,
Sebert, supra note 64, at 1572-73. "If one accepts the economic theory, however, one must
recognize that achieving a Pareto-superior allocation of resources requires avoiding undercompensation as well as overcompensation .... By systematically undercompensating plaintiffs,
we risk encouraging too much breach rather than too little." Id.
78. See Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying
Ind. law) (some breaches are opportunistic because promisor wants benefit of bargain without
assuming agreed upon cost, and exploits inadequacies of purely compensatory remedies); see
also Diamond, supra note 2, at 442 (remedial scheme of contract law based on promisor's
acknowledgement of economic consequences of actually paying promisee's damages); Sebert,
supra note 64, at 1660 (clearly preferable to occasionally discourage an efficient breach by
threat of supracompensatory damage liability than to regularly encourage inefficient breach by
remedial system that consistently fails to fully compensate aggrieved party).
79. Linzer, supra note 66, at 112; see also Marschall, supra note 74, at 734; Speidel, supra
note 2, at 192-93.
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less how flagrant the breach. 0 The enunciation of this principle has
become so ritualized in the law that practically every case and commentary in which the issue of punitive damages for breach of contract
is raised commences its discussion by reciting this dogma.81
The doctrine excluding punitive damage awards from breach of
contract, however, has been subject to exceptions since its inception.
Although the courts customarily pay homage to the doctrine, they
have long been inclined, whenever possible, to qualify its general rule
by creating exceptions.
Consequently, punitive damages traditionally have been awarded in
contract cases that have a markedly tortious nature, such as those
pertaining to breach of contract to marry, breach of contract by a
public utility, breach of contract by fiduciary, breach of contract involving fraudulent-type conduct, and breach of contract involving a
concomitant independent tort (the latter significant exception will be
discussed in Part V).
B. Breach of a Contract to Marry
One of the earliest and most frequently adhered to exceptions entails a breach of a contract to marry.8 2 A breach alone, however, is
insufficient to support a punitive damage recovery. Rather, as the
courts commonly find, the breach must be accompanied by conduct
80. See, e.g., G.M. Brod & Co., Inc. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526, 1536 (11th Cir.
1985) (applying Florida law) (even flagrant breach of contract will not support punitive damages); Splitt v. Deltona Corp., 662 F.2d 1142, 1145-47 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Florida law)
(even though contract flagrantly breached with an evil mind); Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So. 2d
223, 223 (Fla. 1982); Rosen v. Marlin, 486 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Berryhill
v. Hatt, 428 N.W.2d 647, 656 (Iowa 1988) ("belligerent" anticipatory breach does not give rise
to punitive damages); Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. 1984) (punitive damages
refused even if agreement breached maliciously); Texas Power & Light Co. v. Barnhill, 639
S.W.2d 331, 333-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ) (even breach committed capriciously and with malice); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355, at 154 (1981);
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 14-3, at 520; CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 438-39;
K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4.3, at 109-10; WILLISTON, supra note 49, § 1340, at 21011; see also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1989) (precluding awards of punitive
damages for actions arising out of contract).
81. See e.g., Lewis, 428 So. 2d at 223; Texas Power & Light Co., 639 S.W.2d at 333,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 comment a, at 154-55 (1981); Sullivan, supra
note 40, at 207.
82. See, e.g., Sandier v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Co., 358 A.2d 805, 812 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (list of "traditional" exceptions to general rule), cert. denied, 366
A.2d 658 (N.J. 1976); Stanback v. Stanback, 254 S.E.2d 611, 621 (N.C. 1979); Redden, supra
note 80, § 2.5, at 41.
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that is fraudulent, malicious, ruthless, cruel, or motivated by evil
83
motives.
The courts defend the recovery of punitive damages by declaring

that, although the misbehavior does not comprise an independent
tort, the wrong closely resembles the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress." The unique nature of the interest to be pro-

tected, the particularly personal as opposed to pecuniary harm suffered by the victim, for example, social disgrace, humiliation,
embarrassment,"5 and the difficulty of precisely fixing damages due to
the intangible nature of the harm, 6 are cited as justifications for punitive awards. Additionally, the need to punish the wrongdoer,8 7 and
the public's interest in deterring similar wrongs and in expressing the
community's disapproval, 8 are cited as reasons for the award.
A leading criticism of this exception is that, since the breach closely
resembles a tort wrong and is comparable to intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the law should not permit an essentially tort action
to impersonate a contract action.8 9

C.

Breach of Contractby a Fiduciary

Punitive damages are appropriate where a breach of contract comprises a breach of a fiduciary duty. 90 Even though the relationship
83. See, e.g., Smith v. Hawkins, 243 P. 1018, 1019 (Kan. 1926); Sneve v. Lunder, 110
N.W. 99, 100 (Minn. 1907).
84. See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 442; DOBBS, supra note 19, § 12.4, at 81920; REDDEN, supra note 80, § 2.5, at 41, § 4.3, at 110; cf Brown v. Douglas, 122 S.E.2d 747,
748 (Ga. App. 1961).
85. DOBBS, supra note 19, § 12.4, at 819-21.
86. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 222-23.
87. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 441-42.
88. Id. § 1077, at 440-43, § 1076, at 430-32; Coleman, supra note 34, at 272-73; Sullivan,
supra note 40, at 223.
89. Standard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 96 (Wash. 1977); see also Coleman, supra note 34, at
273; cf CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 442.
90. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying New
Mexico law) (failure of a realtor to disclose important information to fiduciary, if willful or
wanton, can be basis for punitive damage award); Wagman v. Lee, 457 A.2d 401, 404 (D.C.
App. 1983) (escrow-depositor relationship); Pelletier v. Schultz, 276 S.E.2d 118, 120 (Ga. App.
1981) (corporation's directors and managers breached fiduciary duty to major shareholder);
Capitol Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Hohman, 682 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Kan. 1984) (defendant
vendor's breach of fiduciary duty to purchasers constituted independent tort that supported
award of punitive damages); Purcell v. Automatic Gas Distrib., 673 P.2d 1246, 1250-51
(Mont. 1983); Bumgarner v. Tomblin 306 S.E.2d 178, 183 (N.C. App. 1983) (fiduciary relationship between legal and equitable title holders of land who agreed to same for resale);
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may arise from the contract, recovery is grounded upon breach of the
implied-in-law duty created by the relationship rather than from
breach of the contract itself.9 Accordingly, the focal point of this
exception is to determine whether or not the contract creates an independent fiduciary relationship between the parties.
Courts, of course, possess a great deal of flexibility in determining
whether a fiduciary relationship exists. Some courts, for example,
hold that merely entering into a contract frequently makes one party
92
so dependent on the other that a fiduciary relationship arises.
This very flexibility, however, underscores the vagueness and subjectiveness of the term.93 Stating that a relationship is "fiduciary"
says nothing about those functional characteristics that lead the
courts to impose punitive damages. As a result, the determination of
whether a fiduciary relationship exists emerges as a difficult and unpredictable undertaking, and is ripe for contradictory consequences.
The use of the conclusionary expression, "fiduciary," therefore, adds
little to the analysis.
D. Breach of a Public Service Contract
Another time-honored and frequently adhered to exception to the
general rule permits punitive damages for breach of a contract by a
Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 184-85 (Tex. 1984) (mineral cotenants relationship);
Douglas v. Aztec Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1985, no
writ) (principal-agent relationship); Mulder v. Mittelstadt, 352 N.W.2d 223, 230 (Wisc. App.
1984); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 45, at 69 (1965); J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
BAD FAITH CASES § 2.10, at 110-11 (2d ed. 1978); Coleman, supra note 34, at 269-72; Ford,
Unconventional Theories of Lender Liability in Florida, FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 1989, at 45 (case
law suggests breach of fiduciary duty theory may play important role in evolution of lender
liability law).
91. Vale v. Union Bank, 151 Cal. Rptr. 784, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 90, § 2.10, at 110-11; Sullivan, supra note 40, at 226-27; Wagman, 457 A.2d at
404; Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Interfirst Bank Dallas v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 907 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ)
(trustee-beneficial owners relationship) ("intentional breach of a fiduciary duty is a tort");
Wilson v. Donze, 692 S.W.2d 734, 739-40 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1985, no writ) ("tortious
nature" of secret profits of real estate broker).
92. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 227, 229; cf Fletcher, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
93. See DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.
REV. 879, 892-901 (comparison of fiduciary obligation with good faith). According to DeMott, "(b)oth are.., protean in their operation, resisting attempts to capture their meanings
in general definitions." Id. at 892; see also Sullivan, supra note 40, at 229 n. 119 (criticizing
vague nature of fiduciary terminology).
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public service entity. 94 This exception originated in the early English
common law concerning "common callings. ' 'g9 These common callings were enterprises or persons that held themselves out as offering
particular services or products to the public, such as the innkeeper,
the seller of food, the blacksmith, and the common carrier. 96 Due to
the public nature of their calling, the common law imposed concomitant duties to serve equally all customers on a reasonable basis and to
perform the service and provide the product one could expect from
their economic status.97 A rationale for the imposition of these special duties was the monopolistic position enjoyed by these common
callings and the consequent potential for oppression and abuse of the
public.9"

The doctrine of common callings evolved into a modern exception
that permits punitive damages in breach of contracts by enterprises
affected by a public interest or in cases involving a special relationship
between the provider of goods and services and the public.9 9 Accordingly, courts impose punitive damages on telegraph and telephone
companies, common carriers, innkeepers, water companies, gas and

electric companies, and other entities which enjoy a monopoly or
quasi-monopoly position in the community, when they fail to discharge their contractual responsibilities to their customers."
Wrongdoing in the public service cases, of course, involves both

contract and tort elements. As in marriage cases, the association may
be deemed personal in that the public service entities supply necessary

services to individuals. 0 1 Because such wrongdoing contravenes the
94. See CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 444; see also REDDEN supra note 80, § 4.4(A), at
110-111; WILLISTON, supra note 49, § 1340, at 213; Burdick, The Origin of the PeculiarDuties
of Public Service Companies, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 518 (1911).
95. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 662; see also Burdick, supra note 94, at
515; Sullivan, supra note 40, at 223-24; Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public
Service Enterprise in the New IndustrialState, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1967).
96. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 95, at 1249-50; see also Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726
P.2d 565, 575 (Ariz. 1986).
97. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 95, at 1249-50; see also Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 575.
98. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 224.
99. Id. at 224-25; see also Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 92, at 1249-50.
100. See, e.g., Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. v. Kormendi, 344 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977); Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., 136 S.E. 218, 221 (S.C. 1927); Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana, 1931), aff'd,
70 S.W.2d 413 (1934).
101. See, e.g., Birmingham Water Works Co. v. Keiley, 56 So. 838, 841 (Ala. App. 1911);
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public interest,10 2 punitive damages are appropriate to punish and
deter.
The exception is further justified by the rationale that, since a public service entity is conferred a special status by the public, it owes a
"legal" duty to serve all applicants and to perform in a suitable manner.1 03 The breach of this duty, of which the contract is merely an
incident, is really comparable to the breach of a tort duty, which will
support a punitive damage award. 10
Moreover, the courts cognizant of the disparity of bargaining
power and economic power resulting from the political and economic
dominance of major enterprises, have employed punitive damages as a
means to protect the public from exploitation and abuse inherent in a
monopoly position.10°
Also, courts are aware that when a public service company capitalizes on its customer's vulnerable status by curtailing necessary services, more than the mere loss of a commercial bargain occurs. As a
result, more than the standard contract damages are justified in order
to punish exploitation and the abuse of economic power.'°6
Courts, however, disagree as to the standard of conduct the victim
must show in order to receive punitive damages. Particularly, the
courts lack agreement as to whether the misconduct must be negligently performing services or merely providing negligent services. 7
The public service cases, although at first glance appearing as a stanCumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hobart, 42 So. 349, 351 (Miss. 1906); Sullivan, supra note 40, at
226.
102. CumberlandTel & Tel Co., 42 So. at 351; see also CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at
444; Sullivan, supra note 40, at 224-25.
103. See, eg., Woodbury v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 49 So. 556, 562 (Fla. 1909); Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. v. Kormendi, 344 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. Civ. App. -Texarkana, 1931),
aff'd, 70 S.W.2d 413 (1934); CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 443; Coleman, supra note 34, at
274; Sullivan, supra note 40, at 224.
104. See, e.g., Woodbury, 49 So. at 562; Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co., 45 S.W.2d at 674;
CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 443; WILLISTON, supra note 49, § 1340, at 213; Coleman,
supra note 34, at 274; Sullivan, supra note 40, at 224; cf Commodore CruiseLine, Ltd., 344 So.
2d at 897-98.
105. See, e.g., Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hobart, 42 So. 349, 351 (Miss. 1906);
DOBBS, supra note 19, § 3.9, at 217; McCORMICK, supra note 18, § 81, at 288-289; Sullivan,
supra note 40, at 224, 226.
106. Birmingham Water Works Co. v. Keiley, 56 So. 838, 841 (Ala. App. 1911).
107. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 81, at 288-289; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra

note 1, § 92, at 658-63.
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dard and traditional exception to the general rule, reveal theories that
have been utilized by modem courts to carve out far-reaching exceptions to the general rule.
V. THE INDEPENDENT TORT EXCEPTION
A.

Statement and Nature of the Exception

Punitive damages are imposed for a breach of contract when the
breach constitutes or amounts to a separate and distinct independent
tort, the commission of which is sufficiently aggravated. 0 8 Punitive
damages technically are not recoverable for the actual breach of contract, but rather are predicated on a tort duty separate from the contract. I 9 This exception, therefore, is not a real exception to the
general rule, 10 even though it is termed an exception by courts and
commentators that employ it."'
If a distinct and independent tort is lacking, punitive damages will
generally not be awarded solely on the breach itself" 2 regardless of
the flagrant nature of the breach."' Pleading and proving the sepa108. See, e.g., Griffith v. Shamrock Village, 94 So. 2d 854, 858 (Fla. 1957) (acts constituting breach of contract also amount to cause of action in tort and breach must be attended by
some intentional wrong, insult, abuse, or gross negligence); Boyd v. Oriole Homes Corp., 515
So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (breach of contract and fraud), rev. dism'd 525 So.
2d 876 (Fla. 1980); Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 740 ("[A] tort may grow out of, be made a part of or
be coincidental with a breach of contract thereby permitting the recovery of exemplary damage
if committed willfully and maliciously."); Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d
316, 324 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ) (breach of contract and gross negligence);
CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 439.
109. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986) (act of party
may breach either tort or contract duties alone or may breach both at same time); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 656, 665.
110. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hanft, 436 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1983) "Once an
independent tort is established in a breach of contract suit, the question of whether punitive
damages are proper is decided under principles traditionally applicable to such questions in
tort cases ...." Id.
111. Nicholas v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co., 339 So. 2d 175, 178 (Fla. 1976); see also
Sebert, supra note 64, at 1600-01.
112. See, e.g., Grossman Holding Ltd. v. Hourihan, 414 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 1982);
Club Eden Roc, Inc. v. Fortune Cookie Restaurant, 490 So. 2d 210, 211-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); Mobile Chem. Co. v. Hawkins, 440 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Texas Power & Light Co. v. Barnhill, 639 S.W.2d 331, 333-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1982, no writ) (termination of employment contract "arbitrary, capricious, and unwarranted"
and done with "malicious intent").
113. See, e.g., Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hanft, 436 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1983)
(omission of doctor from Yellow Pages twice despite numerous communications merely breach
of contract); Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 223, 223-24 (Fla. 1982). "Even where landlord
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rate tort is the key element to recovery herein.

B.

Unavailability of Punitive Damagesfor Independent Tort

Even assuming an independent tort is present in a contract setting,
punitive damages may still not be recoverable due to the absence of
sufficiently egregious conduct, 1 4 the lack of actual'"' or nominal
17
damages," 16 or the running of the tort statute of limitations."
C.

Problems with Certain Independent Torts
1. Fraud
a.

Introduction

The common law tort of fraud committed by a contract party may
serve as a foundation for punitive damage liability. The foundation,

however, is a particularly shaky one as the efficacy of the tort of fraud
is weakened by the presence of several technical requirements.
flagrantly, unjustifiably, and oppressively breached contract, and attempted to conceal breach
by criminal act of making false statements to government, tenants had to plead and prove that
landlord committed an independent tort against them in order to recover punitive damages."
Id.; Texas Power & Light Co., 639 S.W.2d at 333-34 (no punitve damages award even if breach
committed "capriciously and with malice").
114. See, e.g., Floyd v. Video Barn, Inc., 538 So. 2d 1322, 1324-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (breach of contract and gross negligence, arising out of defendant's failure to videotape
plaintiff's daughter's wedding, not enough for award of punitive damages absence reckless
indifference); Porter v. Wilson, Walch, Fortner, Robinson & Besse, 384 So. 2d 190, 191-92
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (breach of and tortious interference with contract but lacked malice
for punitive damages due to reliance on advice of attorney), petitionfor review denied, 392 So.
2d 1378 (Fla. 1980); Cadillac Vending Machine Co. v. Haynes, 402 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Mich.
App. 1986) (actions causing intentional interference with contractual relations but malicious,
willful, wanton, or reckless conduct absent); Enright v. Lubow, 493 A.2d 1288, 1295-96 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1985) (negligence in preparing survey resulting in mislocated easement but conduct
found neither wanton nor reckless).
115. See, e.g., City Prods. Corp. v. Berman, 610 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. 1980); National
Mortgage Corp. of Am. v. Stephens, 723 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex. App.-El Paso), rev. in parton
other grounds, 735 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1987); Menchio v. Rymer, 348 S.E.2d 76, 78-79 (Ga.
App. 1986); Gulftide Gas Corp. v. Cox, 699 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Tex. App.-Houston 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
116. See Norman's Heritage Real Estate Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 727 F.2d 911, 916
(10th Cir. 1984) (applying Oklahoma law). But see Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla.
1989) (nominal damages presumed when established right is violated).
117. See, Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 105-06, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 883, 891-92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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The Specificity Requirement

An axiom of the common law is that the circumstances constituting
a cause of action for fraud must be pled in the complaint with certainty, specificity, and particularity."' The allegations, of course,
must satisfy all the elements of an independent tort of fraud." 9
c.

Breach of a Promise of Future Act

Since the elements of common law fraud must be pled specifically
and with certainty, a cause of action for fraud cannot be predicated

solely on the failure to perform a contractual promise in the future.120
However, there is an exception to the preceding rule that holds that if
the misrepresenting defendant had no specific intention to perform
the contractual promise at the time the promise was made, a cause of
action for fraud will lie.' 2 ' The difficulty in obtaining proof is obvious. The burden of demonstrating that the defendant's representations of performance were purposefully false when the contract was
entered into is so onerous as to render this exception almost academic. 122 The exception is further weakened if the evidence indicates
that the representations of future performance were made with a pur118. See, e.g., American Int'l Land Corp. v. Hanna, 323 So. 2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1975);

Rosen v. Marlin, 486 So. 2d 623, 626, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Jewelcor Jewelers and Distrib., Inc. v. Southern Ornamentals, Inc., 499 So. 2d 850, 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review
denied, 509 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1987). But see Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Murray Inv. Co., 646 F.2d
224, 229 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
119. See, American Int'l Land Corp. v. Hanna, 323 So. 2d 567, 569-70 (Fla. 1975); see
also Charter Air Center, Inc. v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 614, 616 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1977).
120. See, e.g., John Brown Automation, Inc. v. Nobles, 537 So. 2d 614, 618 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1988); Lake Placid Holding Co. v. Paparone, 508 So. 2d 372, 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987), review denied, 515 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1987); Lone Star Steel Co. v. Scott, 759 S.W.2d 145,
155-56 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied) (no evidence that at time promise made
promisor intended not to perform).
121. New Process Steel Corp., Inc. v. Steel Corp. of Tex., Inc., 703 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Tex.
App.-Houston 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) Qack of present intent to perform inferred from party's
denial of making agreement and party's failure to perform); see also John Brown Automation,
Inc. v. Nobles, 537 So. 2d 614, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lake Placid Holding Co. v.
Paparone, 508 So. 2d 372, 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Sebert, supra note 64, at 1607
(theory and cause of action for promissory fraud supported both by many authorities and case
law from wide range of jurisdictions).
122. See Lake Placid Holding Co., 508 So. 2d at 377 (underscoring lack of evidence that
defendant had formed intention to deprive plaintiff of commission at moment commission
agreement executed); see also Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Samuel, 701 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ) (no evidence to show lack of intent to complete home when
contract made). But see Chase Chem. Corp. v. Datapoint Corp., 774 S.W.2d 359, 367 (rex.
App.-Dallas 1989, reh'g denied). Fraudulent intent found if it is determined that: (1) there
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pose to partially perform some part of the promise. If this is the case,
the cause of action for fraud will not lie. 123
d.

Fraud Independent of Breach

If the victim alleges that the misrepresenting defendant fraudulently breached the contract, the full scope of tort damages for fraud
may be available. The burden of proof here is, of course, less difficult

to overcome than in a fraudulent inducement case.
While the proof may be easier, however, the fraudulent breach avenue is blocked by another obstacle, the requirement that the tortious,
fraudulent conduct occur independently of the conduct which constitutes the breach of contract. 124 If the conduct is not independent, but

rather part of the breach itself, 25 or an essential ingredient, 26 or illustrates how the contract was breached, 27 the tort of fraud as the punitive damage vehicle will not lie no matter how malicious and
oppressive the breach. 128
e.

Fraud Plus

If the independent tort of fraud is artfully pled and proved in a
was a promise, (2) the promisor denies making the promise and (3) the promisor fails to per-

form. Id.
123. See Canada Dry Corp. v. Nehi Beverage Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 512, 525 (7th Cir. 1983)
(applying Ind. law) (no clear basis for awarding punitive damages even if party did not intend
wholeheartedly to fulfill contract).
124. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kenco Chem. & Mfg. Corp., 465 So. 2d 581, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); C & C Partners v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 783 S.W.2d 707, 719 (rex.
App.-Dallas 1989, no writ) (no cause of action where some proof of fraud but no evidence of
injury proximately resulting from alleged fraud apart from damages suffered as result of
breach of contract). But see Sebert, supra note 64, at 1602. "Somewhat more interesting,
because they represent examples of punitive damages assessed for conduct that is clearly
breach of contract rather than misbehavior in the bargaining process, are those cases in which
punitive damages are awarded for misrepresentation made during course of contract performance." Id.
125. Cf Lake Placid Holding Co., 508 So. 2d at 377 (fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
"arose out of same conduct which constituted breach of contract"); C & C Partners, 783
S.W.2d at 719-20; John Brown Automation Inc. v. Nobles, 537 So. 2d 614, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (negligent representation associated with performance of contract).
126. Cf Lake PlacidHolding Co., 508 So. 2d at 377; C & C Partners,783 S.W.2d at 71920; John Brown Automation, Inc., 537 So. 2d at 618.
127. See Marcoin, Inc. v. McDaniel, 320 S.E.2d 892, 899 (N.C. App. 1984).
128. See Lake Placid Holding Co. v. Paprone, 508 So. 2d 372, 376-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (regardless of "degree of enmity"). But see Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Murray Inv. Co., 646
F.2d 224, 229 (5th Cir. 1981). "(Flacts which, if proven, would constitute common law fraud
... were incorporated by reference within [breach of contract] claim for relief." Id.
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breach of contract setting, the courts may still impose additional prerequisites for a punitive damage recovery. Some courts, for example,
require "actual malice," that is, an evil motive influenced by hate, for
29
punitive damage recovery in a fraud case arising out of contract.
This malice dichotomy has been severely criticized by one judge:
Why should one who lies or cheats in connection with the performance
of a contract escape liability because he is motivated by greed instead of
hate for the other contracting party? Even in a laissez-faire free market
system, commercial cheating should not be condoned. It seems to me
that there is as much societal benefit in punishing and deterring cheating that arises out of a contract as there is in a pure tort fraud case. I
perceive no societal advantage in encouraging such conduct by applying
a greater obstacle to punitive damages in a contract-related fraud case
than in a pure fraud case. 3 '
Other courts hold that fraud "necessarily" encompasses sufficient
3
malice for a punitive damage recovery, even in a contract setting.' 1
Some courts impose a requirement that the fraudulent representations
must be directed at the "public" in order for a party to recover punitive damages for fraud. 132 In these cases, a court must find public
fraud in a private transaction, and since contract cases usually involve
private wrongs, punitive damages are not usually available for
fraud. 133
129. See, e.g., New Summit Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Nistle, 533 A.2d 1350, 1357 (Md.
App. 1987); Miller Bldg. Supply v. Rosen, 485 A.2d 1023, 1027-28 (Md. App. 1985).
130. Miller Bldg. Supply, 485 A.2d at 1031 (Adkins, J. concurring).
131. See, e.g., Mark Keshishian, & Sons, Inc. v. Washington Square, 414 A.2d 834, 842
(D.C. 1980); Sebert, supra note 64, at 1603 (bulk of more recent decisions reject additional
malice requirements). "For example, [the courts have held] that the mere showing of an intentional and material misrepresentation is sufficient to justify punitive damages. The latter decisions seem clearly preferable since there is no economic or other justification for
misrepresentation." Id.
132. See, e.g., Hauser v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 530 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1988) (plaintiff's claim that defendant's misconduct interfered with public's right to buy
and read his book was not "totally devoid of merit"); J.G.S., Inc. v. Lifetime Cutlery Corp.,
448 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Hoffman v. Ryan, 422 N.Y.S.2d 288, 291-92
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (punitive damages recoverable for consumer fraud by apartment referral
agency).
133. See, e.g., O'Dell v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Assn., 535 N.Y.S.2d 777,
778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (lengthy investigation of fire insurance claim not shown to have
affected a public right); J.G.S, Inc., 448 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
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Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The difficulty with employing the tort of infliction of emotional distress as a vehicle to the recovery of punitive damages in breach of
contract setting is apparent when one encounters the obstacles to obtaining mental anguish damages for breach of contract. When recovery is sought for mental distress suffered as the result of a breach of
contract, the courts routinely deny recovery. 134 It is generally ac-

knowledged that pecuniary loss inflicted on a person by breach of
contract may often cause that person to suffer disappointment and
mental distress. 135 Yet, courts regularly cite the policy rationale that
such damages are too remote to have been in the contemplation of the

parties to the contract. 136 Courts, moreover, deny recovery on the

ground of limiting contractual risk with or without the formal appli137
cation of the Hadley v. Baxendale test.
Traditional exceptions to the general rule have been continued in

cases involving a breach of contract by a telegraph company, 13 8 innkeeper, 139 or common carrier, "4and a breach of contract to marry, 4 1
a "modern" exception for the breach of a contract which is personal

as opposed to pecuniary in nature.'42
Additionally, recovery is allowed for mental anguish damages when
the breach of contract is accompanied by the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 143 The tort is extensively
134. See, e.g., Floyd v. Video Barn, Inc., 538 So. 2d 1322, 1324-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (parents brought breach of contract action when photographer who agreed to photograph daughter's wedding appeared at wrong church and mistakenly videotaped different wedding); Crenshaw v. Sarasota County Public Hosp. Bd., 466 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); DOBBS, supra note 19, § 12.4, at 819; MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 145, at 592.
135. See MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 145, at 592-93.
136. See, e.g., Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 73 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Neb. 1955).
137. See Seidenbach's Inc. v. Williams, 361 P.2d 185, 187 (Okla. 1961); Hall v. Encyclopedia Britannica, 37 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Mich. 1949).
138. See Betts v. Western Union Tel. Co., 83 S.E. 164, 165 (N.C. 1914).
139. See Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d 368, 372-73 (Haw. 1972).
140. See Southeastern Greyhound Corp. v. Graham, 26 S.E.2d 371, 373 (Ga. Ct. App.
1943).
141. See Allen v. Baker, 86 N.C. 105, 108 (1882).
142. See, e.g., Carroll v. Roundtree, 237 S.E.2d 566, 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd on
reh'g, 243 S.E.2d 821 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978); Stewart v. Rudner, 84 N.W.2d 816, 823-24
(Mich. 1957); Lamm v. Singleton, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (N.C. 1949); DoBBs, supra note 19,
§ 12.4, at 819.
143. See Dominquez v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 438 So. 2d
58, 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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used as an attempted avenue to mental anguish awards in a contract
setting.'" The severe disadvantage to the tort of emotional distress,
however, is that the courts usually demand proof of extreme and outrageous conduct."' This requirement emerges as the major problem
in utilizing the tort as a means not only to a mental anguish award but
also to a punitive damage recovery.
3. Conversion
While the tort of conversion may provide the basis for a punitive

damage award in a contract setting,' 46 the efficacy of the conversion
approach is severely tested by two well-entrenched, common law conversion rules: one holds that a conversion action cannot be predicated

on a mere breach of contract where the damages sought are merely
for the breach of contract;' 47 the other holds that a mere obligation to
pay money generally may not be enforced by a conversion action.' 48
4.

Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations

The tort of intentional interference with contractual relations proscribes the purposeful and improper obstruction of the rights to the
benefits of a contractual relationship with a third party.' 49 The grava144. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 90 (Cal Ct. App.
1970); World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 322
So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1975); Stanback v. Stanback, 254 S.E.2d 611, 621-22 (N.C. 1979).
145. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla. 1985)
(medical insurer withholding of benefits in reckless disregard for tragic consequences not "so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency"); Quayside Assocs., Ltd. v. Triefler, 506 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Henry
Morrison Flagler Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434, 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
146. See, e.g., Fraser v. Doubleday & Co., 587 F.Supp. 1284, 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); National Mortgage Corp. of Am. v. Stephens, 723 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987)
rev. in part on other grounds, 735 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1987); Ward v. Shiro Corp., 579 S.W.2d
257, 261-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 2, at
11.
147. See, e.g., Fraser v. Doubleday & Co., 587 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(plaintiff must allege that acts are unlawful or wrongful as distinguished from acts that are
mere violations of contractual rights in order to sustain conversion claim); Capital Bank v. G
& J Invs. Corp., 468 So. 2d 534, 535-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (punitive damages not
available for breach of contract claim arising out of dispute concerning depositor's stop payment order).
148. See, e.g., Rosen v. Marlin, 486 So. 2d 623, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Schimmel
v. Meril Lynch, 464 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); National Mortgage Corp. of
Am. v. Stephens, 723 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987), rev. in part on other
grounds, 735 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1987).
149. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 129, at 978.
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men of the wrong is the improper attempt to obstruct the pursuit of
the economic benefits of a contractual or business relationship.15 ° The
tort, however, does not address the use of outrageous conduct to obstruct a contracting party's ability to obtain redress for the unfulfilled
promise. Additional support is the axiom of common law that a contract party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract, but
rather merely breach it.''
D. Distinguishing Tort from Contract - Theoretical Difficulties
It is axiomatic that tortious conduct may arise in relation to contractual undertakings. A single act or course of conduct may constitute not only a breach of contract but also a separate and independent
tort. The tort would arise out of the contractual setting when an act
of inducing or breaching the contractual agreement gave rise to a separate and independent cause of action in tort.
Therefore, in order to plead a cause of action properly, the prudent
attorney must be aware of the theoretical assumptions distinguishing
tort from contract. Tort and contract, of course, have different
sources of duty. In order to initially ascertain if a case sounds in contract or tort, one must pinpoint the origin of the duty alleged to have
been contravened. Contract duties arise solely from the agreement of
the contracting parties; whereas tort duties are imposed by law independent of any promises made.152 A key question to be determined,
therefore, "is whether the actions or omissions complained of constitute a violation of duties imposed by law, or of duties arising by virtue
of the... agreement between the parties."'' 5 3 If the duty derives from
contract, then the action for breach is perforce on the contract;
whereas if the duty is implied by law, the action is in tort.' 54
Most importantly, however, is the fact that the manner of conduct

150. Id.
151. Id. at 990; see also Transcontinental Gas v. American Nat. Petroleum Co., 763
S.W.2d 809, 821 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ).
152. Atkinson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 625 P.2d 505, 511 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).

153. Id.; see also Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 617 (Tex. 1986).
154. Merrill Lynch v. Anderson, 501 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review
denied, 511 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1986); see also Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 122 (Kan.
1984). Failure to timely execute sell order, conspiracy to cover up error and foist resulting loss
on client merely constituted breach of contrat and not gross negligence since only duty to
client arose out of contract. Merrill Lynch, 501 So. 2d at 638.
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sufficient to breach a tort duty is distinguishable from that sufficient
to breach a contract duty.
Nonfeasance is the total non-performance (or such an ineffective
performance that it is the equivalent thereof) of a contract duty.' 55
Non-performance, without justification, equals a simple breach of
contract which entitles the aggrieved party to pursue relief without
the need to prove that the breach was intentional, negligent, or otherwise wrongful.' 56 Unlike nonfeasance, misfeasance is an attempted
but flawed performance that may amount to a separate and independent tort if. 1) the affirmative conduct also breaches a tort duty which
arose independently of the contract, and 2) if the intentional or negligent wrong or conduct created an unreasonable danger."5 7 The essence of this important distinction, according to one commentator, is
to be found by differentiating "existing entitlements" from "disappoint(ed) expectations:"
If A in a bargain has promised a particular result and through negligent performance leaves B worse off than before, A may be liable to B in
both Contract and Tort. Thus, in a construction contract, A's negligent
and defective performance may both damage B's property and delay the
promised completion date.
In this case, B should have a remedy for both the damage to his existing property (Tort) and the delay (Contract) .... If A's negligent,
defective performance both damages B's existing entitlements and disappoints expectations, B has a claim in both Tort and Contract.' 58
Many courts, by subscribing to an "entitlements" versus "expectations" rationale, have held that a negligent, defective performance
155. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 659-662.

156. Cf Travelers Ins. Co. v. King, 287 S.E.2d 381, 383 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); McClellan
v. Brown, 632 S.W:2d 406, 407 (Ark. 1982) (no tort liability for failure to act).
157. L. L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 665 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Ark. 1984); see also Autumn Grove Joint Venture v. Rachlin, 405 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). "Wisconsin does not recognize an inherent cause of action in tort for every negligent performance of a
contractual obligation. However, where a tort duty coincides with an obligation undertaken
by contract, either a contract or a tort action will lie for its breach." Id. For a discussion of the
nonfeasance versus misfeasance distinction see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at
658-62; Coleman, supra note 34, at 255-56; Speidel, supra note 2, at 168-69; Sullivan, supra
note 40, at 237-38.
158. Speidel, supra note 2, at 183; see also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435
N.E.2d 443, 455 (Ill. 1982) (Simon, J., concurring). Wrongful conduct which causes "physical
harm.. .usually represents an invasion of a right existing apart from any conduct - a tort
interest," however, if the promisor "simply fails to live up to its promise, if it does not accomplish what it was supposed to do, that is only an invasion of a contract-like interest." Id.
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that results only in economic loss, that is, loss of the benefit of the
bargain, will not be actionable in tort. 159 Consequently, finding the
line of distinction between actions in tort and contract emerges as the
critical task. 160 The determination of exactly what is nonfeasance and
misfeasance in a particular case is often a most difficult task. 6 ' A
significant criticism, therefore, of the independent tort exception con-

cerns the contract versus tort distinction upon which it is based and
the presumption of a precise dividing line that is very difficult to
draw.1 62 Even though the demarcation point between breach of contract and tort is often hazy, with many fact patterns being as readily
appropriate for one category as another, 163 the independent tort approach assumes that the line between contract and tort can be drawn
precisely.
E. Distinguishing Tort from Contract - PracticalDifficulties

When a tortious injury arises in a breach of contract setting, a prudent attorney, aware of the shaky theoretical framework, will strive to
draft the complaint in terms of tort, wherever possible, since tort
damages are recoverable if an independent tort is present. If the
plaintiff's attorney does not precisely formulate the tort count of the

complaint and does not differentiate the tort from contract claims, the
plaintiff runs the risk of having a court grasp at technical pleading

requirements to deny any recovery,'" to dismiss the case,'65 or to
deny the punitive damages aspect of the case under the traditional
159. See, e.g., AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla.
1987); Florida Power &.Light Co. v. Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d 899, 899-900 (Fla. 1987); John
Brown Automation, Inc. v. Nobles, 537 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Jim Walter
Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986); accord Edens v. Kole Constr. Co., 450
A.2d 1161, 1165 (Conn. 1982); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ill. 1982).
160. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 664-67.
161. Hamner v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 270 So. 2d 87, 90 (Ala. App. 1972) (distinction between tort and contract actions often nebulous).
162. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 440; Coleman, supra note 34, at 252-53; Sullivan,
supra note 40, at 237.
163. See. e.g., McClellan v. Brown, 632 S.W.2d 406, 407, 409 (Ark. 1982) (majority
found failure of insurance agent to obtain policy even though paid was nonfeasance precluding
tort action, however, dissenting minority found tort action.).
164. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Thrift, 269 S.E.2d 53, 54 (Ga. App. 1980).
165. Hamner v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 270 So. 2d 87, 91 (Ala. App. 1972) "[A]
charge of breach of contract in the cancelling of the policy and an effort to turn such breach
into a tort by charging that such cancellation was done negligently, willfully, and wantonly
. .." resulted in "a misjoinder of causes of action in these counts." Id.
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principles of recovery.'66
The tortious act must be pled separately and with specificity 167 so
as to "prevent confusion and surprise to the defendant and preclude
recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract where there is not
tortious conduct."'' 61 If the facts indicate that either an action in contract or one in tort is possible, the plaintiff must specifically plead a

cause of action in tort. Otherwise,1 69
the presumption ordinarily will be
that the action is one in contract.

The nebulous dividing line between tort and contract, however,
gives the creative attorney the opportunity and challenge to structure
the facts and pleadings in such a manner as to trigger the independent

tort exception. As a practical concern, a plaintiff's attorney should
plead additional conduct as the basis for the tort claim and avoid
utilizing the same facts in the breach of contract claims as in the tort
claim.' 7 ' Moreover, in the independent tort claim, damages greater

166. See, e.g., Greer v. Williams, 375 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1979); B & J
Holding Corp. v. Weiss, 353 So. 2d 141, 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Jewelcor Jewelers &
Distrib., Inc. v. Southern Ornamentals, Inc., 499 So. 2d 850, 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986),
review denied, 509 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1987); Triland Inv. Group v. Warren, 742 S.W.2d 18, 2728 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1989) (no punitive
damages due to "improper election" of remedies); Nelson Cash Register v. Data Terminal
Sys., Inc., 671 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ denied) (no punitive
damages since no issue on any "separate and distinct" tort submitted to jury).
167. See, e.g., Greer v. Williams, 375 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Texas
Power & Light Co. v. Barnhill, 639 S.W.2d 331, 333-34 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 299 S.E.2d 514, 518 (Va. 1983).
168. Dailey v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 291 S.E.2d 331, 333 (N.C. App. 1982), review
denied, 336 S.E.2d 399 (N.C. 1985).
169. L.L. Cole & Sons, Inc. v. Hickman, 665 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Ark. 1984). The complainant sought punitive damages for tortious breach of contract. However, the record reflected confusion as to whether the plaintiff claimed damages for breach of contract, for
tortious interference with contract, or for tortious misfeasance incidental to the breach of contract. Id.
170. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hanft, 436 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1983); see also Floyd
v. Video Barn, Inc., 538 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("some additional conduct" required); Merrill Lynch v. Anderson, 501 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986),
review denied, 511 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1986) (tortious conduct separate from the conduct which
constituted a breach of parties' agreement must be established); Club Eden Roc. Inc. v. Fortune Cookie Restaurant, 490 So. 2d 210, 211 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (mere "rephrasing of
the underlying contract dispute" insufficient to support independent tort); Taylor v. Kenco
Chem. & Mfg. Corp., 465 So. 2d 581, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Overseas Equip. v.
Aceros Arquitectonicos, 374 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (lacked facts on which
to establish compensatory loss over that presented under breach of contract claim), modified
on other grounds, 376 So. 2d 475 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1979). But see Von Hagel v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of N. C., 370 S.E.2d 695, 698 (N.C. App. 1988) (tort may constitute or accom-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

35

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 2, Art. 3

ST. MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:357

than or different in17 kind
from those sought in the contract claim
1
specified.
be
should
Technical procedural requirements also emerge as an impediment

to punitive damage recovery at the instruction 17 2 and verdict 173 stages

of a lawsuit. The practice of strictly construing and applying pleading
and procedural requirements has been criticized for usurping the discretion of the trial court, 174 stressing form over substance,175 placing
".... an emphasis on artful pleading at the expense of the rights of the
parties,"

176

and evidencing a "....

judicial hesitation to acknowledge

that there is a gray area between the metaphorical black and white of
tort and contract law." 17 7 Consequently, some courts are more liberal
in reviewing the pleadings and the proof in order to effectuate a punitive damage tort recovery. 7 8 Such an approach at least recognizes
that the line between tort and contract is frequently thin and often
nebulous.
pany breach of contract); accord Salvator v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, 509 N.E.2d
1349, 1361 (I1. App. 1987), pet for leave to appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. 1987) (plaintiff
need only allege facts which would bring his claim for punitive damages within a recognized
tort theory).
171. Aceros Arquitectonicos, 374 So. 2d at 539; see also Rosen v. Marlin, 486 So. 2d 623,
626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. app. 1986); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.
1986); C & C Partners v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 783 S.W.2d 707, 719 (Tex. App.Dallas 1989, no writ).
172. See Atkinson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 625 P.2d 505, 510-14 (Kan. Ct. App.
1981) (court found negligence, breach of contract and evidence of wanton misconduct but no
punitive damages because instructions expressly stated punitive damages recoverable for "wanton breach of contract").
173. Loom Treasures, Inc. v. Terry Minke Advertising Design, Inc. 635 S.W.2d 940, 942
(Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1982, no writ) (plaintiff failed to request special issue on punitive
damages).
174. McClellan v. Brown, 632 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Ark. 1982)(Hays, J., dissenting) (trial
court should have discretionary power to treat pleadings and proof as sounding in tort rather
than contract).
175. L. L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 665 S.W. 2d 278, 282 (Ark. 1984). "(O)n appeal
the fine wording of the complaint should not concern us so much as whether under the appellee's pleading and proof punitive damages are recoverable under our law." Id.
176. Strausberg, supra note 40, at 297.
177. Bolla, Contort: New ProtectorofEmotional Well-Being in Contract?, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561, 563 (1983).

178. See, eg., Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Murray Inv. Co., 646 F.2d 224, 229 (5th Cir. 1981);
Hubbard Business Plaza v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 344, 347 (D. Nev.
1984); Bazal v. Belford Trucking Co. Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1089, 1101 (S.D. Fla. 1977); All-West
Design, Inc. v. Boozer, 228 Cal. Rptr. 736, 740-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Frazier v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 883, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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F. Broad Definitions of the Independent Tort Exception
Another difficulty emerges when the facts do not conclusively indicate whether the case sounds in tort or contract. If the independent
tort exception is used rigidly, no degree of outrageous conduct in the
contractual transaction will compel the court to award punitive damages if an independent tort is not present. In order to remedy such
misconduct some courts are disposed to broadly define existing torts
so as to provide a basis for punitive damage recovery in a contract
setting. The term tort, of ourse, is conceded to be an "elastic" one
79
which can be expansively employed to protect additional interests.1
Some courts, already predisposed to rectify and punish contractual
wrongdoing, seize upon the independent tort exception as the chosen
vehicle so quickly that no mention is made in the decision as to the
precise independent tort. Rather, after stating the exception, and the
presence of the tort, the discussion revolves about the severity of the
conduct and the concomitant need for punitive damages. 8 0
In order to reach conduct that does not precisely equate to an independent tort, other courts broadly define the independent tort exception to encompass contract breaches which "amount to" or are
"analagous to" an independent tort.""' This broad construction of the
exception does not mean that the breach must actually be a separate
and distinct tort, but rather means that the breach must "amount to"
or be "analagous to" a tort.' 82 That is, the conduct, while not fitting
into a well-defined tort category, must be malicious, wanton, or oppressive so as to "amount to" a tort, and thus should be punished and
deterred by punitive damages.18 3 Where a precise tort cannot be
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 comment b (1981); see also Sebert,
supra note 64, at 1604. "The independent tort relationale provides a potentially fertile ground
for greatly expanding the availability of punitive damages in actions that are fundamentally
contract actions. It would not be surprising to see courts stretching to find an independent tort
for the primary purpose of imposing punitive damages .... If one looks, one can find examples
of... 'stretching' in decisions from other jurisdictions." Id.
180. See, e.g., Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 269 (Miss.
1985), aff'd, 461 U.S. 71 (1988); Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239, 248 (Miss.
1977); Sweet v. Grange Mut. Casualty Co., 364 N.E.2d 38, 41-42 (Ohio App. 1975).
181. United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Srour v.
Barnes, 670 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1987) (breaches "merge with and assumes character" of
tort); Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d 368, 372 (Haw. 1972) (breach "intertwined" with
tort); Bedell v. Inver Housing, Inc., 506 A.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. 1986).
182. Kamlar v. Haley, 299 S.E.2d 514, 519 (Va. 1983)(Compton, J. dissenting).
183. Id. at 521.
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found, the "amounting to [rule]... served the beneficial purpose of
civilly punishing the wrongdoer in those exceptional cases based on a
breach of contract where... the conduct of the breaching party was
egregious. ' Finally, courts may be predisposed to create new torts,
for example, a tort
of willful and wanton misconduct 85 or a tort of
economic duress. 186
G. Expansive Definition of Fraud
Courts, alternatively, may redefine established torts to make them
more expansive. The most striking and frequent example occurs
when courts define the tort of fraud so broadly so as to encompass a
wide variety of wrongdoing. 8 7 By using the traditional independent
tort exception as a base, some courts naturally expanded the recovery
of punitive damages to contract actions involving fraudulent behavior.
This expanded approach, often designated as a separate "exception"
to the general rule,1 88 resembles and encroaches on the traditional exception for a breach of contract that also comprises an independent
tort. It is important to note, however, that an independent tort of
fraud is not precisely required. 18 9 Technically, all that is necessary to
trigger the "exception" is a satisfactory showing that the breach was
accompanied by sufficiently fraudulent behavior.19°
However, requirements for fraudulent breach of contract have been
184. Id. at 520.
185. See, e.g., Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt Assoc., Inc., 468 N.E.2d 414, 418 (Ill.
App.
1984), modified, 492 N.E.2d 181, 185 (Ill. 1986) (tort of willful and wanton misconduct limited
to those situations where willful and wanton breach of contract caused physical injuries and
damages); Sebert, supra note 64, at 1605 (some courts' opinions suggest that new "tort" cause
of action created primarily for purpose of assessing punitive damages breach of contract cases).
186. See, e.g., W.A.Wright, Inc. v. KLD Sylvan Pools, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 589, 592-93
(D.N.J. 1983); Adams v. Crater Well Drilling, Inc., 556 P.2d 679, 681-82 (Oreg. 1976); cf.
Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1049 (Utah 1984) (insufficient
evidence of economic duress).
187. See, e.g., Texas Oil & Gas v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24, 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1984) (fraud "synonymous with bad faith and overreaching"), rev'd on other grounds, 760
S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988); Hill v. Pinelawn Memorial Park, 275 S.E.2d 838, 842 (N.C. App.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 282 S.E.2d 779 (N.C. 1981); Oestreicher v. American Nat'l
Stores Inc., 225 S.E.2d 797, 809 (N.C. 1976).
188. See, e.g., Sebert, supra note 64, at 1601-2.
189. See, e.g., F.D. Borkholder Co., Inc. v. Sandock, 413 N.E.2d 567, 570 (Ind. 1980)
("tort-like" conduct "mingles" in fraudulent breach); Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 648
(Ind. App. 1976) (actor with a fraudulent state of mind may be subject to liability for punitive
damages, even if act was committed conclusively shown to be actionable fraud).
190. See Peterson v. Culver Educ. Found., 402 N.E.2d 448, 454-56 (Ind.Ct. App. 1980).
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variously defined. Some jurisdictions allow punitive damages when
the breach of contract is accomplished through "fraudulent conduct;"'9291 others require a breach accompanied by a "fraudulent
act."

1

Even though the wide meaning to the term "fraud" allows judicial
flexibility, it also poses problems for members of the bar. The problem with this fraud formulation revolves about the vagueness and
complexity of the concept of fraud. The problem is particularly exacerbated since courts often define fraud expansively and since fraudulent conduct can accompany all contractual relations. A term so
obscure can encompass a perplexing variety of divergent conduct' 93

the level of proof required
and may lead to unpredictable results 1since
94
unclear.
be
often
may
fraud
to show
H. Conclusion
The expansive use of the independent tort exception epitomizes judicial uneasiness in the field of punitive damages for breach of contract. Quite possibly, the expansive use of the exception was the result
of difficult cases where the facts of the breach did not add up precisely
to a recognized tort but when the failure to award tort damages would
shield, and might encourage, egregious wrongful conduct.
The judicial freedom derived from such an interpretation of the independent tort exception is not without a price, however. Perplexity
in this field of law ensues, perhaps inevitably, since it is certainly
troublesome to utilize uniformly a principle which many courts have
continually construed in a most general and inclusive manner. Such a
"catch-all" exception naturally yields inexplicable decisions. 95 Con191. See, e.g., Cecil Crews Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Williams, 394 So. 2d 912, 915
(Ala. 1981); Mark Keshishian & Sons, Inc. v. Washington Square, 414 A.2d 834, 842 (D.C.
1980); cf Kiser v. Gilmore, 587 P.2d 911, 916-17 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).
192. See, e.g., Ateyeh v. Volkswagen of Florence, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 378, 379-80 (S.C.
1986); Scott v. Mid Carolina Homes, Inc. 359 S.E.2d 291, 294 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Floyd v.
Country Squire Mobile Homes, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 502, 503-04 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
193. Coleman, supra note 34, at 261-62; Sullivan, supra note 40, at 230.
194. Wright v. Public Say. Life Ins. Co., 204 S.E.2d 57, 59 (S.C. 1974) "Fraud assumes so
many hues and forms, that courts are compelled to content themselves with comparatively few
general rules for its discovery and defeat, and allow the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case to bear heavily upon the conscience and judgment of the court or jury in determining
its presence or absence." Id.
195. Compare Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239, 249 (Miss. 1977) (independent tort exception used but no indication of what independent tort committed) with Sands v. R.
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sequently, the broad independent tort formulations have been criticized as vague and obscure concepts 96 which make predictions of
results in future cases particularly difficult. 197 Such an expansive approach may arrive at morally defensible outcomes but is condemned
as a deceptive practice which conveniently masks legally indefensible
decisions. 11
This "traditional" exception, therefore, becomes very important because its application can markedly add to the number of punitive
damage awards. The occurrence of tort-type misconduct transverses
the total compass of contracting, and independent torts, particularly
fraud, frequently are defined quite broadly.
VI.

BAD FAITH TORT - INTRODUCTION - INSURANCE CASES

A. Introduction
The conventional nonpartisan stance of contract law toward purposeful breach has been converted directly by the doctrine that every
contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 99
Both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts impose a duty of good faith in the performance and enforcement of contracts. Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts provides: "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty
' 2°°
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement.
Good faith, according to the Restatement, requires faithfulness to the
agreed common purpose and protects the justified expectations of the
parties, while the duty prohibits "bad faith" conduct which contraG. McKelvey Bldg. Co., 571 S.W.2d 726, 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (laborious attempt to find a
precise independent tort).
196. Coleman, supra note 34, at 261; Sullivan, supra note 40, at 229-36.
197. Coleman, supra note 34, at 261; Sullivan, supra note 40, at 231.
198. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 235-36.
199. See generally CORBIN supra note 3, § 541. at 98; FARNSWORTH, supra note 27,
§ 3.26, at 187, § 7.17, at 526-27; S.WILLISTON, 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 670, at 159
(3d ed. & Supp. 1983); Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369 (1980); Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract
Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1 (1981); Summers,
The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
810, 812 (1982); Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provision of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 199 (1968).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, at 99 (1981).
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venes community standards of fairness and reasonableness. 20 Section
1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provides that every
contract or duty under the U.C.C. imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement. 20 2 Section 1-201(19) defines good
faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. 2'0 3
Section 2-103(1)(b) imposes on merchants a higher standard of "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade."' ' ° Although the U.C.C. permits the parties
by agreement to determine the standards by which the obligation of
good faith will be measured, the parties can neither exclude the obligation nor establish manifestly unreasonable standards.20 5
Under common law, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
in every contract prohibits the contracting parties from destroying or
impairing the other party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement.2' A breach of the covenant occurs when a contract party engages in bad faith conduct that injures or frustrates the non-breaching
party's right to receive the expected benefits of the bargain.20 7
Although the courts invariably recognize the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, the courts differ as to the character of the
cause of action that arises from its breach. Courts initially employed
the covenant as an extension of contract law, thereby treating the
breach of the covenant as a breach of contract and awarding contract
damages.20 The weight of present authority still views the covenant
as a contract term and recommends contract damages for its
breach. 2' The Restatement, however, may support alternative remedies by stating that the "appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty
of good faith ...

varies with the circumstances." 210

201. Id. comment a, at 99-100.
202. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1988).
203. Id. § 1-201(19).
204. Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
205. Id. § 1-102(3).
206. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 569-70 (Ariz. 1986); Gruenberg v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1040 (Cal. 1973); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.,
188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933); CORBIN, supra note 3, § 541, at 97; FARNSWORTH, supra note
27, § 3.26, at 187, § 7.17, 526-27; WILLISTON, supra note 199, § 670, at 159.
207. See Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 569-70; CORBIN, supra note 3, § 541, at 97.
208. See, e.g., Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 167-68; Burton, supra note 199, at 404
(list of cases).
209. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977).
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a, at 100 (1981).
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B. Bad Faith Breach as a Tort
The suppleness of the good faith standard has enabled the courts to
shift away from the nonpartisan stance toward contract breach. The
court's break with conventional contract compensation principles coheres with an inclination to impose a higher degree of damage in
breach of contract cases and a desire to punish and deter certain misconduct attendant to the breach. These objectives--compensation,
punishment, and deterrence-have prompted the tort action for
breach of contract.
Consequently, the courts have held that breaching a contract in bad
faith results in a tort action arising from the breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Moreover, the tort remedy is
separate and distinct from the cause of action for breach of contract.
A tort action, of course, lies for a breach of a duty imposed by law,
whereas a contract action lies for a breach of duty imposed by the
mutual consent of the parties. 21' Liability in tort for breach of the
implied covenant is justified by the rationale that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing does not rise from the terms of contract, but
rather the duty is a responsibility superimposed on the contracting
parties by law.2" To determine whether a breach of contract is "tortious," therefore, one must examine the character of the duty
breached. If the breach contravenes a purely contractual promise, the
cause of action is contract; if the breach violates the superimposed
duty of good faith, the action is tort.21 3
The classification of the breach of the implied covenant as tortious
portends momentous consequences because tort damages are not
strictly limited unlike common law contract damages.214 Moreover, a
tort cause of action can also serve as the predicate for punitive
damages.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, therefore, has
a significant impact on both contract and tort law. Today the courts
continually address whether the remedy in tort for the bad faith
211. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 570 (Ariz. 1986); PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 1, § 92, at 655-56.
212. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973); Chitsey v. National
Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641, 643 n.1 (Tex. 1987); Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 570.
213. Bolla, Contort: New Protectorof Emotional Well-Being in Contract, 19 WAKE FOR-

EST L. REV. 561, 574-75 (1983).
214. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 665-66.
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breach of the covenant should be curtailed and limited to particular
categories of contract cases, or extended to all breach of contract
cases.
C. Bad Faith Tort - Insurance Cases Third Party Actions

DistinguishingFirstfrom

Before grappling with the tort of bad faith in the insurance context,
one must first grasp the important distinction between first and third
party actions. First party insurance is insurance that is purchased to
protect against some casualty, such as life, accident, health, disability,
fire, and homeowner's insurance; the insurance company agrees to indemnify the insured for harm sustained thereto. Consequently, a first
party bad faith tort action is predicated on proof that an insurer intentionally embarked on a course of misconduct in order to avoid a
proper obligation to the insured party. The gravamen of the cause of
action emerges as the wrongful denial of coverage with the insurer
and the insured the only two parties involved.215
Third party insurance refers to insurance that protects the insured
against liability for injury caused by the insured to the person or property of a third person. Accordingly, a third party bad faith tort is
predicated on proof that the insurer wrongfully failed to settle a third
party claim within the policy limits, which results in a judgment
awarded to the third party that exceeds the policy limits and causes
the insured to be liable for the difference.216
D. Bad Faith Tort - Third Party Insurance Cases
That an insurer owes its insured an independent duty of good faith
and fair dealing in the processing of policy settlements and in the defending of the insured is a long established principle that has been
widely recognized in the context of third party claims. 2 17 Recovery
215. Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 575-76; see also Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 665 S.W.2d 873, 873-74 (Ark. 1984); K. Harvey & T. Wiseman, First Party Bad Faith:
Common Law Remedies and a ProposedLegislative Solution, 72 KY. L. J. 141, 145 (1983-84);
Sebert, supra note 64, at 1614-15.
216. Employers EquitableLife Ins. Co., 665 S.W.2d at 874; see also Rawlings v. Apodaca,
726 P.2d 565, 570-71 (Ariz. 1986); Harvey & Wiseman, supra note 215, at 145-46; Sebert,
supra note 64, at 1614-15.
217. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d 331, 334-35 (5th Cir.
1967) (applying Georgia law), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 1005 (1967); Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins.
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under a tort theory of bad faith in the first party context, however, is a
more recent development.
California courts have pioneered the principle of the tort cause of
action in third party insurance cases.218 In the seminal case of
Comunale v. Traders and General Insurance Co.,219 the California
Supreme Court confronted the problem of extra-contractual recovery
in the third party context when an insurer refused to settle a claim
within policy limits. The court held that in every insurance contract
there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that obligates the insurer to refrain from any act which might impair the right
of the insured to receive the benefits of the agreement. 220 The court
also stated that the breach of this covenant could give rise to a cause
of action, not only in contract but also in tort, and that the insured
could elect to choose between recovery based in contract or tort damages. 22 ' This new concept was subsequently employed in Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.,222 where the California Supreme Court expressly
stated that the breach of the implied covenant in the third party context would support a remedy in tort and an award of tort damages.223
Presently, courts in most jurisdictions not only impose the impliedin-law duty of good faith and fair dealing in the field of third party
insurance contracts, but also maintain that if bad faith on the part of
the insurer is present, the insurer is subject to tort liability.224 The
Co., 87 N.E.2d 347, 349 (Ohio 1979); Hilker v. Western Auto Ins. Co., 231 N.W. 257, 260-61
(Wis. 1930).
218. Some states are compelled to classify a bad faith breach as a tort because of state
statutes permitting punitive damages only for the breach of obligations not arising out of contract. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering Supp. 1990).
219. 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
220. Id. at 200.
221. Id. at 201-02. The California Supreme Court, however, adhered to contract principles and denied any recovery for consequential damages beyond the excess judgment amount.
Id.
222. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
223. See id. at 178-79 (plaintiff could recover damages for mental distress caused by insurance company's breach of good faith duty).
224. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Continental Casualty Co., 647 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir.) (applying
Ohio law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053 (1981); Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d
816, 817-18 (Fla. 1976); Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1018
(Oreg. 1978); Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. San Benito Bank & Trust Co., 756 S.W.2d 772,
776 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988), rev'd, 773 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. 1989); Beck v. Farmer's
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985). But see Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire and Casualty Co., 652 P.2d 665, 668 (Kan. 1982) (tort of bad faith not recognized in
Kansas).
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rationale commonly asserted to justify the imposition of the bad faith
tort in the third party arena is based on the fiduciary relationship existing between the insurer and insured.2 25 Since the insurer is deemed
to act as agent for the insured,2 2 6 and since the insured is wholly dependent on the insurer to safeguard the insured's best interests,2 2 ' the
law imposes on the insurer-agent the fiduciary obligation to the insured concerning affairs within the scope of the agency.22 8
The application of the bad faith tort doctrine manifests itself most
frequently in the specific third party context of an insurance company's failure to settle a claim within policy limits, and thereby exposing the insured to a judgment in excess of policy limits. The third
party liability insurer's failure to accept a settlement offer within policy limits may constitute the bad faith breach.2 2 9
The standard of conduct of the insurer in its relationship to the
insured is ordinarily represented by the rules of negligence law. In
Crisci,2 30 the California Supreme Court revealed the test to be
"whether a prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted
the settlement offer."' 23 1 According to the Supreme Court of Colorado, "[t]he question of whether an insurer has breached its duties of
good faith and fair dealing with its insured is one of reasonableness
under the circumstances. The relevant inquiry is whether the facts
pleaded show the absence of any reasonable basis for denying the
claim .... ,232 The Supreme Court of Montana has discerned further
that while "the failure to settle may have been the result of either bad
faith or negligence ... , there is no clear distinction ...between the
two terms in such cases ....
[T]here may be theoretical differences

225. See, e.g., Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Colo. 1984) ("quasifiduciary"); Butchikas, 343 So. 2d at 817-18; Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So.
2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 682
P.2d 725, 730 (Mont. 1984); Beck, 701 P.2d at 799; Sebert, supra note 64, at 1614.
226. Beck, 701 P.2d at 799.
227. See id. (in third party actions, insurer controls disposition of claims against insured;
insured relinquishes right to negotiate on own behalf); see also Transamerica Title Ins. Co.,
756 S.W.2d at 775 (insurer has duty to protect interests of insured).
228. Beck v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985).
229. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176-77 (Cal. 1967).
230. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
231. Id. at 176; see also Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785
(Fla. 1980)(negligence relevant to question of insurer's good faith).
232. Farmers Group Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Colo. 1984); accord Boston
Old Colony, 386 So. 2d at 785 (settle within policy limits "where a reasonably prudent person
would do so").
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between bad faith and negligence, [but] the resulting neatness is
highly illusory, and the two tests have tended to coalesce."2 a
In third party cases, therefore, the determination of bad faith has
evolved into the application of a reasonable insurer test. Consequently, when an insurer contravenes the "reasonableness" standard,
breaching the good faith duty and exposing the insured to an excess
judgment, the insured may recover the "excess" and other potential
tort damages including punitive damages.234
E. Bad Faith Tort - FirstParty Insurance Cases
1. Introduction
Extra-contractual liability based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a first party insurance context
materializes as a relatively recent phenomenon. California emerges as
the first jurisdiction to extend the tort of bad faith from third party to
first party cases in the momentous decision of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company.2 " In Gruenberg, the California Supreme Court
ruled that an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay an insured's valid first
party claim was a breach of the implied in law duty of good faith and
fair dealing, thereby rendering the insurer responsible for the independent tort of bad faith, 236 and permitting the insured to recover
not only compensatory but also punitive damages.237 The California
Supreme Court reasoned that, despite the inherent differences between first and third party claims, a breach of either
covenant entails
"merely two different aspects of the same duty. ' 238
In the aftermath of Gruenberg, courts in other states encountered
no difficulty in applying the same duty to both third and first party
cases and, thus, also began to hold insurers liable in tort for the bad
233. Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725, 731 (Mont. 1984). The Gibson court,
however, did enunciate a six factor test to determine whether an insurer acted with bad faith.
Id. at 736-37.
234. See id. at 740 (reckless indifference by insurance company rendered punitive damages proper issue for jury); see also Henderson v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 620 F.2d 530, 536-37 (5th
Cir. 1980) (punitive damages appropriate when insurance company intentionally hid existence
of coverage), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980); Liu v. Interinsurance Exch., 252 Cal. Rptr.
767, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 1988); Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816, 819 (Fla.
1976).
235. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
236. Id. at 1038.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1037.
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faith denial of first party claims.23 9

While a majority of state courts that have confronted the problem
recognize the first party cause of action, a significant minority still
remain unwilling to extend the bad faith tort action to a first party
case.M ° Those courts refusing to recognize the tort argue that, in a
third party liability case, the insurer is acting in a fiduciary capacity as
the insurer's agent, rendering the insured totally dependent on the
insurer for protection from the claims of third parties; whereas in a
first party case, the insurer has neither exclusive control nor the ability to subject the insured to excess liability.24 ' The "first" parties,
moreover, are in an adversarial relationship because the insured
claims that he is owed money under the policy, while the insurer contends that he is not.242
2.

Rationales

In developing the bad faith tort doctrine in the first party insurance
realm, the courts have posited legitimate public policy concerns and
special attributes of the insurance relationship that raise insurance
contracts beyond the reach of general contract and damage law. The
paramount public policy rationales, moreover, closely resemble those
developed in the old public service cases.
The insurance industry (and thus the insurance contract) is re239. See, e.g., Chavers v. National Security Fire & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 6-7 (Ala.
1981); Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867-68 (Ariz. 1981); Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Ark. 1984); Hoskins v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1319-20 (Ohio 1983); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d
313, 319 (R.I. 1980); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167-68
(Tex. 1987); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376-77 (Wis. 1978); Comment, The Other Insurance Crisis: Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First Party Benefits, 15 FLA. ST.
L. REV. 521, 522 (1987) (list of jurisdictions).
240. See, e.g., Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 317 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1975); Industrial
Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), petition
denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1983); Heinson v. Porter, 772 P.2d 778, 785 (Kan. 1989); Federal
Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, 711 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Ky. 1986); English v. Fischer, 660
S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1983); Beck v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985); see
also O'Neill v. Blue Cross, 366 N.W.2d 816, 818-19 (S.D. 1985); Comment, supra note 239, at
523.
241. See Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, 711 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Ky. 1986); Lawton
v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1981); see also Spencer v. Aetna Life and
Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 155 (Kan. 1980).
242. Spencer, 611 P.2d at 155-56; see also Sebert, supra note 64, at 1614.
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garded by the courts as "quasi-public" in nature. 243 An entity to
which the public interest attaches will have the duty of good faith and
fair dealing imposed upon it for the purpose of "encouraging fair
treatment of the public whom the enterprise serve." 2" The fact that
the insurance industry is already subject to widespread government
regulation gives credence to the quasi-public nature of the industry.245
Moreover, insurance is regarded as a necessity; doing without insurance is regarded as an alternative with little viability for most people
in today's society. 2 6
The prospective insured, however, ordinarily is subject to unequal
bargaining power. The courts construe the bargaining power between
insurer and insured as "inherently unbalanced" when they enter into
a contract.247 Due to the uneven bargaining positions, insurance contracts are often condemned by the courts as contracts of adhesion.248
The insurer has the luxury of "negotiating" a contract filled with fine
print terms; the insured's only alternative is either complete adherence or outright rejection. 249 If the insured was in an inferior bargaining position and subject to a take-it-or-leave-it contract, then the
possibility of extra-contractual recovery would "reflect... an attempt
to restore balance in the contractual relationship. ' 25"
The insured manifests no commercial motive in seeking the insurance contract; the very purpose of the contract is to provide coverage
against loss the insured would suffer had he not secured the policy. 25 '
Rather, the insured enters into the contract in order to obtain peace of
243. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 146 (Ca. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 912 (1980); see also Noble, 624 P.2d at 867.
244. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970).
245. See Phillips v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 984, 990 n.4 (D. Vt. 1979); see also
First Sec. Bank v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Mont. 1979); Sebert, supra note 64, at 1615.
246. See Egan, 620 P.2d at 146; see also Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5
(7th Cir. 1972).
247. See Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987);
see also Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 570 (Ariz. 1986); Noble v. National Am. Life Ins.
Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867 (Ariz. 1981); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 146
(Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 912 (1980); Sebert, supra note 64, at 1615.
248. See Egan, 620 P.2d at 146; see also D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Casualty
Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), aff'd 431 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1981).
249. See Egan, 620 P.2d at 144-45; see also Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89
Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
250. Egan, 620 P.2d at 146.
251. Id. at 145; see also Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 571 (Ariz. 1986); Sebert,
supra note 64, at 1615.
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mind, emotional security, mental well-being, and protection against
the financial and psychological stresses of calamity.252 To condone
insurer misconduct that impairs the insured's right to receive the benefit of the agreement is to vitiate the insured's justifiable interest that
securing the agreement would afford shelter from misfortune.253
Should the insurer in bad faith deny a valid claim, the insured suffers
not only an immediate monetary loss, but also a deprivation of secur254
ity and serenity, resulting in foreseeable mental anxiety.
The insurer, moreover, is not only regarded as the supplier of a
vital service, quasi-public in nature, but also as a fiduciary-a relationship where trust and confidence are accentuated.255 Moreover,
the insured is heavily dependent upon the insurer's skill and judgment. Since the insured is relying so heavily for emotional and financial security on the insurer, the strong possibility exists that the
insured, experiencing financial difficulties and emotional strain at the
time of making the claim, will be particularly vulnerable to the insurer's pressure in seeking settlement.25 6 The dependency aspect inherent in the insurance association, and the potentially dire economic
position of an emotionally distraught insured, leave the insured especially exposed to bad faith or outrageous conduct by the economically
257
more powerful entity.
The insurer, in addition, may be in the enviable position of being
able to arbitrarily refuse to pay a claim yet suffer virtually no penalty.
In the absence of extra-contractual damages, the most adverse consequence threatening the company may be that it will be compelled
eventually to remit only what is owed in the first instance. In the
interim, however, the company is allowed to hold the contested funds
252. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 145 (Ca. 1979), cert denied,
445 U. S. 912 (1980); see also Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972);
Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 571 (Ariz. 1986); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,

10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.,
426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967); Sebert, supra note 64, at 1615.
253. See Eckenrode, 470 F.2d at 4; see also Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 570-71.
254. Stewart v. Rudner, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich. 1957); see also Speidel, supra note 2,
at 190-91.
255. Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987); see

also Egan, 620 P.2d at 145.
256. See Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167; see also Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624
P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1981); Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375
A.2d 428, 429 (Conn. 1977).
257. See Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972); see also Crisci
v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967).
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at a very high rate of interest and, additionally, to take advantage of
the statistical certainty that a significant number of claimants will be
cajoled to surrender or compromise their claims. Without the threat
of extra-contractual damages, the insured lacks a dominant force to
counterbalance the insurer's denial to pay directly. A mere contract
action for the amount of the policy may be wholly inadequate when
the insured has been financially ruined by either personal or commercial loss. 2 "
The presence of these factors has prompted the courts' conclusion
that an insured should be permitted more than a contract action for
the policy amount when the insurer acts in bad faith. The nature of
the insurance industry and the insurance contract render such a contract suitable for the courts to recognize that its bad faith breach
should be actionable in tort. The deliberate denial of a claim, moreover, violates the trust and confidence of a fiduciary relationship and
destroys the proper expectation of the insured of a prompt and equitable settlement. The total pattern of behavior, therefore, emerges as
tortious in nature, consisting of something more than a standard contract breach, and amounting to a wrong that society has an interest in
punishing and deterring. This type of bad faith breach has emerged
as the tort of bad faith breach." 9
3.

First Party Standard

Once the duty of good faith is found to exist independently of the
terms of an insurance contract, a court must still confront the difficult
task of determining exactly what conduct constitutes a tortious
breach of this duty. The precise definition of a tortious bad faith
breach differs from state to state. The state supreme courts that have
struggled with the problem have failed to enumerate precisely the elements of the tort of bad faith breach. 6
In examining the first party caselaw, one can deduce that a bad
faith, tortious breach typically involves: 1) an insurance company's
258. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167; see also Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 575-76
(Ariz. 1986); Speidel, supra note 2, at 190-91; Sebert, supra note 64, at 1615-16.
259. Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 574-75; see also Speidel, supra note 2, at 190-91.
260. For a discussion of the bad faith tort doctrine and, in particular, for an examination
of the state standards for a bad faith, first party, tortious breach see Sebert, supra note 64, at
1618; Kornblum, The Current State of Bad Faith and Punitive DamageLitigation in the U.S.,
23 TORT & INS. L.J. 812, 832-36 (1988); Harvey & Wiseman, supra note 215, at 156-57; Freeland & Freeland, Bad Faith Litigation: A PracticalAnalysis, 53 Miss. L.J. 237, 245-48 (1983).
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intentional refusal to pay a claim due under a policy; 2) the absence of
any legitimate, justifiable, or reasonable reason for the refusal or delay; and 3) the insurer's knowledge that the denial was lacking any
legitimate, justifiable, or reasonable basis.26 ' The gravamen of the
cause of action appears to be the absence of a reasonable basis for the
insurer's denial of the claim. 2 62
The problem, of course, in employing an objective standard of reasonableness as the essential ingredient of the test, is that reasonable-

ness is an element customarily associated with a negligence standard.
The bad faith test, however, if correctly applied, denotes more than
mere negligence by demanding an element of willfulness.2 63 Once the
insured establishes that no reasonable basis existed for the refusal to

pay the claim, the insured then must demonstrate that the insurer
intentionally denied the claim despite knowledge that it lacked an ob-

jective, reasonable basis to do

so.264

Under a correct elucidation and application of the reasonable basis
test not every intentional denial of an insurance claim will trigger bad

faith tort liability. 26 Accordingly, the presence of a reason for the
refusal that rises to the level of a "reasonable basis" emerges as the
key issue. Cases from several jurisdictions suggest the types of dis261. See, e.g., Pierce v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 531 So. 2d 654, 656 (Ala. 1988);
National Security Fire and Casualty Co. v. Bowen, 417 So. 2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982); Rawlings
v. Apodaca 726 P.2d 565, 576 (Ariz. 1986); Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866,
868 (Ariz. 1981); Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988); Arnold v. National
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167-68 (Tex. 1987); Anderson v. Continental Ins.
Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978); Sebert, supra note 64, at 1617-18.
262. See, e.g., Pierce v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 531 So. 2d 654, 656 (Ala. 1988); Gulf
Ad. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 924 (Ala. 1981) (adopting Anderson reasonable
basis test); Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 576; Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 868
(Ariz. 1981); Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988); Nichols v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 619 (S.C. 1983); Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167-68; Anderson
v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Wis. 1978) (under circumstances of case insurer
was reasonable); Gruenberg v. Aetna, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1973).
263. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 428 So. 2d 593, 598-99 (Ala. 1983); Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 576; Consolidated Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Touche, 410 So. 2d 1303, 1306 (Miss.
1982); Noble, 624 P.2d at 868; Harvey & Wiseman, supra note 215, at 156-57 (criticizing "reasonable basis" as vague standard commonly associated with negligence cause of action).
264. See Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co. v. Barns, 405 So. 2d 916, 924 (Ala. 1981); see also Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 576; Heninger, Bad Faith in Alabama: An Infant Tort in Intensive Care, 34
ALA. L. REv. 563, 571-73 (1983).
265. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Wisc. 1978); see also Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 573. "[A]n insurance company ... may challenge claims which are fairly
debatable and will be found liable only where it has intentionally denied.., a claim without a
reasonable basis." Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 377.
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putes that amount to a "reasonable basis" and preclude bad faith tort
liability. 266 If a reasonable basis exists, moreover, bad faith tort liability is precluded even if the plaintiff-insured later prevails on the
merits.267
4. Punitive Damages
Since recovery for a bad faith refusal to pay a first party claim is
premised in tort, punitive damages surely should be recoverable.
Although the Gruenberg court did not address the issue, the California Supreme Court, in Silberg v. CaliforniaLife Insurance Co.,268 subsequently held that punitive damages may be recovered in a first party
266. Disputes that prevent bad faith tort liability encompass: (1) legal questions, see, e.g.,
Bard's Apparel Mfg., Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir.
1988) (applying Tennessee law) (legitimate uncertainty as to whom check should be sent due
to bankruptcy of insured); Gillespie v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 533 So. 2d 521, 523 (Ala. 1988)
(legal efficacy of cancellation); Schipes v. Hanover Ins. Co., 687 F. Supp. 601, 603-4 (M.D. Ga.
1988) (doubtful question of law and case of first impression); Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
761 P.2d 401, 409 (Mont. 1988) (issue of constitutionality); (2) factual questions, see, e.g.,
Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 679 F.2d 803, 804-5 (9th Cir. 1982)
(applying California law) (question of coverage under policy); National Say. Life Ins. Co. v.
Dulton, 419 So. 2d 1357, 1362 (Ala. 1982) (dispute over facts essential to liability); Dolan v.
Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988) (question as to whether residual disability
existed when accident occurred); (3) policy construction questions, see, e.g., ALFA Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Smith, 540 So. 2d 691, 694-95 (Ala. 1988) (insured's name no longer appeared on policy
as named insured); King v. Public Say. Life Ins. Co., 290 S.E.2d 134, 135 (Ga. App. 1982)
(contract clause susceptible to two reasonable constructions); Lake v. Farm Bureau Mutual
Ins. Co., 624 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Mo. App. 1981) (question of policy lapse); Transcontinental Ins.
Co. v. Washington Pub. Utils. Dists.' Util. Sys., 760 P.2d 337, 347 (Wash. 1988) (reasonable
but incorrect interpretation); (4) disputes concerning damages, see, e.g., Pierce v. Combined
Ins. Co. of Am., 531 So. 2d 654, 656-57 (Ala. 1988) (question as to whether insured was
compensated previously); Sexton v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 405 So. 2d 18, 22 (Ala. 1981);
Sigue Trucking, Inc. v. Insured Lloyds, 417 So. 2d 97, 100 (La. App. 1982); (5) evidence of
misconduct by the insured, see, e.g., Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. McMinn, 541 So. 2d 494, 497
(Ala. 1989) (wrong information in application); McLaughlin v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co., 437 So. 2d 86, 91 (Ala. 1983) (misrepresentation by insured on application);
Federated Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkins, 435 So. 2d 10, 13 (Ala. 1983) (evidence of suicide);
Lasma Corp. v. Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio, 764 P.2d 1118, 1122-23 (Ariz. 1988); Meshell v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 416 So. 2d 1383, 1389 (La. App. 1982) (lack of cooperation in
supplying information); Trico Servs. Corp. v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 414 So. 2d 1313, 1322
(La. App. 1982) (exaggerated claim amount); Cook v. Detroit Auto Inter-Ins. Exch., 318
N.W. 2d 476, 478 (Mich. App. 1982) (question of statutory construction or constitutional
law); English v. Home Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 463, 466 (Mich. App. 1982) (question concerning
statute of limitations); Helmick v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 529 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Ohio
1988) (evidence of arson).
267. Manis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 760, 762 (Okla. 1984); see also Dueringer
v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 853 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1988).
268. 521 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Cal. 1974).
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bad faith action. Decisions from other jurisdictions also disclose that
punitive damages are permissible in a bad faith tort cause of action.2 69
Mere proof, however, that an insurer acted in bad faith toward its
insured, by itself, should not support a punitive damage award. S&1berg appears to have established the principle that to sustain an award
of punitive damages, there must be proof beyond that required to
show bad faith. There also must be evidence demonstrating that the
insurer acted in a flagrant manner, with an intent to injure or vex the
2 70
insured, or otherwise consciously disregard the insured's rights.
Other courts are in accord in ruling that mere proof of the elements of
the bad faith tort alone is insufficient to justify an automatic award of
punitive damages.271
Although the bad faith tort is appropriately regarded as a species of
intentional tort, the bad faith tort initially comprehends only an intentional breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing; the
proper test for punitive damages then impels an examination of the
character of the insurer's conduct in breaching the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.272 The imperative analytical task, therefore, is
to discern the distinction between the type of conduct that contravenes the implied duty of good faith and the type of conduct that
additionally compels a punitive sanction.
Although the exact standard for determining whether an insurer's
behavior breaches the good faith duty may differ, there is greater
agreement among the courts as to the elements essential to sustain an
award of punitive damages once the bad faith tort has been established. Even in those jurisdictions employing a reasonableness standard for bad faith, the punitive damage recovery requires that the
269. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 556, 561-62 (11th Cir. 1983)
(applying Alabama law); Gulf At. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 925 (Ala. 1981);
Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 645 (N.D.
1979); Sentry Ins. v. Siurek, 748 S.W.2d 104, 106-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1987, no writ);
Lee v. Safemate Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ dism'd); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 377-79 (Wis. 1978).
270. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Cal. 1974).
271. See, e.g., Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 925 (Ala. 1981); Rawlings
v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 577-78 (Ariz. 1986); Farmers Group, Inc. 768 P.2d 1243, 1247
(Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279
N.W.2d 638, 645 (N.D. 1979); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319 (R.I. 1980);
Izaguirre v. Texas Employers' Ins. Assoc., 749 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1988, writ denied).
272. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W. 2d 368, 368 (Wis. 1978); see also Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 577-78; Heninger, supra note 264, at 579-80.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

53

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 2, Art. 3

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:357

insured show, in addition to misconduct constituting the breach of the
duty of good faith, that the insurer's misbehavior rose to the height of
fraud, malice, or oppression.273
As a result, in most jurisdictions, the level of misconduct compulsory to uphold a claim for punitive damages is, and should be, higher
than that required for initial recovery under a bad faith claim.274
Consequently, not every bad faith claim should produce a punitive
recovery, 275 and relying on the advice of counsel may preclude a finding of punitive liability.276
The traditional justifications for the imposition of punitive damages
in tort cases are to punish the wrongdoer and to deter others who may
consider similar misbehavior. 277 Motivated by these traditional rationales, the courts impose punitive damages to punish insurers for their
flagrant bad faith behavior and to deter other insurers from engaging
in similar misconduct.278
Protecting the public from flagrant bad faith behavior is particularly acute in the insurance field. The necessity of insurance, the prey273. See, e.g., GulfAtl. Life Ins. Co., 405 So. 2d at 925; Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 578; Egan
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 146 (Cal. 1979); Von Hagel v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 370 S.E.2d 695, 699 (N.C. App. 1988); McCorkle v. Great Atl. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583,
586 (Okla. 1981); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Joseph, 769 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989, no writ); Underwriter's Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810, 817 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, no writ); Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 379.
274. See, e.g., Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 577-78; Dailey v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 331
S.E.2d 148, 154-55 (N.C. App. 1985); Timmons v. Royal Glove Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 918-19
(Okla. 1982); McCorkle v. Great Atl. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 586-88 (Okla. 1981); Arnold v.
National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex. 1987); Sebert, supra note 64, at
1617-18.
275. See, e.g., Franceschi v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 852 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir.
1988); McMillan v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 379 S.E.2d 88, 90 (N.C. App. 1989); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1322 (Ohio 1983); McLaughlin v. National
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 772 P.2d 383, 389 (Okla. 1988); Izaguirre v. Texas Employers' Ins. Assoc., 749 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (differentiating between bad faith tort damages and punitive damages); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271
N.W.2d 368. 379 (Wis. 1978).
276. See, e.g., Henderson v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 695 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1983); Cotton
States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevethan, 390 So. 2d 724, 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Gordon v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 605 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 431 (1972).
277. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1 § 2, at 9.
278. Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 665 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Ark. 1984).
"Compensatory damages for bad faith in an occasional lawsuit would not deter the wrongdoing insurance company, or others, from seeking a wrongful gain by similarly victimizing hundreds of other policyholders. Punitive damages will have a deterrent effect in a case of this
type." Id.
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alent sale of policies, and the special relationship between the parties
create an unreasonable risk of harm from outrageous practices that

must be patrolled by the courts." 9 Without the potential of punitive
damages, there may actually be an incentive for an insurer to use flagrant bad faith tactics to delay or deny the settlement of a claim. 80
F. Conclusion to Bad Faith Tort - Insurance Cases

The California bad faith decisions and their progency developed
two significant principles with regard to the tort of an insurer's bad
faith denial of a claim: 1) an insurer's conduct generally is to be
measured by the test of reasonableness in both first and third party
cases; and 2) damages include punitive, as well as compensatory damages, when there is evidence of flagrant bad faith misconduct. These
two principles, and the rationales therefor, provide the starting point
for an examination of those decisions that extend the bad faith tort

from the insurance to other fields.
G.

Insurance Statutes

Several states have enacted statutory schemes regulating insurers
that proscribe certain unfair, unreasonable, or bad faith insurance
practices and that prescribe extra-contractual recovery for the insured.28 Presently, some statutes include a provision providing for a
potential punitive damage recovery.282
279. Heninger, supra note 264, at 579-80.
280. An example of a particularly disturbing case where flagrant bad faith tactics were
used by an insurance company is Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50
(Mich. 1980). See Comment, supra note 239, at 536-37; see also Lissmann v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 50, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying Virginia law) (no punitive damages even
though insurer adopted a plan to lull insured into inaction until statute of limitations had
expired); United Dept. Stores Co. No. 1 v. Continental Cas. Co., 534 N.E.2d 878, 882 (Ohio
App. 1987) (no punitive damages even though insurer failed to respond to insured's repeated
requests until limitations period had run).
281. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155(1) (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 334-6 (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (Vernon Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105
(Vernon Supp. 1989); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 1990). For a detailed

analysis of the Florida statute see Berezin, First Party Bad Faith - A Right of Action Now
Legislatively Sanctioned in Florida,THE FLA. B.J., Feb. 1989, p. 53; Comment, supra note 239,
at 540-43.
282. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431-455 (1985); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21,
§ 16(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990); see also Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d
129, 135-36 (Tex. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155(4) (West Supp. 1990); Comment, supra
note 239, at 542-43.
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Courts in several states have construed these statutory provisions as
evidence of legislative intent to establish an exclusive remedy for violation of the proscribed practices. Accordingly, these courts have
held that the statutory remedy has preempted the field of insurance
and thus has precluded a cause of action in tort against the insurer for
bad faith breach of the insurance contract.283
Conversely, several courts have rejected the proposition that the
states' statutory remedy preempts the bad faith tort.28 4 Still other
courts have held that the states' statutes, rather than precluding the
action in tort, actually imply a common law cause of action in tort
against an insurance company for bad faith conduct.2" 5
VII.

A.

BAD FAITH TORT - NON-INSURANCE CASES

Introduction

Since the inception of the bad faith tort doctrine, the constant challenge confronting the courts has been to enunciate a policy to determine when the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, found in every
contract, rises to a tort duty upon which a punitive damage recovery
may be based in the event of a flagrant breach. Although valid arguments can be asserted for not extending the tort of bad faith breach of

283. See, e.g., Kohlmeier v. Shelter Ins. Co., 525 N.E.2d 94, 104 (Ill. App. 1988). "From
the standpoint of the insurance bad faith plaintiff... these statutes present a major risk. The
risk is that the statute will be deemed an exclusive statement of the insured's rights, thus
denying the potentially more lucrative common-law recovery of punitive damages. ... "
Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 42 (Iowa 1982); Spencer v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 156-57 (Kan. 1980); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Mich. 1980); Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Casualty Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979); D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty, 431 A.2d 780, 970 (Pa. 1978); Sebert, supra note 64, at 1626.
284. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1157-58
(Alaska 1989); Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 665 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Ark.
1884); Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 547-49 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
285. See, e.g., First Sec. Bank v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040, 1048-49 (Mont. 1979); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 902-3 (Okla. 1977); Jenkins v. J.C.
Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 259 (W. Va. 1981); see also Opperman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 515 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 523 So. 2d
478 (Fla. 1988) (remedy recognized in first party context but unclear as to whether statutory or
common law remedy); cf. Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 670 F. Supp. 937, 942 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(statutory cause of action recognized pursuant to Florida statute for first party claims). But see
Lee v. Safemate Life Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1987, writ dism'd) (art.
21.21 not provide individual with private cause of action against insurer).
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all contracts, no policy can fairly and logically be formulated that
limits its application solely to insurance contracts.
The courts, however, generally have limited the availability of a
cause of action for the tort of bad faith breach to cases involving insurance contracts. By identifying certain central significant characteristics of insurance contracts that stem from the fiduciary
relationship between the insurer and the insured, courts have managed to confine the tort mainly to the insurance context.
If the underlying predicate for recovery in bad faith insurance cases
emerges as the presence of special factors involved in the relationship,
the presence of these special factors in other types of contracts presumably should trigger the bad faith tort. An inequality of position
between contractual parties is certainly not confined to the insurance
context.2" 6 The rationale that the insurance industry is highly regulated applies equally well to other businesses, which are also regulated
by government, for example, banks. 87 Contracts of adhesion are also
not unique to the insurance industry; as today many, if not most, contracts with the general public are standardized.28 8 Additionally,
many contracts intertwine a profit motive and the desire for security.289 Finally, the quasi-fiduciary nature of the relationship found in
insurance contracts should not be dispositive of the issue of tort liability for a bad faith breach, since a relationship of trust and confidence
can arise in any type of contract.
The rationale that allowed courts to extend the bad faith tort to
insurance contracts, should, logically and fairly, allow courts to extend the doctrine to other contracts. 29 In fact some courts have extended the bad faith tort to encompass contracts other than insurance
contracts. 29 And a few courts have even applied the tort to ordinary
commercial contracts. 292 However, an examination of bad faith
caselaw beyond the realm of insurance discloses the continuing diffi286. Freeland, supra note 260, at 239 (example of manufacturer-seller not honoring warranty made to consumer-buyer); see also Sebert, supra note 64, at 1650-52.
287. Blan, The Tort of Bad Faith-A Defense Viewpoint, 34 ALA. L. REv. 543, 557-58

(1983).
288. Id. at 558; see also Sebert, supra note 64 at 1650-52.

289. Farris v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1021-22 (Oreg. 1978) (most
contracts made for economic and financial peace of mind).
290. The Oregon Supreme Court in Farris, however, employed this logical extension rationale to reject the bad faith tort in an insurance context. Id.
291. See infra notes 312-315 and accompanying text.
292. See infra notes 345-358 and accompanying text.
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culty courts confront in determining rational limiting principles for
the doctrine.293
B.

Employment Cases
The next stage in the development of the bad faith tort doctrine was

the expansion of the tort to non-insurance contracts in the area of

employment contracts.2 94 The genesis of the doctrine in this field can
be traced to the decision of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.295 In Monge,

the New Hampshire Supreme Court declared that "(i)n employment,
whether at-will or for a definite term, the employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of
the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest
in maintaining a proper balance between the two. ' 296 The Court then
held that unjustified employer actions in terminating an employee
"motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation" were "not

297
in the best interest of the economic system or the public good.
Although the Monge court failed to denominate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the court's recognition of an extracontractual duty not to terminate in bad faith fulfills the covenant's
essential function. 29 There appears to be some confusion in the decision, however, as to whether the cause of action created therein
sounded in tort or contract.299

293. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the tort theory of recovery in a first party insurance context in part due to the "analytical straining necessitated by the tort approach." Beck
v. Farmers Inc. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 800-01 (Utah 1985). Commentators, however, have
attempted to establish boundaries for the tort. See Louderback & Jurika, supra note 2, at 22123 (relevant factors are: contract of adhesion, security rather than profit motive, inequality of
bargaining power, and the level of bad faith by the party with greater bargaining power);
Diamond, supra note 2, at 448-49 (emphasis on encouraging efficient breach and discouraging
inefficient breach; accordingly, tort applicable "only if it can be established that at the time of
wilful breach the promisor could not have reasonably believed his gains would exceed the
promisee's compensable pecuniary losses"); Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1291, 1305 (1985).
294. For a review of cases and a discussion of the implied covenant in the employment
context see Kornblau, Common Law Remedies for Wrongfully DischargedEmployees, 9 INDUS. REL. L. J. 660, 691-96 (1987); Mallor, Punitive Damagesfor Wrongful Discharge of At
Will Employees, 26 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 449, 456-59 (1985).
295. 316 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1974) (press machine operator discharged for her refusal to
date foreman).
296. Id. at 551.
297. Id.
298. Mallor, supra note 294, at 468.
299. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
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The breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
was articulated expressly by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co."3o In Fortune, however, the duty
of good faith was employed solely as the basis of a substantive right to
contest the employment-at-will doctrine. Although the court based
301
the breach of contract action on the contravention of the covenant,
the court demurred to theorize as to the presence of a tort cause of
action.3 o2
The California Supreme Court, in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.,303 strongly suggested that tort remedies for breach of the implied
covenant would be appropriate in an employment contract setting.3 3°
Shortly thereafter, the California Court of Appeals, in Cleary v. American Airlines,30 5 expressly held that a wrongfully discharged employee
could maintain an action in tort for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. 3°6 Consequently, the California courts
had utilized the tort to attack a variety of bad faith conduct in the
30 7
employment setting.
Authority exists in other jurisdictions to the effect that a breach of
the duty to deal fairly and in good faith in an employment setting is a
tort. 308 However, it must be noted that even in those jurisdictions not
300. 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257-58 (Mass. 1977) (employer discharged salesman to decrease
commissions he otherwise would have received for a large sale).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1255, n.7; Mallor, supra note 294, at 469.
303. 610 P.2d 1330, 1336-37 (Cal. 1980) (discharge after 15 years of service for refusing
to participate in an illegal scheme to fix prices).
304. Id. at 1337 n.12.
305. 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
306. See id. at 728 (arbitrary discharge of employee after 18 years of satisfactory service
despite existing procedures for dismissal).
307. See, e.g., Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 532-33 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (plaintiff alleged that IBM committed tortious breach of covenant by terminating her
employment because of her romantic relationship with an employee of a competitor); Wallis v.
Kroehler Mfg. Co., 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (employer stopped payment without cause under an agreement not to compete).
308. See, e.g., Carter v. Catamore Co., 571 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Gates v. Life
of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Mont. 1983) (employer obtained plaintiff's resignation by deceptive means and contrary to employer's personnel policies), aff'd on reh'g, 668
P.2d 213, 216 (Mont. 1983) (upholding compensatory award and reinstating punitive award);
K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987) (discharge with motive of defeating retirement benefits); Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Okla. 1985); see also
Nilsson v. Mapco, 764 P.2d 95, 100 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) (discharge in bad faith directed
personally at employee may give rise to independent ground of employer liability); cf Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Sutton, 868 F.2d 352, 354, 357 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Kansas
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all conduct attendant to a discharge triggers the bad faith tort."°
The adoption of the bad faith tort in the employment context perforce raises the question of the appropriateness of an award of punitive damages for outrageous breach of the covenant. Accordingly,
authority exists permitting the recovery of punitive damages when the
employer's misconduct not only violates the covenant but also contravenes the applicable standard for punitive culpability.31 °
Courts have offered similar rationales to support adoption of the
bad faith tort in employment cases. The Montana Supreme Court, for
example, reasoned that the duty created by the implied covenant in an
employment contract is very similar to the duty to act in good faith in
discharging contractual insurance obligations. Thus, since the duty is
imposed by operation of the law, its breach should reap a remedy in
law) (punitive damages in retaliatory discharge action); Motsch v. Pine Roofing Co., Inc., 533
N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. App. 1988) (tort action for retaliatory refusal to recall employee after employee filed claim under Workers' Compensation Act); Boudar v. E.G. & G., Inc., 742 P.2d
491, 495 (N.M. 1987) (tort of retaliatory discharge plus bad faith conduct will support award
of punitive damages). But see Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clincal Laboratories, Inc., 552 So. 2d
241, 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (no common law tort for retaliatory discharge recognized
in Florida).
309. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska
1989) (drug test did not violate covenant due to public concern for employee safety); Shapiro v.
Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (plaintiffs failed to
allege facts sufficient to show that defendant acted in bad faith in order to trigger tort cause of
action); Siles v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 103, 106 (Mass. Ct. App. 1982), rev.
denied, 440 N.E. 2d 1176 (1982) (employee's discharge for reasons of personal dislike or as
result of careless or sloppy business practice does not constitute breach of covenant); Combs v.
Gamer Shoe Co., 778 P.2d 855, 887 (Mont. 1989) (employer must give "fair and honest reason" for discharge; here, "financial difficulties [created] ... economic necessity"); Barrett v.
ASARCO, Inc., 763 P.2d 27, 32 (Mont. 1988) (employee dishonesty), modified on other
grounds, 772 P.2d 315, 316 (Mont. 1989); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d
1015, 1020 (Mont. 1984) (tort liability available only if employer's representations created a
reasonable belief employee had job security and would not be discharged without cause); Larson v. SYSCO Corp., 767 P.2d 557, 560 (Utah 1989) (poor performance by employee).
310. See, e.g., Carter v. Catamore Co., 571 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D.Ill. 1983) (punitive
damages allowed for discharge of employee in violation of duty of good faith if plaintiff establishes discharge willful and malicious); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213, 21415 (Mont. 1983) (employer's coercing resignation letter by duress and misrepresentation and
refusing return thereof subjects employer to punitive damage liability); see also Caplan v. St.
Joseph's Hosp., 233 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905 (Cal Ct. App. 1987) (retaliatory withholding of employee's back wages for disclosing illegal business practices affecting public was malicious, thus
entitling employees to seek punitive damages for breach of covenant); Monge v. Superior
Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (sufficient allegations of malice and oppression, in form of sexual discrimination and harassment, basis for award of punitive damages); Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan, 720 P.2d 257, 265 (Mont. 1986), cert.
dismissed, 479 U.S. 980 (1986).
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tort.311 The court, in Wallis v. Superior Court,3 12 stressed the insurance rationale by stating that a non-insurance contract could be tortiously breached if the contract contained characteristics similar to
those in an insurance contract.31 3 The Wallis court then enumerated
five "similar characteristics" to an insurance contract that would
make breach of the implied covenant tortious.3 14 The Wallis court
then concluded that the characteristics of an insurance contract are
also present in most employer-employee contractual relationships.31 5
It is important to discern that the extra-contractual damages
awarded in employment cases are prone to be punitive rather than
compensatory. Apparently, in employment context, courts appear to
be motivated by a preference to redress the abuses stemming from an
inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee
rather than by a requirement to supersede traditional contract damage rules in order to fully compensate employee-plaintiffs. 316 The punitive remedy provides a device to punish and deter outrageous abuses
in the exercises of the employer's superior, discretionary authority.31 7
Although most courts have not yet addressed the issue, several courts
have expressly refused to recognize the existence of an action for tortious breach of the implied covenant in the employment context.318
311. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213, 214-15 (Mont. 1983).
312. 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
313. Id. at 127.
314. Id. at 129 (inherently unequal bargaining position, non-profit contract motivation,
inadequacy of ordinary damages, one party especially vulnerable, other party aware of
vulnerability).
315. Id. at 127.
316. See Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 534-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(underscoring that employer's conduct was designed "to emphasize that she (employee) was
powerless to do anything to assert her rights as an IBM employee... " and that . . . such
powerlessness is one of the most debilitating kinds of human oppression"); see also Cleary v.
American Airlines Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (underscoring that
at-will doctrine "easily leads to harsh results for employee" and that implied right to job security is necessary to ensure social stability).
317. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213, 216 (Mont. 1983) (employer's
conduct warranted "sting of punitive damages" to deter future employers from using similar
tactics).
318. See, e.g., Kelley v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (neither
tort of retaliatory discharge nor obligation of good faith recognized in Florida where wrongful
dismissal claimed); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 998, 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 518 N.E.2d 306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d
24, 26 (Okla. 1989); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.Houston 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989) (no view expressed as to
tort duty of good faith); Lumpkin v. H.C. Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex.
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Concerns that prompted these courts to reject the tort approach include a fear that the covenant could compel an employer to demonstrate just cause for every termination, 319 and a fear that the covenant
could subject employers to unpredictable lawsuits in which sympathetic juries would be permitted to decide whether the employer's
conduct comported with the good faith standard. 320 The inherent
nebulousness and subjectivity of the standard,321 the difficulty of applying the standard, 322 and the adequacy of existing principles of tort
law323 are also cited as additional reasons. Moreover, some courts
comprehend that "[care must be taken to prevent the transmutation
of every breach of contract into an independent tort action through
the bootstrapping of the general contract principle of good faith and
324
fair dealing.
Recently, the California Supreme Court in a decision portentous to
the development of the bad faith tort doctrine in the employment and
commercial context, Foley v. InteractiveData Corp.,325 held that "we
are not convinced that a 'special relationship' analogous to that between insurer and insured should be deemed to exist in the usual employment relationship which would warrant
recognition of a tort
326
action for breach of the implied covenant.

The Foley court reasoned that the employer-employee relationship
is not "sufficiently similar" 327 to that of insurer and insured to warApp.-Houston 1988, writ denied) (implied covenant not recognized in employer-employee
relationship); Brockmeyer v. Dunn and Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 842 (Wis. 1983); Chasson
v. Community Action of Laramie County, Inc., 768 P.2d 572, 575 n.1 (Wyo. 1989).
319. See Daniel v. Magma Cooper Co., 620 P.2d 699, 703 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
320. See Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 441 N.E.2d 50, 53-55 (Ill. 1980).
321. See Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 998, 1006 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982)
("vague notion of fair dealing"); see also Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 629
(Haw. 1982); Brockmeyer v. Dunn and Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 842 (Wis. 1983).
322. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 557 F. Supp. 230, 238 (D. Mass.
1983), aff'd in part and vacated and remandedin part on othergrounds, 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.
1988); see also Martin, 440 N.E.2d at 1006.
323. Martin, 440 N.E. 2d at 1006; see also Redgrave, 557 F. Supp. at 236.
324. Redgrave, 557 F. Supp. at 237; accord McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757
S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Houston 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70
(Tex.1989) (fear of "putting every commercial contract under the umbrella" of insurance).
325. 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Cal. 1988). An executive employee of six years and nine months
alleged he was given repeated oral assurances of job security, consistent promotions, salary
increases and bonuses during the term of his employment and that these assurances contributed to his reasonable expectation that he would not be discharged except for good cause. Id.
326. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
327. Id. at 234.
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rant the tort remedy "in view of the countervailing concerns about
economic policy and stability, the traditional separation of tort and
contract law.., and the numerous protections against improper terminations already afforded employees. ' 328 The "imprecision" of the
bad faith standards thus far formulated 329 and the concomitant fear
that "[v]irtually any firing (indeed any breach of a contract term in
any context) could provide the basis for a pleading alleging the discharge was in bad faith..."33o were also cited by the court as reasons
for rejecting the tort remedy. The court further explained that the
determination of liability and compensation in the employment termination context involves "significant policy judgments affecting social
policies and commercial relationships"33 and thus "arguably is better
'
suited for legislative decisionmaking.
The Foley court noted, however, that an employee still may sue in
tort for discharges based on breaches of public policy. 332 The Foley
decision and conflicting state caselaw underscore the difficulty of defining the employer's duty of good faith in the employment setting.
The bad faith doctrine can be utilized in a variety of ways: to preclude a wrongful at-will discharge, to equate to good cause for discharge, to equal a tort, or to be the tort foundation to support a
punitive recovery.333 Precisely defining the employer's duty of good
328. Id. at 235.
329. Id. at 238.
330. Id. at 239.
331. See id. at 235 n.31 (Court specifically referred to Montana "Wrongful Discharge
from Employment Act"); accord McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 820
(Tex. App.-Houston 1988), rev'd on othergrounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989) "(T)here is
no want of legislation which restricts an employer's ability to dissolve an employment contract. It would be impertinent for us to arrogate to ourselves the right to pass additional laws
under the guise of deciding cases." Id.
332. Foley, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234 n.30; see also Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 185, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (evidence insufficient to raise issue that termination was
racially motivated in violation of public policy).
333. See Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 766 P.2d 768, 775-76 (Idaho 1988)(Huntley, J.,
dissenting) (good faith does not equal good cause for termination). Since Justice Huntley contends that lack of good faith is not a good cause for termination, the requirement that good
faith be exercised in an at-will contract does not require good cause for discharge. Good cause,
however, does tend to negate the existence of bad faith. Therefore, a termination without good
cause does not equal bad faith but is merely a factor in determining bad faith. Clement, 766
P.2d at 77 (Huntley J. dissenting); see also Foley, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 238 n.39 (expressing judicial fear that if covenant equated to good cause .... then all at-will contracts would be
transmuted into contracts requiring good cause for termination"); Sebert, supra note 64, at
1634-35 (discussing various uses of covenant).
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faith ultimately will depend upon a careful evaluation of the policy,
and theoretical and practical considerations involved in the employment context.
The critical issue on which courts should focus in the employment
arena is the employer's abuse of superior, discretionary power to the
detriment of the employee, rather than the employer's failure to perform contract duties.33 4 Since it is outrageous conduct, rather than
the mere breach of contract, that should be punished and deterred, an

appropriate tort-like sanction must be capable of precise elucidation
so as to punish and deter only clear violations of societal norms.
As in bad faith insurance cases, punitive damages are permitted in

employment cases provided the appropriate standard of malice or oppression is met. Since the precise definition of the terms remain unclear, punitive damages should be confined to cases where the
employer's misconduct is deemed outrageous with regard to an important public or private interest.335
Even though the utilization of the bad faith tort theory in the employment context suffers from defects in clarity and predictability, the
doctrine certainly does supply a highly flexible standard that can facilitate employee expectations and punish and deter employer

misconduct.
C.

Banking Cases

The insurance rationales supporting the bad faith tort have invited
the courts to expand the tort remedy for breach of the implied covenant to other special relationships. Consequently, the tort of bad faith
breach emerges not only in employment contracts but also in banking
contracts.3 3 6
334. Kornblau, supra note 294, at 691, 695 (discussion of whether "public policy" exception or implied covenant is preferable vehicle to provide job security); Mallor, supra note 294,
at 468.
335. Malor, supra note 294, at 494.
336. See Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985) ("stonewalling effort" preventing depositor from recovering monies entrusted to
bank and subsequently lost due to bank's negligence found tortious breach of the covenant for
which punitive damages recoverable); see also Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 704 P.2d 409, 419
(Mont. 1985); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombluy, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984) (bank committed tortious breach of implied covenant by: 1) unjustifiably accelerating maturity date of
promissory note, 2) offsetting the amount owed against the funds remaining in plaintiffs' account, and 3) causing plaintiffs' checks to "bounce"); cf. Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr.
516, 521-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (court assumed but did not decide that bad faith cause of
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In expanding the bad faith tort to banking contracts, courts ordinarily stress the similarities between the banking and insurance industries. For example, courts underscore the "quasi-fiduciary" nature of
the banker-customer relationship, the customer's heavy dependence
on and trust in the bank,337 the substantial inequality of bargaining
power,338 and the fact that the customer seeks security in utilizing the
bank's services. 339 The court also focuses on the high degree of statutory regulation of a vital public service, 3 and an objective of punishing and thereby deterring a bank's abuse of its superior bargaining
position.341
Other courts, however, refuse to recognize the tort of bad faith
breach in the banking context.342 To support their stand they cite the
primacy of article 4 of the U.C.C. in governing the relation between a
bank and its customers,343 and express the fear that to allow tort liaaction may arise from borrower-lender relationship); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Curfman, 386
So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (conversion by credit union and lack of U.C.C. good
faith supported punitive damage award); Ford, Unconventional Theories of Lender Liability in
Florida,FLA. B.J., July-Aug. 1985, 46, 46-47 (fertile area for growth in lender liability law is in
requirements of good faith dealing in U.C.C. and F.S.A.).
337. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (banker-depositor relationship "quasi-fiduciary" because of depositor's heavy dependence and trust in bank). But see Aaron Ferer & Sons v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 731 F.2d
112, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1984).
338. See Commercial Cotton Co., 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554; see also Tribby, 704 P.2d at 419
(bank has superior bargaining power over its customer); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombluy, 689
P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984) (because of bank's relationship to its debtor, finding of "reckless
disregard" for debtor's rights would warrant punitive damages).
339. Commercial Cotton Co., 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
340. Id.
341. See Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 704 P.2d 409, 419 (Mont. 1985) (court remanded
but indicated approval of award of punitive damages); see'also First Nat7 Bank, 689 P.2d at
1230 (approval of punitive damages indicated even though remanded); Commercial Cotton
Co., 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55 (court affirmed punitive damage award, but reversed damage
award for mental anguish).
342. See Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d 9, 12-13, 16 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Maine law)
(bank exhibited bad faith by precipitously and without warning halting further advances on
which it knew commercial borrower's business depended, but no punitive damages because
bad faith tort not recognized and no other independent torts found); see also Brown-Marx
Assocs., Ltd. v. Emigrant Say. Bank, 527 F. Supp. 277, 283 (N.D. Ala. 1981), aff'd, 703 F.2d
1361 (11 th Cir. 1983) (applying Alabama law) (tort of bad faith limited to insurance context);
Carrico v. Delp, 490 N.E.2d 972, 977 (I11.
App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied., 141 Ill. App. 3d 684
(1986); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank and Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 536-37 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986); International Bank v. Morales, 736 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. 1987) (breach of implied
"covenant gives rise to cause of action sounding in contract"); Texas Nat'l Bank v. Karnes,
717 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1986).
343. Rigby Corp., 713 S.W.2d at 536. "The obligation of good faith appertains to the
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bility for bad faith breach of the covenant might spawn punitive damage liability for every purposeful breach of contract. 3 "
D.

Commercial Contract Cases

Although courts readily accept the bad faith tort doctrine in the
insurance context, and recognize its applicability to the employment
and banking areas, courts confronted with the problem of the doctrine's applicability to general commercial contracts consistently disallow its availability.
The California Supreme Court, however, in Seaman's Direct Buying Services, Inc. v. StandardOil, 345 intimated that tort remedies may
be appropriate in commercial contract cases. The court professed to
reserve the issue of the tortious character of the implied covenant's
breach in a commercial contract setting; 3 " yet the court's recognition
of a tort of bad faith denial of contract engendered a theoretically
limited but a practically expansive construction of a bad faith tort in
the commercial context. a47 Pursuant to the new tort created by the
Seaman's court, tort damages are allowed when a party fails to perform a contract, and then, "in bad faith and without probable case"
denies that the contract ever existed at all. a48 While apparently acknowledging the tort of bad faith breach of contract, the court did not
specify when the tort should extend to non-insurance cases. The
court suggested that courts should extend tort liability to cases involving relationships with "similar characteristics" to those found in insurance contracts.3 49 The court's language, however, indicated that
deterrence of wrongful conduct was also a substantial factor in supporting the extension of tort damages to ordinary commercial conperformance or enforcement of every contract duty under the Code. The remedy for breach of
the obligation of good faith under the Code .
accordingly, is a contract, and not a tort
remedy." Id.
344. Carrico, 490 N.E.2d at 977. "To sanction punitive damages on a bad faith theory
would allow punitive damages whenever the breach was intentional. Thus, the exception
would swallow up the general rule denying punitive damages for breach of contract." Id.
345. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).
346. Id. at 1167.
347. Id.; see also Sebert, supra note 64, at 1640-41 (criticizing Seaman's as an "unhappy
compromise," reached by court trying to avoid implications of broad holding and "troubling
because it creates another meaningless distinction in the law and diverts attention from the
fundamental policy question").
348. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal.
1984).
349. Id. at 1166.
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tracts. The court stressed that taking the "stonewall" approach of
saying "see you in court" without probable cause or belief in the exist-

ence of a defense outraces a mere breach
of contract,350 as "[i]t offends
351
accepted notions of business ethics.
Although the Seaman's court did not explicitly recognize the tortious breach of the implied covenant in commercial cases, the court
did very little to deny its applicability. The court's failure, however,
to differentiate its new tort from a tortious breach of the implied cove-

nant, and its concomitant failure to precisely express its rationale,
therefore, only exacerbated the confusion in this complex area of the
law. Instead of circumventing the issue, the court should have accepted or rejected the tort of bad faith breach of the implied covenant
in the commercial context, as the Foley court appeared to do in the
employment context.

Decisions by the California courts after Seaman's, however, have
refused to impose tort remedies unless the contractual setting revealed
a "special relationship.

3

52

In other jurisdictions there is some limited

authority supporting the extension of tort remedies to the breach of
the implied covenant in a commercial setting.353 Montana's extension
of tort remedies for breach of the covenant is particularly significant
because its supreme court underscored the moral justification for imposing a remedy in tort. 5 4
Most jurisdictions, however, have refused to apply the bad faith

tort to a commercial case. 35 Their denials were largely based on the
350. Id. at 1167.
351. Id.
352. See, e.g., Landsbery v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193, 1199
(9th Cir. 1986) (punitive damages awarded to author for expropriation of work by publisher);
Okun v. Morton, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 233-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (sophisticated investor,
represented by counsel, and motivated by profit, not in unequal bargaining position); Quigley
v. Pet Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 401-2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (denying tort damages for breach of
covenant because only ordinary commercial contract and "special relationship" lacking).
353. Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 720 P.2d 1148, 1155 (Mont. 1986) (evidence sufficient to create jury question as to punitive damages when franchisor unreasonably denied franchisees' request for relocation); see also Nicholson v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 1342,
1348-49 (Mont. 1985) (commercial lessor awarded punitive damages for lessee's breach of covenant); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 763 P.2d 673, 676 n.1 (Nev. 1988) (dicta),
aff'd on rehearing,774 P.2d 1003 (Nev. 1989); Forty Exch. Co. v. Cohen, 479 N.Y.S.2d 628,
639-40 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984) (recognizing existence of tort for bad faith breach of commercial
lease but finding breach in this case privileged).
354. Dunfee, 720 P.2d at 1153 (focusing on franchisor's conduct even in absence of
breach of express term in contract).
355. See, e.g., Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 837-38 (2d
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lack of the "special relationship" found in the insurance cases3 6 and a
fear of unacceptably blurring the line between tort and contract.3 a 7
Nonetheless, several commentators have attempted to propose precise
standards and enunciate clear rationales for the covenant's
application.358
VIII.

A.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR A MALICIOUS OR OPPRESSIVE
BREACH OF CONTRACT

Insurance Cases

Several courts have taken a more direct approach to the problem of
outrageous breaching conduct and have permitted punitive damages
in insurance cases for a malicious or oppressive breach of contract
separate from the independent tort or implied covenant of good faith
doctrines.
The leading case in this field is Vernon Fire and CasualtyInsurance
V.Sharp,35 9 where the Indiana Supreme Court held that punitive damages may be imposed in a contract case when "a serious wrong, tortious in nature, has been committed... [even though] the wrong does
''36° if it apnot conveniently fit the confines of an independent tort,
pears that "the public interest will be served by the deterrent effect
punitive damages will have upon future conduct of the wrongdoer and
Cir. 1980) (applying New York law); Kennedy Elec. Co., Inc. v. Moore-Handley, Inc., 437 So.
2d 76, 81 (Ala. 1983); Aluevich v. Harrah's, 660 P.2d 986, 987 (Nev. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1006 (1984); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571 (Tex. 1981).
356. See Delta Rice Mill, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 583 F. Supp. 564, 566 (E.D. Ark.
1984), aff'd, 763 F.2d 1001 (8th Cir. 1985) (relationship was commercial transaction where
parties were bargaining at arms length, not relatonship imposing trust or confidence in one
party because of its superior position); see also Kennedy Elec. Co., 437 So. 2d at 81 (court
expressly isolated special duty implied by law as distinguishing insurance contracts from other
contracts); Aluevich, 660 P.2d at 987 (contract did not involve "a special element of reliance
such as that found in partnership, insurance, and franchise agreements").
357. See Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111, 118 (6th Cir. 1976) (applying
Ohio law) (to make extension would "allow parties" to convert contract actions into tort actions); see also Iron Mountain Sec. Storage Corp. v. American Specialty Foods, Inc., 457 F.
Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (if tort of bad faith applicable to any commercial contract,
then most parties breaching contracts would be subject to tort liability since violation of most
contracts involves breach of faith).
358. See, e.g., Louderback & Jurika, supra note 2, at 227' Comment, supra note 288, at
1305 (among other elements, conduct "that obstructs the injured party's ability to receive the
substitutionary value of the agreement"). The Comment's author is correct to focus on the
obstruction of remedies as an essential analytical feature. Id. at 1302.
359. 349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1976).
360. Id. at 180.
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'
parties similarly situated."361
The significance of the decision is that,
since the breach was accompanied by intentional, and malicious or
oppressive conduct, punitive damages will be awarded for the breach
of a contract
per se, without the necessity of proving an independent
2
tort.

36

Other courts have followed the lead of the Indiana court and have
imposed punitive damages against insurance companies for their malicious or oppressive breaches of contract.363 These courts have found
that malice "denotes the intentional doing of a harmful act without
just cause or excuse or an intentional act done in utter disregard of the
consequences,.. . and does not necessarily mean actual malice or ill
will.. . ."61 Constructive or implied malice, therefore, "exists where
the act or conduct is performed in such a reckless or wanton manner
that the law will imply malice from the nature of the conduct and the
actor's heedless disregard of the consequences and the rights of
others. ' 365 Oppression is "[a]n act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, or excessive use of authority. ' 366 The misconduct is ".... similar
to that usually found in the commission of crimes or torts done intentionally or with reckless indifference to the rights of the other party
...

or with an evil motive (e.g. to vex, harass, annoy, injure, or op-

'
press) in conscious disregard of the rights of the injured person. 367
One court, in reviewing the numerous legal descriptions characterizing flagrant misconduct in breaching a contract, noted:

361. Id. at 180-81.
362. Id. at 180-81, 184 (insurer, without reasonable explanation or offer to settle, refused,
despite "so clear" policy provision, to pay insured's legitimate claim for business fire loss, even
though insured repeatedly informed insurer of desperate need of proceeds to satisfy pressing
financial matters); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 362-63 (Ind.
1982).
363. See, e.g., Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 484 F.
Supp. 1375, 1388 (D. Del. 1980) (malice or wanton disregard); Casson v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
455 A.2d 361, 368 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (willful, wanton, or malicious conduct); Linscott v.
Rainier Nat. Life Ins. Co., 606 P.2d 958, 965 (Idaho 1980) (element of outrage); Greenspan v.
Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, 395 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520-21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (willful,
malicious, or fraudulent breach and "public fraud" requirement not essential in insurance setting); Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 352 S.E.2d 73, 80-81 (W. Va. 1986)
(malicious intent to injure or defraud).
364. Curtis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 560 P.2d 169, 172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied,
615 P.2d 992 (N.M. 1980).
365. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mudgett, 397 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979).
366. Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 184 (Ind. 1976).
367. Linscott v. Rainier Nat. Life Ins. Co., 606 P.2d 958, 965 (Idaho 1980).
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at the core of these descriptions is a consideration of the quality of the
actor's conduct that characterizes it as reprehensible. It embodies a
consciousness of intended or probable effect calculated to unlawfully
injure the personal safety or property rights of others. In some instances it may consist of the conscious desire to maximize rather than
mitigate the amount of injury suffered.36

Courts have stated three major reasons for awarding punitive damages against insurance companies for their malicious or oppressive
breaches of contract. First, an expansive recovery rule in an insurance setting serves a consumer protection function.36 9 Courts are
aware of the considerable economic power possessed by insurance
companies and stress the gross disparity of bargaining power between
the parties to the insurance contract.3 7 ° Second, the fiduciary aspect
of the insurance relationship is emphasized by some courts, which
hold that the breach of the insurance contract "approximates" a
tort.37 ' Other courts, finally, see the prevention of such malicious
conduct on the part of insurers as an overriding issue of public policy
and, thus, feel that it is a useful and appropriate sanction to punish
insurance companies for their malicious or oppressive conduct in the
marketplace.372
Numerous situations arise when the breach of an insurance contract is an extreme departure from standards of reasonable conduct,
and, when done with knowledge of the breach's probable effects,
should be grounds for an award of punitive damages. Accordingly,
courts have awarded punitive damages for the breach when the malice
standard, or the functional equivalent thereof, has been met. Thus,
intentionally denying a claim with knowledge that the policyholder's
claim was proper is grounds for punitive damages,3 73 as is intention-

368. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 397 N.E.2d at 1008.
369. Linscott, 606 P.2d at 963-64.
370. H. H. Henderson v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 620 F.2d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying
Mississippi law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980); Linscott, 606 P.2d at 965-66; see also Guy
v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 1305, 1315 (N.D. Miss. 1988).
371. See Hamed v. General Accident Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 170, 172 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Indiana law); see also Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 484
F. Supp. 1375, 1387 (D. Del. 1980); Linscott v. Rainier Nat. Life Ins. Co., 606 P.2d 958, 965
(Idaho 1980) ("like a tort, many such breaches may be impossible to insure against").
372. See Guy, 698 F. Supp. at 1315; see also Linscott, 606 P.2d at 965; Frizzy Hairstylists,
Inc. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 392 N.Y.S.2d 554, 557 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977).
373. Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1986).
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ally refusing to pay a claim without probable cause,37 4 or without just
cause. 37" Punitive damages are also proper when the reason for denying payment was contrary to an express term in the policy. 376 Further
examples that may merit punitive damage claims are: 1) a delay in
paying the claim, either due to a policy of paying the whole claim as
opposed to separate parts thereof, despite the insured's dire financial
straits,3 77 2) a policy of "delaying payment of just claims through barraging the policyholder with mindless paperwork,
379
of "low-balling" claims.

' 37

and 3) a policy

The requisite malice standard is not met, and punitive damages denied, if the insurer's conduct was merely the result of negligence, mistake, lack of judgment, over-zealousness, incompetence, or
bureaucratic confusion. 38 Accordingly, punitive damages are denied
when the insurance company has a legitimate or arguable reason for

not paying the claim,38 ' when it honestly contests the amount of dam-

age,38 2 or when it contests coverage because the insured has failed to
33

comply with a condition in the policy.

374. Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc., 484 F. Supp. at 1388.
375. See Guy v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 1305, 1313-14 (N.D. Miss.
1988); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 763 P.2d 673, 676 (Nev. 1988); see also Curtis
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 560 P.2d 169, 172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 615 P.2d 992
(N.M. 1980) (without "just cause or excuse"); Greenspan v. Commercial Ins. Co., 395
N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (without "justification").
376. Ainsworth, 763 P.2d at 676; see also Hamed v. General Accident Ins. Co., 842 F.2d
170, 173-74 (7th Cir. 1988); Henderson v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 620 F.2d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1980).
377. Henderson, 620 F.2d at 536; Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wetherbee, 368 So. 2d 829, 835
(Miss. 1979); Ainsworth, 763 P.2d at 676.
378. L.F. Pace & Sons, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 514 A.2d 766, 776-77 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1986) (evidence of economic duress by defendant's manager), certif for appeal denied, 516
A.2d 886 (Conn. 1986); see also Hayseeds Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 352 S.E.2d
73, 81, n.2 (W. Va. 1986).
379. Frizzy Hairstylists, Inc. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 392 N.Y.S.2d 554, 557 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1977).
380. See Hayseeds, Inc., 352 S.E.2d at 80-81 (some evidence that company began investigation with preconceived disposition to deny claim does not "rise to the level of malice" in
settlement process); see also Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 362 (Ind.
1982); Kocse v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 377 A.2d 1234, 1238 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1977)
(lack of immediate investigation and taking incriminating statements from insured without
informing of right to counsel not sufficiently "aggravated situation" for punitive damages);
Olbrich v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 469 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (extreme caution
not malicious).
381. H.H. Henderson v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 620 F.2d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1980); Standard
Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239, 248 (Miss. 1978).
382. Henderson, 620 F.2d at 536.
383. Casson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 361, 368-69 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
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Still other courts, utilizing the Vernon approach, treat the breaches
considered malicious as similar in substance to those constituting a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
insurance context.384
B.

Non-Insurance Cases

The Vernon approach has also been utilized in breach of contract
cases outside of the insurance context. Thus, some courts elect the
most straightforward option, proclaiming unambiguously that punitive damages are permissible for any sufficiently malicious,38 5 oppres388
sive,3 86 or the equivalent, 38 7 breach of contract.
384. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 763 P.2d 673, 676 (Nev. 1988);
Upthegrove Hardware, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 689, 695
(Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (insurer's investigators knowingly destroyed potentially exonerating evidence and lied about what they found gave rise to punitive damages for malicious, bad-faith
handling of insured's fire claim).
385. See Robison v. Katz, 610 P.2d 201, 208 (N.M. App. 1980), cert denied, 615 P.2d
992 (N.M. 1980) (malice is the "intentional doing of a wrongful act").
386. See Davis v. Gage, 682 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). "This means there
must be an 'intersection' of a bad act (an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of
conduct) and a bad state of mind (for example, malice)." Id.
387. See Alaska N. Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33, 41 (Alaska
1983) ("outrageous" means act committed with bad motives, malice or reckless indifference).
388. See, e.g, Unifoil Corp. v. Cheque Printers & Encoders Ltd., 622 F. Supp. 268, 272
(D.N.J. 1985) (sufficiently aggravated circumstances found where breach of implied warranty
of merchantability may lead to punitive damages); L.F. Pace & Sons, Inc. v. Travelers Indem.
Co, 514 A.2d 776, 776 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986), certif for appeal denied, 516 A.2d 886 (Conn.
1986) (tort elements such as wanton or malicious injury or reckless indifference to interests of
others gives tortious overtones to breach of contract action thereby justifying award of punitive
damages); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 453 P.2d 551, 556 (Idaho 1969) (if "fraud, malice,
oppression or other sufficient reason" found, punitive damages may be assessed in contract
actions); Young v. Scott, 700 P.2d 128, 133 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (breach of lease by landlord
and delay in remodeling, leaving tenant with no income during usual busy period, sufficient
misconduct for punitive damages); Art Hill Ford, Inc. v. Callender, 423 N.E.2d 601, 602 (Ind.
1981) (punitive damages recoverable "whenever the elements of fraud, gross negligence, or
oppression mingle ... and it can be shown that the public interest will be served by the
deterrent effect of punitive damages"); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845,
847-48 (Ind. 1977) (automobile dealer's failure to make repairs supported finding of elements
of tort-fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression-"mingled into" claim of breach of
warranty to justify award of punitive damages); A.B.C. Home & Real Estate Inspection, Inc.
v. Plummer, 500 N.E.2d 1257, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (standard of reckless disregard and
contravention of public interest); Southern School Bldgs., Inc. v. Loew Elec., Inc., 407 N.E.2d
240, 253-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (malice); Peterson v. Culver Educ. Found., 402 N.E.2d 448,
453-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression combined with breach of contractual promises may support award of punitive damages); Robinson
v. Katz, 610 P.2d 201, 208 (N.M. App. 1980), cert. denied, 615 P.2d 992 (N.M. 1980) (stan-

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol22/iss2/3

72

Cavico: Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract - A Principled Approach.

1990]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CONTRACTS

These courts stress the consumer protection function as the rationale for their award. Punitive damages are viewed as particularly ap-

propriate in punishing and deterring flagrant misconduct in a

dard of malice or reckless or wanton conduct as breach of contract with material misrepresentations made in reckless disregard of the truth); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 210 (Vt.
1984) (to recover punitive damages, "willful or wanton or fraudulent breach of contract may
be shown by conduct manifesting personal ill will, or carried out under circumstances of insult
or oppression, or even by conduct manifesting... a reckless or wanton disregard of [one's]
rights"). But see Mortgage Finance, Inc. v. Podleski, 742 P.2d 900, 902-03 (Colo. 1987) (overturning long line of appellate decisions awarding punitive damages for breach of contract since
statute required "tortious conduct" for punitive damages).
In LF Pace, defendant's manager refused to review plaintiff's current financial statements
before refusing to issue payment and performance bonds in violation of implied contract after
issuing bid bond for project. LF.Pace, 514 A.2d at 776. In Boise Dodge, a car dealer turned
back the odometer on a demonstrator car before selling it as a new car. Boise Dodge, 453 P.2d
at 556. In Art Hill Ford, an automobile dealer took six months to complete repairs on a new
truck, falsely informed the plaintiff that he needed parts that were unavailable, and accused the
plaintiff of causing the trouble. Art Hill Ford,Inc., 423 N.E.2d at 604. In Plummer, a home
inspector misrepresented to home purchasers that the roof on a house was in good condition.
Plummer, 500 N.E.2d at 1263. In Southern School Bldgs., Inc., a building contractor maliciously withheld monies due to an electrical contractor for purposes of injuring his business.
Southern School Bldgs., Inc., 407 N.E.2d at 253-54. In Hilder, tenants sued their landlord for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability and requested punitive damages for the landlord's failure to repair, after notice of defect, and his failure to provide a facility essential to the
health and safety of the tenant. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 210.
Several courts have adhered to the rule permitting punitive damages for breach of contract
but have denied punitive damages on the facts therein. See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys.,
Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750-51 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Indiana law requiring clear and convincing evidentiary standard for punitive damages); Lull v. Wick Const. Co., 614 P.2d 321, 325-26
(Alaska 1980) (breach of contract not sufficiently tortious or malicious); Curtis v. Partain, 614
S.W.2d 671, 673 (Ark. 1981) ("willful or malicious act in connection with contract" were
insufficient allegations in breach of construction contract by diversion of funds paid on contract); Quedding v. Arisumi Bros., Inc., 661 P.2d 706, 710 (Haw. 1983) (breach of construction contract by failure to insert reinforcing steel bars in wall as per requirements not wanton,
oppressive, or malicious); Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59, 62 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (insufficient
evidence of defendant's outrageous or willful action in breaching noncompetition clause contained in sale of business); New Mexico Hosp. Ass'n v. A.T. & S.F. Memorial Hosps., Inc.,
734 P.2d 748, 753 (N.M. 1987) (refusal to award punitive damages for group account member's intentionally misleading behavior and breach of contract with representative of unemployment compensation group account was not abuse of discretion); Hood v. Fulkerson, 699
P.2d 608, 611 (N.M. 1985) (no evidence of malice or fraudulent contract when sub-contractor
breached plumbing installation warranty by improperly and negligently installing water lines
in attics of townhouses); Ranchers Exploration and Dev. Corp. v. Miles, 696 P.2d 475, 478-79
(N.M. 1985) (premature termination of contract due to inability to obtain processing for raw
materials not sufficiently malicious); O'Coin v. Woonsocket Inst. Trust Co., 535 A.2d 1263,
1266-67 (R.I. 1988) ("egregious" standard used when bank employee, without subpoena, disclosed embarrassing information regarding payment of debtor's loan to auditor general's office,
not "egregious" as a matter of law since same disclosures later compelled in open court).
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consumer contract setting.38 9 Courts recognize that the consumer
may be in an inferior bargaining position, 39 and be forced to sign an
adhesion contract or do without the desired product or service.391
Courts also rely on the rationale that the public interest is served by
the deterrent effect of punitive damages for a flagrant breach of
contract.392
Consequently, if the breach involves a commercial contract,3 93 an
"arms-length business deal," 394 or a transaction involving "two presumably sophisticated parties, not one experienced party attempting

to deceive or defraud a neophyte,1 395 punitive damages are not con-

389. See, e.g., Delta Rice Mill, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 583 F. Supp. 564, 566-67
(E.D. Ark 1984), aff'd, 763 F.2d 1001 (8th Cir. 1985) (punitive damages not awarded because
"the existing relationship... was a commercial relationship where both parties were bargaining at arms length as opposed to a relationship imposing some degree of trust and confidence
in one party because of its superior position"); Bank of N.Y. v. Bright, 494 N.E.2d 970, 977
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (not only plaintiff's account improperly liquidated by bank and investment company but small investor's concerns treated with "utter indifference over a substantial
period of time."); Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 650-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (punitive
damages awarded against mobile home dealer who: (1) sold mobile home with major defects
in its construction to young, married couple, (2) failed to repair it despite continued assurances, (3) refused to refund the down payment upon rejection, and (4) concealed limited warranty until warranty period ran out.); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 210 (Vt. 1984)
(landlord, after receiving notice of defect, failed to make repairs essential to health and safety
of tenant).
390. See, e.g., Bright, 494 N.E.2d at 976-77; see also Jones, 350 N.E.2d at 650.
391. See, e.g., Jones, 350 N.E.2d at 650.
392. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Indianapolis v. Mudgett, 397 N.E.2d 1002,
1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); see also Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 210 (Vt. 1984) (public
benefit in "display of ethical indignation").
393. See, e.g., J.Yanan & Assocs., Inc. v. Integrity Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1025, 1033-34 (7th
Cir. 1985) (applying Indiana law) (some evidence of harassment in suit between two insurance
companies but not rising to level of "economic duress"); Reliable Tire Distrib., Inc. v. Kelly
Springfield Tire Co., 607 F. Supp. 361, 374 (D. Pa. 1985) (punitive damages not awarded
against tire manufacturer who manufactured tires in violation of agreement with plaintiff-distributor and who disposed of excess inventory to competing distributor). "Where a cause of
action is limited to a breach of a commercial contract, punitive damages are not appropriate
regardless of the nature of the conduct constituting the breach ...." Id.
394. See, e.g., J.Yanan & Assocs., Inc. v. Integrity Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1025, 1033-34 (7th
Cir. 1985); Reliable Tire Distrib., 607 F. Supp. at 374 (parties who contract at arms length
obtain mutual rights and obligations arising under the contract"); Delta Rice Mill, Inc. v.
General Foods Corp., 583 F. Supp. 564, 566 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff'd, 763 F.2d 1001 (8th Cir.
1985) ("both parties bargaining at arms length"); Alaska N. Dev. Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33, 41 (Alaska 1983) ("arms length business deal").
395. Canada Dry Corp. v. Nehi Beverage Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 512, 525 (7th Cir. 1983)
(neither exploitation of the consumer nor infliction of economic duress present in breach of
franchise agreement by franchisor); see also Art Janpol Volkswagon, Inc. v. Fiat Motors, 767
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sidered appropriate regardless of the nature of the misconduct constituting the breach.
The courts that stress the consumer protection rationale do not perceive any essential differences which would prompt punitive damages
to be more proper against an unreasonable insurance company than
against a car dealer, a96 for example. In either case, a consumer is provided with a significant, supplemental, common law safeguard against
flagrant misconduct by an entity possessing a stronger negotiating
position.
A breach sufficiently malicious to award punitive damages emerges
as an "extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct" and
" [was] performed by the defendant with understanding of [his] conduct and . . . with understanding of or disregard for the consequences.

' 397

Accordingly, a breach "without just cause or excuse,

398

a breach resulting from a blatant violation well within a layperson's
understanding,399 or a "distorted or fanciful contract term interpretation" 4 ° will warrant punitive damages. Moreover, breaches, involving "predatory practices,"" "economic duress, ' 402 or aiming
towards "unjust enrichment" 3 also meet the punitive damage
F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying New Mexico law) (no finding of malice in breach of
dealership contract by auto distributor).
396. See Hibschman Pontiac Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845, 847 (Ind. 1977).
397. See Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 665 P.2d 661, 667-69 (Idaho 1983) (owner of
cattle deprived bailees of their possessory lien on cattle in order to be unjustly enriched by
bailee's labor); Yacht Club Sales & Servs., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 623 P.2d 464, 475-76
(Idaho 1980) (payor bank wrongfully dishonored checks by placing "hold" on bank account
without prior consultation with an attorney and without inquiry or notice to payee); Young v.
Scott, 700 P.2d 128, 133 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) ("extreme deviation from standards of reasonable conduct" found in landlord's delays in completing promised remodeling, evidence that
landlord disturbed plaintiff's personal property, and statement made by landlord that he
wanted to terminate lease and board up plaintiff's restaurant).
398. Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. B & G Rent-A-Car, Inc., 619 S.W.2d 832, 837-38 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981) (franchisees' breach of noncompetition covenant in franchise agreement was
willful and without just cause or excuse and franchisees sought to conceal breach).
399. Davis v. Gage, 712 P.2d 730, 731 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
400. Storck v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 634 P.2d 1319, 1323-24 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) (contract interpreted as without malice or intent to deliberately injure).
401. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying
Indiana law) (predatory, monopolizing practices by franchisor against franchisee), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 917 (1980).
402. J. Yanan & Assocs., Inc. v. Integrity Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1025, 1033-34 (7th Cir.
1985) (some evidence of harassment in contract dispute between two insurance companies but
insufficient evidence of "economic duress").
403. Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 665 P.2d 661, 669 (Idaho 1983).
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standard.
If the breach is part of the adjudication of a "good faith" or "honest" dispute as to what the contract requires of a party, punitive damages are not proper. 404 Consequently, if the breach involves an honest
4 6 neglect or negligence, 40 7
error of judgment, 4° "poor judgment,"
forgetfulness," ° mistake of law or fact,' "extremely poor workmanship, '' 10 "4041142
incompetence,
overzealousness, 1 2 or technical infractions,41 3 punitive damages will not be awarded. However, courts will
refuse to find malice even if the breach involves harassment, 1 4 or if
the purpose of the breach is to take business directly from a competi-

404. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mudgett, 397 N.E.2d 1002, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979) (cause of action by purchasers of home against vendor alleging that vendor breached real
estate purchase agreement by failing to make specified repairs). In First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, the court denied punitive damages, reasoning that "the evidence of events reflects casual
discussion of defects, imperfectly remembered conversations, questions of judgment as to the
extent of damages to be repaired, varying degrees of expertise necessary to satisfy plaintiffs,
forgotten details, an ambiguous memorandum hastily drawn, bad tempers and delays." Id.
405. Tolliver v. Mathas, 538 N.E.2d 971, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); see also Kruszewski
v. Kwasneski, 539 N.E.2d 965, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Bank of N. Y. v. Bright, 494 N.E.2d
970, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 397 N.E.2d at 1006.
406. Delta Rice Mill Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 583 F. Supp. 564, 567 (E.D. Ark.
1984), aff'd, 763 F.2d 1001 (8th Cir. 1985) ("neglect and exercise of poor judgment" in commercial transaction "falls far short of constituting willfulness, wantonness, malice or conscious
indifference").
407. See, e.g., Hood v. Fulkerson, 699 P.2d 608, 611 (N.M. 1985) (negligent installation
of water lines breached plumbing installation warranty but no punitive damages); Dotlich v.
Dotlich, 475 N.E.2d 331, 345-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Tolliver, 538 N.E.2d at 977; Orkin
Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Traina, 461 N.E.2d 693, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (failure to supervise or fire employee amounted to willful and wanton misconduct warranting punitive damages), rev'd, 486 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (Ind. 1986) (evidence insufficient to support award of
punitive damages).
408. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 397 N.E.2d at 1006.
409. See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988) (ambiguous description of territory in truck stop franchise agreement resulting in "honest mistake"); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 606 P.2d 944, 956 (Idaho 1980) (auctioneer
mistakenly sold equipment at less than minimum price); Kruszewski, 539 N.E.2d at 967; Tolliver, 538 N.E.2d at 977; Bright, 494 N.E.2d at 977; Dotlich, 475 N.E.2d at 345-46.
410. Harper v. Goodin, 409 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
411. Id.
412. Tolliver v. Mathas, 538 N.E.2d 971, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Kruszewski v. Kwasneski, 539 N.E.2d 965, 967 (Ind. Ct. Ap. 1989); Dotlich v. Dotlich, 475 N.E.2d 331, 345-46
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
413. Davis v. Gage, 712 P.2d 730, 731 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
414. J. Yanan & Assocs., Inc. v. Integrity Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1025, 1033-34 (7th Cir.
1985).
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tor or to redirect business to oneself.415
C.

Conclusion

The Vernon-based decisions clearly and markedly emerge as concise and unequivocal pronouncements by some courts that a breach of
contract alone will support the recovery of punitive damages without
resorting to either the bad faith or independent tort doctrines, or by
taking refuge in any of the traditional "exceptions" to the general
rule. This method definitely possesses the benefits of avoiding the rigidities of orthodox doctrine and the complexities of legal inventions
necessitated by the other approaches. Moreover, this method serves
as a strong punishment and deterrent. As a result the author's proposed principle is based on this prescript.41 6
IX.

A.

PROBLEMS IN PROPOSING A JUST PRINCIPLE

Vague Standards

The nebulous nature of the standards for awarding punitive damages for breach of contract emerges as a particularly serious concern
in the current controversy as to the availability of such damages. Adherents to the orthodox rule raise the issue of vague standards to advance arguments in favor of maintaining the present rule prohibiting
417
the recovery of punitive damages in contract actions.
The imposition of potentially large liability in the absence of precise
standards, although obviously fulfilling a compensatory function, may
produce great uncertainty for all contracting parties. Moreover, the
interjection of uncertainty into the breaching party's calculation of
the costs attendant to the breach serves to diminish the deterrence
aspect of punitive damages.
The efficient allocation of societal resources might also be impaired.
Punishing conduct not clearly denoted as contrary to law impedes the
415. Id.; see also Reliable Tire Distrib., Inc. v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co., 607 F. Supp.
361, 373-74 (D. Pa. 1985).
416. See Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988) (underscoring "opportunistic breach" as the "common element in most of the Indiana cases that have

allowed punitive damages").
417. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 18, § 81, at 289-91; Ellis, supra note 54, at 39-40;
Farnsworth, supra note 59, at 1146-47. But see, Sebert, supra note 64, at 1661. "The 'chilling
effect' of punitive damage liability in contract actions is likely to be much less significant than
is feared by the critics of punitive damages." Id.
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predictability of risks and, therefore, affects an essential aspect of the
efficient operation of commercial transactions. If the prospective contract parties are disinclined to enter into an agreement which ultimately may result in unlimited liability, the parties may be deterred
from entering into contractual relations.
In addition to the potentially chilling effect punitive damages might
produce for commercial transactions, vague or non-existent standards
that fail to specify the conduct subject to civil punishment diminish
the fairness value of punitive damages. To compel a contract party to
guess what behavior a jury would find sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages certainly raises the social costs for their
imposition.
Admittedly, standards for awards of punitive damages are inherently difficult to elucidate, particularly in breach of contract actions.
Case law in general manifests a lack of precision as to the standards
the courts are applying. The current standards merely present a confusing and partial picture. In many cases, the distinguishing features
among "bad faith," "malicious," and "oppressive" conduct are more
theoretical than practical, and are frequently misconstrued, misapplied, or just ignored by the courts. To permit the recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract actions in a functional and fair
manner, it is imperative that the courts promulgate precise standards
for their recovery.
B. Substance Over Form
Some courts, although ritually incanting the traditional maxims,
treat the cases in such a fashion as to indicate the orthodox doctrine is
no longer taken seriously. In some jurisdictions, the alleged general
rule has become so perforated with exceptions as to contradict either
the influence of the traditional theories or the honesty of their usage.4"' Examination of these decisions indicates that some courts are
trying to make punitive damage law governing breach of contract
418. See Linscott v. Ranier Nat. Life Ins. Co., 606 P.2d 958, 963 (Idaho 1980); see also
Sebert, supra note 64, at 1649-50 (bad faith insurance cases primarily responsible for helping to
obliterate classical tort-contract distinction). "The general rule has never really been the inpenetrable barrier it has appeared to be. Many of the so-called established exceptions to the

general rule simply have afforded traditional courts more latitude in escaping the strictures of
the rule without seeming to violate it. In some jurisdictions, the so-called exceptions have been
construed broadly enough to raise doubts as to the continuing viability of the rule." Linscott,
606 P.2d at 963.
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similar to the law governing the commission of a tort. As the traditional bases supporting the orthodox rule are further rejected by
courts, the general rule in those jurisdictions will continue to dissolve
by the introduction of new exceptions and the liberal construction and
application of old ones.
The continuing use, however, of the standard "general rule exceptions" format poses problems. Perplexity perforce ensues from utilizing a harsh general rule and then for exemplary reasons adopting and
construing exceptions which render the orthodox doctrine altogether
meaningless. The extensive employment of exceptions to obviate the
general rule makes anticipation and logical analysis of these cases extremely onerous. Finally, this traditional format sows the seeds of
lamentable rulings. A court in a static and rigid jurisdiction may utilize the general rule and only narrowly apply the standard exceptions,
resulting in frequent miscarriages of justice.
The origin of the orthodox rule is apparently mixed up with the old
canard distinguishing actions in tort from actions in contract. Since
drawing a rigid line between contract and tort actions is a hazardous
undertaking at best, an award of punitive damages should not hang
upon so slender a thread as to whether a case sounds in contract or
tort. Moreover, a cause of action may inextricably combine tort and
contract elements.41 9 As the two areas of law are often intermixed, if
not inseparable, defending the traditional differentiations drawn in
punitive damage awards emerges as an increasingly difficult and intricate task. The major reason given for distinguishing between actions
in tort and actions in contract, when deliberating on punitive damages, is the adherence to the hoary tort-contract dichotomy. 2 °
In modern cases authorizing the award of punitive damages for
breach of contract, the court does not seem overly concerned with
whether the plaintiff's cause of action sounds in tort or contract. The
law manifestly should sanction the recovery of punitive damages
where the behavior of the breaching party signifies outrageous con419. See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1077, at 439; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1,
§ 92, at 655-67.
420. See Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt Assocs. Inc., 492 N.E.2d 181, 187 (Ill. 1986)

(Goldenhersh, J., dissenting) (artificial distinction needs to be acknowledge and excised from
law of Illinois); Kennedy & Duncan, Distributive and PaternalisticMotives in Contract and
Tort Law, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 591 (1982) (differences between tort and contract "mere
anachronisms, relics of an earlier form of false legal consciousness" that should not effect

outcome).
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duct, regardless of whether the claim is based in tort or contract. This
prefered solution directly addresses the problem of an outrageous
breach of contract by placing substance ahead of legal form.
C.

The Tort of Bad Faith

Although several jurisdictions utilize the tort of bad faith breach of
contract as the solution to the problems of undercompensation and of
punishing and deterring reprehensible conduct in a contract setting,
serious practical and theoretical problems ensue from the imposition
of this type of tort liability for breach of contract.
Primarily, the bad faith tort doctrine fails to differentiate between
the contractual breach of the implied convenant of good faith and fair
dealing and a bad faith breach of contract rising to the level of a tort.
Since every breach of contract contravenes the right of another party
to receive the benefits of the bargain, theoretically, every breach of
contract would also constitute a breach of the implied convenant of
good faith and fair dealing. On one hand, if courts uniformly construe any and all willful breaches of contract to equate to breaches of
the implied convenant, then every intentional breach must be regarded as tortious. Such a doctrine would seriously erode the fundamental bases of contract law and could totally supplant traditional
breach of contract law. On the other hand, courts cannot, on principled grounds, mandate tort liability for some breaches of the implied
convenant while merely imposing contract liability for others. Formulating rational restricting prescripts emerges as an arduous task
since the convenant is implied in all contracts.
The difficulty in formulating precise standards is further exacerbated by the inherent ambiguity accompanying the particular nature
of the implied duty of good faith. The expression "good faith" not
only lacks a precise definition, but the generally accepted definition
that the implied duty of good faith means to do nothing to harm is
necessarily vague.
Regardless of the theoretical inconsistency and the vagueness of the
terminology, the courts struggle, on a case by case basis, to effect the
bad faith tort determinations. Conduct rising to the level of a bad
faith tort, however, may manifest itself in a myriad number of forms,
yet the courts have not devised a precise set of standards which must
be met in order for tort liability to ensue. The unfortunate result is
that the bad faith tort has been employed with so little explanation of
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its essential elements that one is unable to derive an inclusive, functional definition from the caselaw.
Presuming a court has surmounted the theoretical and practical obstacles and has branded particular breach of contract conduct to be in
such bad faith so as to trigger tort liability, the court next would confront the punitive damage issue. That is, is the conduct that has been
found sufficiently unreasonable for the tort of bad faith so reprehensible so as to make punitive damages the appropriate remedy for the
breach? Courts appear to have difficulty in grasping the distinctions
between bad faith conduct breaching the contract covenant, unreasonable bad faith conduct giving rise to tort liability, and bad faith
conduct that is such a departure from the norm that punitive damages
are appropriate.42 '
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing does require that a contract party not do anything to deprive the other party of the benefit of
the bargain. Yet, it is not likely that the mere breach of this covenant,
even intentionally, will be sufficient bad faith to trigger tort liability
without an additional showing of unreasonableness, such as an intentional breach by a party with knowledge that it is asserting a dubious
claim. For punitive damage recovery, however, this bad faith, unreasonable, and thus tortious breach, must also exhibit an actual showing
of some of the traditional indicia for punitive damages. Otherwise, if
a tortious bad faith breach is not, for example, also malicious, punitive damages are too harsh a sanction.
Many courts, however, fail to undertake the rigorous analytical re421. See, e.g., United Am. Ins. Co. v. Brumley, 542 So. 2d 1231, 1238-39 (Ala. 1989) (bad
faith tort present but no punitive damage standard mentioned when court awarded punitive

damages against Medicare supplemental benefits carrier for intentionally failing to determine
whether there was lawful basis for paying claim); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Smith, 375
S.E.2d 866, 870-871 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (punitive damages awarded for bad faith conduct but
no mention as to bad faith as a tort); Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Peavy, 528 So.
2d 1112, 1115-16 (Miss. 1988) (punitive damages awarded but difficult to discern basis
thereof); Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Mass., 516 So. 2d 495 (Miss. 1987) (punitive damages awarded but unable to discern whether based on bad faith breach, malicious breach, bad
faith tort, bad faith aggravated tort, or gross negligence); Staff Builders, Inc. v. Armstrong, 525

N.E.2d 783, 788-90 (Ohio 1988) (instructions confused bad faith and punitive damage standards), reh'g denied, 533 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio 1988); Olbrich v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 469 N.E.2d
892 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (punitive damages for bad faith but bad faith standard equated with

traditional punitive damage standard); Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641,
643-44 (Tex. 1987) ("gross negligence" standard but not clear if gross negligence the standard
for initial breach of the tort duty of good faith or the punitive damage standard for aggravated
breach).
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sponsibility of precisely defining the breaching conduct in relationship
to the proper standard of recovery: bad faith breach of the contract
covenant, bad faith tortious breach, or bad faith-tortious-punitive
breach. Absent such an explicit analysis, punitive damage recovery
might unfairly chill legitimate conduct by imposing punishment disproportionate to the degree of culpability and might give the party
asserting the breach of the covenant a disproportionate economic
weapon to wield over the party avoiding or denying the obligation.422
Applying an amorphous bad faith doctrine, as well as stretching
established independent torts, begets judicial decision-making that fictionalizes the law and spawns uncertainty and instability. The integration of the bad faith tort doctrine into contract law, however, does
indicate that courts are increasingly discontented with traditional
contract remedies and are actively searching for routes by which to
escape the traditional restrictions on recovery in contract. A reasoned
approach to the problem, therefore, is to formulate precise criteria
that recognize the recovery of punitive damages, premised on the contract, for particularly outrageous breaches of contract. If the appropriateness of punitive damages, founded on the contract, is
forthrightly recognized, and firm criteria framed for their application,
the courts will not be compelled to resort to amorphous doctrines or
strained constructions to fit the facts of a particular case.
D.

The Special Relationship Requirement

The "special relationship," "special factors," and consumer protection doctrines, enunciated by courts and commentators as a device to
circumscribe punitive damage liability for breach of contract, are subject to several criticisms. On one hand, the doctrines are inherently
vague, expansive, and over-inclusive; they could justify tort-like liability for almost any breach of contract. On the other hand, the doctrines are under-inclusive; they23 too easily can be interposed to avoid
4
the issue of tort-like liability.
The special factors themselves, moreover, may not be particularly
meaningful in determining extra-contractual liability. The fact that a
contract is an adhesion contract is not relevant to the issue of outra422. Comment, supra note 293, at 1327-28 (excellent analysis of bad faith conduct as

opposed to punitive damage conduct).
423. Id. at 1299-1301 (thorough discussion and analysis of criticisms of special relationship doctrine).
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geous conduct in the breach of the contract. The fact that an industry
is highly regulated is not relevant to the issue of the effect of an outrageous breach on the victim and society. The fiduciary aspect of the
relationship should not be dispositive of the issue of extra-contractual
recovery, since a relationship of trust, confidence and dependence can
arise in any type of contractual relationship. The "special relationship" and "special factor" doctrines are, thus, inadequate to demarcate the boundaries of punitive damage liability.
The failure, furthermore, of contract remedies to sufficiently punish
and deter misconduct occurs in every type of contract, not merely
those designated as "special," or "consumer." The punitive damage
remedy, therefore, should be predicated upon outrageous misconduct
that violates moral norms, not upon the existence or nature of a special or consumer relationship.
The often enunciated distinction between commercial and noncommercial contracts, moreover, emerges as a specious one that no
longer should dominate the discussion of punitive damage liability.
The line between commercial and non-commercial contracts is not
clear. Many categories of contracts, for example, employment contracts, possess both commercial and non-commercial characteristics.
The desire for profit and the desire for security and peace of mind are
often mixed motives. In addition, elements of trust and dependence
may arise in a commercial contract setting, especially at the time of
performance.
Punitive damages for an outrageous breach of contract cannot be
divorced from the commercial contract cases on any principled basis.
Punitive damages must be predicated upon the contravention of societal standards of appropriate conduct, rather than upon the presence of
a specific type of contractual relationship.
Although the type of contract, relationship, or "factors," may underscore an exigency to punish and deter particular breaches of contract, these contractual aspects should not delimit the boundaries of
punitive damage liability. Therefore, the rule to be proposed herein is
not limited to the non-commercial, consumer, special relationship, or
special factor case. An aggrieved party should not be compelled to
prove that the parties to the contract had a particular relationship or
contract. The proposed rule is based on principles distinct from any
relationship, principally that a promise broken in an outrageous manner is so morally offensive so as to demand punitive damage
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liability.424
X.

RATIONALES FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT

A. Introduction
A potential avenue of redress that opens up to a victim of an outrageous breach of contract is the availability of punitive damages. The
purposes of punitive damages are to punish the wrongdoer and to deter others from engaging in the proscribed behavior. Punitive damages, moreover, serve a compensatory function. These purposes of
punitive damages are not incompatible with the purposes of contract
law.
B.

Compensation

Compensation, of course, aims to make the aggrieved party
"whole," that is, to compensate the nonbreaching party for consequent losses. Contract law is designed not only to compensate but
also to advance the market economy by affording the parties flexibility
in the area of breach of contract.
There is wide recognition, however, that traditional contract remedies fail to adequately compensate the nonbreaching party. To correct this problem of undercompensation, many commentators urge
that tort principles and tort damages, particularly punitive damages,
be expanded in certain circumstances into the arena of contract
4 25

law.

Punitive damages are enlisted into the service of compensating the
nonbreaching party due to the remedial limitations of contract damage law. The contract damages recognized by the common law are a
particularly imprecise reflection of the aggrieved party's actual losses.
The orthodox Hadley v. Baxendale426 rule prohibits recovery for consequential losses unless the breaching party knew of the particular
424. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984).
The California Supreme Court, in Seaman's, in a commercial setting, justified its holding that
"stonewalling" is a type of bad faith tort by proclaiming that the practice "offends accepted
notions of business ethics." Id.
425. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 2, at 445-46, 448; Speidel, supra note 2, at 195;
Sebert, supra note 64, at 1570, 1648, 1664-65.
426. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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risks at the time the contract was entered into.427 The expectation
measurement of damages serves as a cap on recovery, even when reliance losses exceed expectation.428 Undercompensation is also exacerbated by the restrictive requirement that the nonbreaching party
429
prove the certainty of damage and the foreseeability of loss.
Punitive damages also may redress the undercompensation that results from other restrictive aspects of traditional contract damages.
Damages for mental distress, for example, generally are not recoverable for breach of contract.430 Transactional expenses may have to be
paid out of the damages awarded for actual monetary loss. 431 Thus,
legal costs may emerge as a significant cause of the undercompensation of the contract plaintiff. In particular, a plaintiff that incurs substantial legal fees in enforcing contract rights, but receives only
ordinary contract damages, is definitely not made "whole.

4 32

A pro-

hibitively expensive legal system may even deter parties from enforcing their contract rights altogether. To offset expenses, such as legal
costs, that are not otherwise recoverable, punitive damages may be
awarded.433 Another example of undercompensation is illustrated by
the fact that prejudgment interest generally is not recoverable.434
Contract remedies, finally, do not compensate the nonbreaching party
if the nonbreaching party is wrongfully obstructed by the breacher
from utilizing the remedies.
The inadequacy of contract law to fully compensate the nonbreaching party has prompted courts to award damages other than, or
427. 9 Ex. at 355, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 351, at 135-36 (1981); Farnsworth, supra note 59, at 1200-01.
428. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349, at 124 (1981); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 12.16, at 888-90.
429. See Sebert, supra note 64, at 1662 ("relatively stringent certainty requirements").
430. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353, at 149 (1981).
431. Mallor, supra note 294, at 486-87; see also Sebert, supra note 64, at 1662.
432. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of CompensatoryDamagesfor Breach of
Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1444-45 (1980); see also Sebert, supra note 64, at 1662.
433. See Erhardt v. Leonard, 657 P.2d 494, 499 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (punitive damages
may be awarded to compensate plaintiff for necessary and reasonable attorney fees and expenses); see also Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988); Morrow v. L. P. Goldschmidt, 492 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Il. 1986)(Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
434. See Morrow, 492 N.E.2d at 185-86 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting) (discussion of effect
if punitive damages not awarded); see also Patton, 841 F.2d at 751; Sebert, supra note 64, at
1662. "Absent the assessment of punitive damages, a willful violator of a contract incurs no
sanction and bears only the costs of performance under the terms of the agreement. In many
instances, the sum awarded is not subject to prejudgment interest, and absent a specific provision, the wronged party cannot recover his attorney fees." Morrow, 492 N.E.2d at 185-86.
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in addition to, ordinary contract damages. In particular, tort remedies, with their more permissive requirements for providing damages,
have been employed as a device to fully compensate contract claimants. To the extent, however, that legal costs and fees are recoverable,
and that the consequential damage standard is expansively construed
by courts,435 the compensatory rationale is thereby significantly diminished. The compensation factor, therefore, emerges as a rudimentary foundation to support the recovery of punitive damages in a
breach of contract cause of action. The strength of compensation as a
rationale supporting the recovery of punitive damages hinges on the
power of the other two rationales - punishment and deterrence.
C.

Punishment

Punishment of the wrongdoer is another often stated rationale underpinning awards of punitive damages.436 In addition to punishing
the' wrongdoer, punitive damages express society's outrage towards
the misconduct of the wrongdoer.437 In the context of breach of contract, punishment is executed through the exaction of punitive damages. Awards of punitive damages in breach of contract cases also
display this feature of societal condemnation.
Clearly, contract disputes can engender outrageous conduct that is
particularly appropriate for a punitive damage sanction. Justice,
however, demands that punishment be imposed for conduct precisely
defined as wrongful.438 Unfairness ensues when the standards proscribing behavior are vague. Since the punishment rationale functions
as a principal pillar underlying the recovery of punitive damages in
breach of contract cases, the definitiveness of the standards for awarding punitive damages emerges as a paramount concern.
D. Deterrence
The purpose of punitive damages is not only to punish the wrong435. See, e.g., Lawton v. Great S. W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 580-81 (N.H. 1981)
(insurer who breaches implied contractual duty of good faith may be liable for reasonably
foreseeable consequential damages in excess of policy limits); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701
P.2d 795, 801-02 (Utah 1985) (expansive range of recoverable damages in excess of policy
limits foreseeable, including mental anguish damages).
436. See, e.g., DoBBs, supra note 19, § 3.9, at 205; MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 77, at
275, § 81, at 286; Ellis, supra note 54, at 8-10; Sebert, supra note 64, at 1664-65.
437. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 2, at 11-12.
438. See Ellis, supra note 54, at 9; Sebert, supra note 64, at 1664-65.
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doer but also to deter others from repeating the proscribed conduct.439 Deterrence effects a benefit to society by the reduction of
future misbehavior and the enforcement of agreeable social standards.
Punitive damages regulate future conduct by increasing the penalties
for misconduct." 0
In breach of contract cases, the threat of punitive liability will deter
immoral business practices. The availability of punitive damages
serves to constrain a dominant contract party from capitalizing on the
weaker party's condition." 1 Discouraging abuse of power is particularly appropriate at the performance stage, where the contract may be
essential to the personal or business interests of a party who does in
fact become dependent on the other's performance.
Deterrence is an especially convincing rationale when the breaching
party engages in a systematic course of misconduct that, even though
substantial in its entirety, is too slight in an individual case for the
aggrieved party to sue. Deterrence targeted at repeated institutional
misconduct that tramples the rights of individuals emerges as a forceful justification for exacting punitive damages.
The availability of punitive damages, finally, creates a strong incentive to perform one's contractual obligation or to admit liability. The
additional strong deterrent effect of punitive damages is particularly
appropriate in breach of contract cases due to the comparatively limited measure of compensatory damage recovery. The breaching party
may calculate in advance the expected liability and may have little
incentive not to breach when the expected liability for compensatory
damages is less than the actual harm caused by the breach. In such
cases, punitive damages can adjust the breaching party's calculation
442
and thereby promote deterrence.
Extremely large punitive damages need not be awarded to achieve
the desired deterrent effect. Rather, the awarding of smaller yet more
frequent awards might be the most proper method to prevent outrageous breaches of contract.
439. See MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 77, at 275; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1,
§ 2, at 9, 12; Sebert, supra note 64, at 1664-65.
440. See Ellis, supra note 54, at 8, 25, 77.
441. Ma~lor, supra note 294, at 485. The courts "have become more receptive in recent
years to the use of punitive damages in cases involving abuse of power in contractual relationships, and this new willingness reflects changing views about the responsibilities of those who
wield a high degree of economic power." Id.
442. See id. at 486-87; see also Sebert, supra note 64, at 1660-61.
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E. Conclusion
Punitive damages are appropriate to address willful, tort-like misconduct arising out of a breach of contract. By recognizing punitive
damage recovery, the courts will further the goals of compensation,
punishment, and deterrence. Compensation, however, does not provide a complete rationale for punitive recovery. Punishment and deterrence emerge as the most appropriate rationales for the imposition
of punitive damages. Punitive damages, of course, should not be
available for every breach of contract. The appropriateness of punitive damages for an outrageous breach of contract, however, can be
justified by the traditional policies underlying punitive damages. No
persuasive rationale presents itself for the courts to hold that outrageous misconduct arising out of a breach of contract should not be
punished and deterred in the same manner as outrageous misconduct
resulting in a tort.
XI.
A.

THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLE FOR THE RECOVERY OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

Introduction

Since deterrence emerges as the most significant rationale for the
recovery of punitive damages in breach of contract cases, the objective
in devising standards for such awards should be to strengthen the deterrent purpose. Present standards, however, only provide a partial,
and often perplexing, response. It is virtually impossible as well as
undesirable to catalogue the multifarious variety of contractual transactions and then attempt to tailor standards to fit categories of cases
and categories of defendants. Rather, flexible standards are necessary
in order for the law to adapt to new business practices. Therefore, in
formulating standards that strengthen deterrence, courts should tailor
the standards to fit categories of conduct.
Courts, of course, should treat immoral business practices more severely than legitimate contractual disputes. The type of misconduct
to be condemned and punished, although difficult to precisely categorize, should be made comprehensible. The breaching party's behavior
should be more than merely distasteful, sharp, or wrong. Rather, the
breach, by the nature of the contract, the breacher's state of mind, or
method of the breach, should entail outrageous conduct. To be properly imposed, punitive damages must not only be limited to the most
outrageous conduct, but also must be limited to situations where the
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defendant possesses some precise means to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct.
The solution, therefore, requires providing a remedy for a recognizable wrong, and assuring that a breacher is required to pay the higher
measure of damages only when the breacher's misconduct justifies the
heightened liability. Most importantly, the standard must distinguish
between misconduct which merely entails the breach of the contract
duty, rendering traditional contract remedies applicable, and outrageous misconduct accompanying the breach which contravenes punitive damage standards, rendering punitive damages applicable.
B.

The Principle - Outrageous Breach

The principle for imposing punitive damages for breach of contract
should call for a finding that the defendant's conduct amounted to a
separate and independent tort committed in an aggravated fashion,
and was fraudulent, or outrageous." 3 An outrageous breach is an intentional breach where the defendant maliciously or oppressively
caused harm to the plaintiff.
C.

Malice and Oppression Defined Under the OutrageousBreach
Principle

The malice requirement is satisfied by a finding of either actual or
implied malice. Actual malice is conduct by a defendant which is
intended to cause injury to the plaintiff. Actual malice entails the
performance of an intentional act, with an evil or rancorous motive,
prompted by hate, spite, resentment, or ill will, and for the purpose of
deliberately and willfully injuring the plaintiff." Implied malice is
conduct done by a defendant with conscious disregard, callous disregard, or in reckless disregard of a person's rights." 5 Reckless disregard involves knowledge of a risk which is substantially greater than
that which is necessary to render an actor's conduct negligent. ' 6 The
443. See Alaska N. Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33, 41 (Alaska
1983) (employing and defining an "outrage" standard); see also Linscott v. Rainier Nat. Life
Ins. Co., 606 P.2d 958, 965 (Idaho 1980) (employing and defining an "outrage" standard).
444. See e.g., Curtis, 560 P.2d at 172; First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 397 N.E.2d at 1006,
1008; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 2, at 10.
445. See e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mudgett, 397 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 2, at 10.
446. See, e.g., First Fed.Say. & Loan Ass'n, 397 N.E.2d at 1006-07; PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 34, at 213-14.
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implied malice standard, however, is a lesser standard 7than actual
malice and denotes a slightly lower level of culpability."
Malice, whether actual or implied, is a subjective standard which
necessitates an inquiry into the motive of the defendant. The subjectivity aspect of the malice standard renders the malice requirement
inherently difficult to meet. The difficulty is particularly present in
breach of contract cases, which, unlike tort cases, often lack the physical acts a jury can point to as disclosing the presence of a subjective
malicious intent. Wanting such physical manifestations, a jury will be
compelled to establish the motive by inference or by surmising the
state of mind of the defendant. The task of proving intent is particularly exacerbated in a case involving a breach of contract by an institutional or corporate defendant. The plaintiff will often be unable to
pinpoint the precise actor, let alone be able to offer proof of intent, in
an institutional or corporate context.
A subjective standard, such as malice, moreover, focuses on the evil
intent of the defendant and fails to concentrate on the outrageousness
of the defendant's conduct. Consequently, the primary purpose of punitive damages, the deterrence of reprehensible conduct, is not sufficiently promoted by adopting merely a subjective malice standard.
Accordingly, if a breacher's conduct is deemed oppressive, punitive
damages also are appropriate under the outrageous breach principle.
Oppression is the defendant's subjection of a person to cruel and unjust hardship." 8 Oppression, an objective standard, is more realistic
than, and thus preferable to, a subjective malice standard for outrageous breach of contract cases. Oppression, in examining actual
abuses of bargaining power and immoral practices, focuses on the acts
of the defendant in order to determine whether the plaintiff has been
subjected to cruel and unjust hardship. An oppression standard,
therefore, offers a practical, objective test to assess the outrageousness
of the defendant's conduct by turning the jury's attention from the
defendant's motive to the degree the conduct oppressed the plaintiff.
Although a malicious motive may not be demonstrated, if the defendant's acts oppress the plaintiff, it is the oppressive character of the
defendant's conduct that warrants the punitive damages. 4 9
447. See supra notes 364-368 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 366-368 and accompanying text.
449. Comment, supra note 293, at 1329 (distinguishing bad faith conduct from punitive
damage conduct).
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The oppression standard provides a more definite standard, not
only for the jury but also for reflective defendants, by which to judge
the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct. The oppression standard, in addition, permits the more precise standard to be applied to
cases that lack malice but still warrant an imposition of punitive damage liability. Oppression, therefore, more efficaciously fulfills the deterrent function of punitive damages and emerges as an essential
concomitant to the proposed punitive damage principle.
D. Malice and Oppression Distinguishedfrom Bad Faith
Malice and oppression denote, respectively, the presence of an actor's intent to cause harm and the presence of misconduct that causes
hardship. Although, admittedly, the precise meaning of these terms is
difficult to discern, the malice or oppression standard represents an
attempt justifiably to restrict punitive damages to cases exhibiting
clearly outrageous behavior.
Bad faith conduct, however, does not involve sufficient culpability
to warrant punitive damages. The actor's state of mind or the harm
caused under a bad faith standard renders the recovery of punitive
damages a disproportionate remedy. The bad faith state of mind does
not possess the necessary element of purposefulness or substantial
awareness that the victim will suffer severe consequences as a result of
the misconduct. Rather, the bad faith state of mind contemplates an
actor with an intent or knowledge to avoid liability, evade litigation,
or gain an advantage which litigation might not support. The bad
faith actor acts unreasonably; yet the actor need not intend to harm
the victim, and even may be ignorant of the consequences. Bad faith
conduct, although illegitimate and wrong, simply does not rise to the
outrageousness level needed for punitive damages.45°
Since bad faith satisfies neither the state of mind nor conduct requirements, punitive damages are not to be awarded for mere bad
faith conduct. Practical and theoretical policy rationales demand the
finding of either malice or oppression before punitive damages properly are recovered pursuant to the outrageous breach principle.
E. Determining the Presence of Malice or Oppression
In order to promulgate a fair and workable outrageous breach rule,
450. Id.
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one must attempt to determine the grounds sufficient to support a
finding of malice or oppression. The breaching party's possession of a
"good" reason for the breach, for example, inability to perform,
should not subject the breacher to punitive damage liability. Neither
good faith business judgment, even if mistaken, nor the honest, but
mistaken, assertion of a right is sufficient. Negligently asserting an
invalid position is insufficient, as is the purposeful assertion of a colorable but losing defense.
A mere intentional breach, standing alone, is insufficient to meet
the outrageous breach malice or oppression standard. The grounds
constituting malice or oppression must require more than merely not
fulfilling one's contractual obligation. Something more than a purposeful economic decision not to perform, which is really nothing
more than nonfeasance, is mandated under this malice or oppression
standard.
Even an intentional breach that entails the avoiding or denying
clear rights under the contract is insufficient. A breach committed
with the purpose of deriving financial benefits or profits is insufficient.
A motive of greed is not enough to trigger the standard. Finally, not
even an intentional breach of contract committed out of malevolence
towards the other contract party will satisfy the standard. Thus, the
question emerges as to just what grounds are contemplated that
would satisfy the outrageous breach standard and result in punitive
damages.
Punitive damages are warranted when a contract party, who is capable of performing, intentionally breaches the contract with the intent of causing the victim harm beyond the harm usually considered as
reasonably foreseeable for breach of contract. This rule coheres with
the traditional common law principles because, under the rule, an actor is assigned punitive damage liability only if the actor possesses the
intent to injure beyond the extent considered recoverable for breach of
contract under the Hadley v. Baxendale limitations. The rule also
coheres with the malice standard since the rule proposes a subjective
test that focuses on the intent of the breaching party. The breaching
party also must have the knowledge that he will be causing harm
which traditional contract damages will be inadequate to rectify. The
breacher need not possess the knowledge at the time the contract is
entered into, although such a requirement is a prerequisite for recovery under Hadley; rather, knowledge to a substantial certainty need
only come about by the time of the breach.
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Punitive damages are warranted, in addition, when a contract
breacher causes injury beyond that which is considered reasonably
foreseeable for breach of contract. This rule also coheres with the
traditional common law principles because, under the rule, an actor is
assigned punitive damage liability only if his actions go beyond the
Hadley limits. Such a rule also coheres with an oppression standard
since the rule proposes an objective test that focuses on the conduct of
the defendant in causing the harm as the key factor in determining
liability.
Punitive damages are warranted, finally, when the breaching party
purposefully seeks to obstruct, or does obstruct, the victim's ability to
pursue the expectation remedies and to receive the subtitutionary
value of the contract.451 Once again, such a rule coheres with the
common law limitations as well as with the malice and oppression
standards.
F. The Proposed Principle and the Common Law
The common law recognizes that a contract party possesses a justifiable expectation that either performance will occur or that a breach
will occur for which the nonbreaching party will be able to recover
damages incurred as a result of the breach.
Breaching conduct that equates to failure to perform or that impedes or frustrates the aggrieved party's right to performance can normally be remedied by ordinary contract remedies, for example,
recovery of expectation damages. Breaching conduct, however, that
intends to or does harm the victim beyond the victim's ability to obtain the substitutionary value for the performance, or that intends to
or does obstruct the victim's ability to seek the equivalent of performance, warrants the punitive remedy. An intentional breach, for example, by a defendant who is capable of performing, but who attempts to
avoid both performance and liability for non-performance for a contractual obligation recognized to be binding, by denying the existence
of the contract or asserting an illegitimate defense, for the purpose of
attempting to extract an unjustifiable favorable settlement, is a proper
case for imposing punitive damage liability under the proposed
principle.
The punitive damage standard proposed herein coheres with the
451. Id. at 1302, 1305.
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classical "efficient breach" theory. The traditional view that contract
damages should protect the non-breaching party's expectancy interest
is reinforced by the rules proposed herein in that punitive damages are
only warranted for conduct beyond the expectancy interest or in obstruction of the expectancy interest. Moreover, this proposal is in accord with classical doctrine in recognizing that a breach of contract
well may be a routine part of a contractual transaction by proposing a
standard that permits punitive damages for a breach only in outrageous situations.
The proposed principle also takes the "special relationship" and
consumer cases into account. When the relationship entails a disparity in bargaining power, and an ensuing imbalanced bargaining process, the potential for the dominant party to thwart the weaker party's
expectancy is high. Such impediment, of course, would materialize as
a key, but not exclusive, factor in determining punitive damage liability under the proposed principle.
A long line of cases pronounces that an intentional breach of contract, even if motivated by ill will, is insufficient for punitive damage
liability. The reason, of course, is that while the breacher does in fact
want to cause harm to the victim, the harm intended and the harm
caused is merely the breach of the contract; thus, the actionable
wrong is only the breach of contract for which ordinary breach of
contract remedies typically are sufficient. The proposed standard recognizes the orthodox rationale.
The proposed outrageous principle also recognizes that an intentional breach of contract, committed with the purpose of inflicting
injury beyond that which is considered reasonably foreseeable under
the common law limitations on contract damages, should warrant punitive damage liability. The reason, of course, is that since the actor
intends to cause harm beyond the breach of contract damages, the
actionable and punitory wrong is the intentional causing of the harm.
The breach of contract is merely the means by which the harm is
inflicted.
The proposed principle, finally, is consistent with those jurisdictions that strictly adhere to the independent tort "exception," because an actor who breaches a contract with the intent to cause harm
beyond that recognized by common law contract limitations is not
only breaching a private contract duty not to perform, but is also
breaching a public tort-like duty not to harm the other party. This
principle, therefore, does more than merely protect the contract inter-
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est in having promises performed or the substitutionary equivalent
paid. The principle also protects the tort interest in being free from
harm by imposing punitive liability for harm beyond that ordinarily
recoverable for a breach of contract that is intentionally committed.
The proposed outrageous breach principle, finally, coheres with the
traditional common law requirement of a finding of moral "fault," in
the form of extreme social unreasonableness, as a necessary condition
for punitive damage liability. The actor subjected to punitive damage
liability under this proposal is either personally blameworthy, because
he subjectively knows he is injuring the victim beyond recognized limits, or is objectively at fault because he has departed from acceptable
societal standards of conduct. Such "fault" creates the moral responsibility for punitive damages and coheres with the traditional common
law view that "fault" consists of a failure to meet an objective societal
standard of behavior or of personal blameworthiness. 2
G.

Conclusion

A primary purpose of this paper is to devise a fair and functional
approach to the awarding of punitive damages in breach of contract
cases. The author believes that the outrageous breach principle proposed herein fulfills that purpose. One recalls that important arguments against awarding punitive damages are that such damages will
discourage contractual transactions, undermine commercial stability,
and impede the free flow of commerce. Considering the precise, clear,
and strict guidelines proposed herein, and the rationales therefor, the
author feels that these legitimate fears should be allayed. The availability of punitive damages under such a clear and workable principle
plainly will put contract parties on notice that extremely immoral
business practices will not be tolerated by the law merely because
such practices are perpetuated in a contractual setting.
XII.

CONCLUSION

This complex and eventful area of law, punitive damages for breach
of contract, raises an important and elemental public policy objective:
how to solve the problem of outrageous conduct in contract relations,
without introducing uncertainty, inflexibility, and inefficiency into the
contract arena? Conflict, of course, exists between these objectives
452. Id. at 1307 (discussion of moral "fault" in the context of implied covenant).
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and a just solution necessarily comprises balancing one goal against
another. The seminal issue arises as to which of the principles examined-independent tort based on contract breach, tortious breach
of convenant, tortious breach of contract, breach of contract with
malice or oppression, or the author's outrageous breach of contract strikes the proper balance and, thus, best promotes the realization of
these policy objectives.
The author believes that the courts will be able to accomplish an
important mission by adopting the outrageous breach of contract
principle by introducing morality into contract law through the punishment and deterrence of clearly immoral breach of contract conduct. Thus, the principle represents a modification of the neutral
attitude of orthodox contract law toward the breach.
In order to avoid uncertainty and inefficiency, a principle must be
composed of precise rules. The principle also must provide the courts
with a uniform approach to resolving cases. The principle proposed
meets both of the previous criteria. Additionally, the principle proposed provides attorneys with a legal framework to analyze a client's
breaching behavior and to anticipate the outcome of a punitive damage action based on that conduct.
A jury, of course, will be necessary to make the final determination
as to the outrageousness of the conduct. Juries are assigned other
duties of rectification and this one does not appear to be any more
arduous, particularly since the court will be instructing the jury as to
the legal framework upon which to base their conclusion. The jury
must be trusted to distinguish an ordinary breach of contract, involving socially tolerable conduct, from a breach involving such outrageous conduct that the societal interest in punishment and deterrence
is triggered. A business person, tempted by an opportunity to commit
an outrageous breach of contract, surely will reconsider the action if
confronted with the possibility of suffering an adverse jury verdict
with a punitive element.
When a rule of law permits clearly immoral conduct, the courts
must reject it as unjust; when a rule of law no longer mirrors current
practices or moral standards, the courts must modify it. The law has
outgrown not only the rigid dichotomy between tort and contract in
the area of punitive damages for breach of contract, but also the strict
adherence to the general rule-orthodox exceptions methodology of
resolving recovery issues.
On principle, an outrageous breach of contract must be subject to
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punitive damages. Punitive damages must be rooted in the character
of a wrongdoer's behavior and not the technical term given to the
wrongful act. One contemporary inclination, as manifested by the latest "exception" to the general rule, is forcefully predisposed to discard
the difference between tort and contract and to comprehend that a
breach of contract, like a tort, is a proper subject for punitive damages. As a matter of public policy, sound morality, and justice, the
courts can no longer condone clearly immoral behavior merely because of the contractual context.
Contract law must be based on fundamental fairness and decency.
The law cannot provide a contract "cover" for immoral actions. Furthermore, punishment of immoral breach of contract conduct must be
a purpose of contract law. Consequently, the courts must update antiquated legal theories by imposing legal responsibilities anchored on
a heightened awareness of moral concerns and contemporary moral
standards. To do otherwise is to risk the pernicious effects of a commensurate diminution of individual moral responsibility and accountability and a concomitant diminution of respect for law.
The courts must be more receptive to the use of punitive damages
in cases involving abuse of power in contractual relations. The concentration of economic and other forms of power today exposes a
weaker contract party to outrageous conduct by a stronger contract
party. The courts especially must be attuned to the activities of those
who possess a great deal of economic power, and, accordingly, must
employ tactics to guard against the risks of abuse in economic
transactions.
The principle proposed herein emphasizes the value of morality.
The principle also seeks to combine efficaciously the value of morality
with the values of economic efficiency and individual freedom. The
author believes that the principle markedly enhances the clarity and
morality of existing doctrine in this area of damage law without impairing commercial transactions or individual initiative. The principle promotes personal morality while punishing and detering abuses
of superior power, economic tyranny, and morally outrageous misconduct. Most importantly, the principle serves to make contract law
just.
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